trustee for Mrs. Field for her separate use were assigned to Luke Marler, who was to stand possessed of the same upon trust for Mrs. Field for life, for her separate use, and on her death for the children of the marriage, and if there should be no children of the marriage, then upon trust for such person or persons as Mrs. Field should by deed or will appoint; and in default of appointment, for her next of kin. There were no children of the marriage. Mr. Field died on the 15th June 1865, and after his death the trustee in whose name the shares were standing, by the direction of Mrs. Field, transferred the shares into her name by a deed of transfer, which was executed by Mrs. Field and duly registered. Mrs. Field died in Jan. 1872, without having made any other appointment of the shares, and intestate. The plaintiff, who was the next of kin of Mrs. Field, claimed to be entitled to the shares, and one of the questions in the suit was whether the execution of the deed of transfer by Mrs. Field operated as an appointment to herself of the shares. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Hadley for the plaintiff. Southgate, Q.C., Alfred Smith, Fry, Q.C., and W. P. Beale for the defendants. Sir G. JESSEL held, that the execution of the deed of transfer operated as an appointment by Mrs. Field to herself. Solicitors: Robinson and Preston; Matthews and Matthews. Monday, Nov. 10. LINE v. HALL. Power of appointment-Appointment to object of the power for life, with remainder to his son, not an object of the power, in tail-Doctrine of cy près applicable. Commons, London. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Avon. Bolton-le-Moors. Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex. Dec. 24; NEWBERRY (Elizabeth), Poole Cottage, Randwick, Glouces- sex, gentleman, formerly a watchmaker. Jan. 1; H. SMITH (Rev. Edward), formerly of Ashley, Cambridge, late REPORTS OF SALES. Thursday, Nov. 6. By Messrs. NEWBON and HARDING, at the Mart. how and by what means the deceased came by his or her death; and that the police magistrates have no jurisdiction whatever to direct or authorise the production at an inquest of a prisoner committed to custody, under remand upon a criminal charge. And we are, therefore, not surprised to find that, in these respects, the decision of Re Reardon is confirmatory of our views. It was admitted as a matter of course that the magistrate did not possess this jurisdiction, how. ever convenient was the practice which, so long as it was uncontroverted, assumed the existence of a power in aid of an ancient tribunal, and in furtherance of the ends of municipal and of natural justice. By what procedure the reversal of this practice was decreed, need not now be said. By what illusory and needlessly aggressive arguments the inspiration of the Crown was propagated need not be recalled from the oblivion which may happily overtake the echoes of a policeoffice. But, if ever it should happen to be said that coroners' findings should not be regarded because coroners' juries have acquitted prisoners who were afterwards tried and convicted, it will be remembered that human imperfection prevails beyond the precincts of the coroner's court; that, but lately, a judge of our Court of Bankruptcy has had occasion publicly to denounce that meddlesome officialism which would arrogate to itself the conduct of prosecutions that have failed, to say the least of it; and perhaps attention may be directed to certain other inquisitions of office, instituted by governmental departments, encroaching less constitutionally on the functions of the ordinary criminal administration of the land. Fortunately, in Reardon's case the effort failed to secure his committal by the magistrate before the coroner's inquisition, and equally failed the effort to prevent his being present at the inquest. But we are bound to say that, when the matter came to be discussed before the Court of Queen's Bench, the attitude then adopted on behalf of the Crown was irreproachable. It was extremely expedient that the question involved should be presented for judicial consideration; the Crown did not oppose ex-officio, but, bowing to the discretion of the court, submitted that, lest justice might possibly be frustrated, special circumstances should be shown in order to warrant the granting of the writ; at the same time intimating that, in a proper case, the Crown would apply for the writ and save the prisoner the expense of doing so. This line of interposition was conceived in a most proper spirit, and was quite what was to be expected under the skilful and sensible auspices of the learned law GEORGE KILWORTH, by his will, dated the 1st of Jan., 1805, gave and devised an estate at Napton-on-Hill, in the county of Warwick, unto his daughter Elizabeth, the wife of Esmy Edward Hall, for life, and after her decease to the said Esmy Edward Hall for his life, and on his decease he gave and devised the same to all or such one or more of the children or grandchildren of his said daughter Elizabeth who should be living at the time of her decease, in such shares and proportions as the survivor of them, the said Esmy Edward Hall and his daughter Elizabeth should by deed or will appoint, and in default of appointment to all and every the children of his daughter Elizabeth in equal shares. Elizabeth Hall died in the year 1820, leaving the said Esmy Edward Hall her surviving, a son Giles Kilworth Hall, and three other children, but no grandchildren. Esmy Edward Hall made his will, dated the 18th March 1844, and thereby devised the said estate unto his son, the said Giles Kilworth Hall, for life, with remainder to the first and other sons of the said Giles Kilworth Hall, severally and successively, Life interest of a gentleman, aged 50 years, in £312 Three and the coroner so desire, and that, in the opinion according to their respective seniorities in tail male. The question in the suit was whether, as the children of Giles Kilworth Hall were not objects of the power, the doctrine of cy près was applicable, so as to give to Giles Kilworth Hall an estate tail. Fry, Q.C. and Batten for the plaintiff. Sir G. JESSEL said this was the very case where the doctrine of cy près should apply; the donee of the power had given to a child of an object of the power an estate tail, which the law would not allow. His Honour held that Giles Kilworth Hall took an estate tail. Solicitors: Peacock and Goddard; Taylor, Hoare and Taylor; Rickards and Walker. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. BULL (Henry W.), formerly of 12, Wilton-crescent, after- at twelve o'clock. at twelve o'clock. DEACON (Grosvenor), 155, Stanhope-street, Mornington crescent, Middlesex, gentleman. Dec. 1; E. Pope, solicitor, 12, Gray's Inn-square, Middlesex. Dec. 15; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. Gомм (Mary), formerly of Goodwyns, East Cosham, South ampton. late of Granville House, Nelson-street, Ryde, Isle of Wight, widow. Dec. 8; F. Jackson, solicitor, 55, Chancery-lane, Middlesex. HORN (John) Middleton-in-Teesdale, Durham, tailor and draper. Dec, 5; William Robinson, solicitor, Darlington. Dec. 12, M.R., at eleven o'clock. RUSSELL (John) Terhill House, Cheltenham, Esq, Dec. 8; C. J. Collins Prichard, solicitor, Bristol. Dec. 20, M. R., at twelve o'clock. STACKHOUSE (Thos.), Taitlands, Stainforth, Giggleswick, Settle, York. Jan. 13; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. late of 75, Lancaster Gate, Hyde Park, Middlesex. Jan. Jan, 21; M. R., at eleven o'clock. Soho.-Nos. 12 and 13, Macclesfield-street, freeehold-sold adviser. And we are sure that, acting in the same spirit, and acquiescing in the high authority of the decision in Re Reardon (a case which every coroner should peruse and perpend), the Crown will, in future, move for a writ of habeas corpus. to have any prisoner in attendance at a coroner's inquest, and so that he may there be examined as a witness, wherever it happens that the prisoner of the coroner and of the Crown, the presence of the prisoner would not tend to frustrate the ends of justice. But there remains another question of much secured upon a freehold estate of 248 acres-sold for moment. Is the police regulation to continue, £1975. Wednesday, Nov. 12. By Messrs. RUSHWORTH, ABBOTT, and Co., at the Mart. Regent's-park.-No. 21, Sussex-place, with stabling, term 48 years-sold for £2600. MAGISTRATES' LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISONS. HIGHWAY-NONUSER-LOCAL ACT.-A strip of land which has been declared by Act of Parliament to be a public highway will not of necessity become so until all the provisions of the Act for making and creating it have been strictly complied with. Where commissioners, by their award under a local Act, set out a public highway, but no road was ever made in pursuance of the award, and the proposed road always remained impassable to the public: Held, that the mere allotment of a piece of land by the commissioners was not sufficient to make it a public highway, and that all the regulations of the Act of Parliament must be complied with before it became such a highway as was in the contemplation of the Legislature, and before the parish could be called upon to repair it: (Cubitt v. Maxse, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 244. C. P.) THE PRODUCTION OF PRISONERS AT COMMENTING on the case of Re Reardon, the under which prisoners are to be brought, in the complications, may indeed arise from the provision that, when the inquest has concluded (eventuating, it may be, in acquittal), the prisoner is unconditionally to be remitted back to custody and so detained. When traditional usage is ousted and overriden_by_sudden reformations, without recourse to the Legislature, and some system has to be substituted forthwith as a temporary expedient, it is hardly possible to consider and provide for every contingency, and a judicial imbroglio becomes only too possible. Certainly, the conflict of concurrent jurisdictions which has been brought about is attended with extreme inconvenience, and may not improbably lead to a failure of justice, if not to positive injustice to individuals; while, it is anything but seemly and conducive to the due administration of justice that a public scandal should be created by the deliberate disregard of the coroner's authority, and the undisguised attempt to set above it that of an inferior court, and to subject it to the surveillance and half-contemptuous toleration of a police regime. What can be more grievously detrimental to the interests of justice, than the reiterated verdicts of jury after jury, denouncing this system and its unhappy results in case after case? What more lamentable, than to find a judicial personage-whose high office and functions are denoted by the fact that the Lord Chief Justice himself is our supreme coroner-flouted by a sub-constable, acting on his veritable or supposed instructions from the Castle, who refuses, as in the Marron case at Belfast, to receive the corroner's warrant to bring up the suspected person, until he obtains his superior officer's permission, and, that having been graciously accorded, perfunctorily deposits the warrant in his pocket, and takes it upon himself to pronounce a dead letter; while the jury append to their verdict a statement "that, owing to what they considered important evidence being deliberately kept back by the Crown authorities, they refuse to find such a verdict as otherwise might be warranted in the case." May not this state of things well recall the saying of Bentham, that it is even more important that justice should seem to be pure, than that it should be pure in reality? Were we not justified in our former paper, as it were almost by anticipation, in saying, as we now emphatically repeat: "If a function is no longer of public utility, it surely does not mend matters to permit the function still to be exercised, but to render its exercise so obnoxious, and the consequences of its exercise so invidious, that, in the course of time, it may come to be abated as a common nuisance. It may be that, as the constable permits a delinquent to proceed until he commits himself beyond yea or nay, so, the coroner is to be allowed to indulge in the discharge of his duties, under watchful police supervision, until the time comes for direct intervention in order to supersede the office of coroner altogether. But if the office is to be superseded (we trust that it will not), is this, too, only to be accomplished by waging a long conflict of authority with officers who are endeavouring to perform, to the best of their ability, an onerous, delicate, and ill-paid public service ?" HAMMERSMITH POLICE COURT. (Before Mr. BRIDGE.) Wednesday, Nov. 12. THE GASLIGHT AND COKE COMPANY v. O'BRIEN. The City of London Gas Act 1868-Revision of price-Operation of award of Commissioners. In this case Major O'Brien was summoned for arrears of gas rates amounting to £5 2s. 9d. made up of 2s. 6d. rent of meter, and 2s. 9d. charge for cutting off the gas, the residue being for gas supplied. F. O. Crump (instructed by Bartholomew) appeared for the defendant and first took objec. tion to the charge for cutting off the gas. The defendant had left his house and thereupon the company cut off the gas, for which they sought to charge. The company's officer referred to a section of their Act giving power to the company to cut off gas fourteen days after default made in payment duly demanded. Mr. BRIDGE held that under that section there was clearly no power to charge for disconnecting the pipes of a consumer who had ceased to occupy the house. The charge for gas was then disputed, and the company's officers based their claim on sects. 57 and 66 of the City of London Gas Act 1868. The former section says that if in the month of Jan. 1871, or any subsequent year, application is made. to the Board of Trade for a revision of the scale of illuminating power and price, commissioners shall be appointed; and by sect. 66 the commissioners so appointed shall, after hearing the applicants, fix an illuminating power and price, to take effect as on and from the 1st Jan. in the year of revision. Notices had been issued by the company early in December that the charge would be 5s. 5d. per 1000 feet, or such other price as might be fixed by the Mr. BRIDGE said that he should hold that the COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. bound. Upon appeal by the plaintiff to the Exchequer Chamber, the majority of that court (Blackburn, Keating, Brett, Grove, and Archibald, JJ., dissentientibus Quain and Honyman, JJ.), affirmed the judgment of the majority of the court below, and upon the same grounds; but Quain and Honyman, JJ., were of a contrary opinion, and held, with Kelly, C.B., that there was a good contract for the 800 tons, and that, therefore, the judgment below should be reversed. Per curiam," Reply by return of post," does not mean exclusively "reply by letter by return of post." A reply by telegram, or by verbal message, or by any means, not later than a letter sent by post, would reach its destination, would equally satisfy the requisition. Two persons each in ignorance at the time of what the other had done, write D letter to each other on the same day, the one offering to buy a certain article at a certain price, and the other offering to sell the same article at the same price. The letters cross each other in the post. The majority of the court (Blackburn, Keating, Brett, Grove, and Archibald, JJ.) expressed their strong opinion that such cross offers would not make a binding contract, and that the offers in one of such letters could not amount to an acceptance of the offer contained in the other: (Tinn v. Hoffman and Co., 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 271. Ex. Ch.) WINDING-UP-CONTRIBUTORY-TRANSfer of SHARES-ALLOWANCE FOR VALUE OF GOODWILL.-Application was made by the executors of a deceased shareholder, who had been settled on the list of contributories of a company, that B., who had formerly been a shareholder in the company, but had executed a transfer of his shares some time previous to the commencement of the winding-up, might be settled on the list of contributories. B. was a director when he executed the transfer, the validity of which was disputed on two grounds-first, that it was made in pursuance of a fraudulent scheme to relieve B. and some of his co-directors of their liability; and, secondly, that the provisions of the articles of association with respect to transfers had not been complied with. The deed of settlement required that upon a transfer of shares the consent of the directors 22nd Nov. 1871, the plaintiff wrote to the defen- should be obtained, that a certificate of consent for. In the said report, the accountant made no allowance for the value of the goodwill of the company as a going concern. A special meeting was not called, but the annual general meeting occurred soon after the said report was made. At that meeting the said report was not submitted to the shareholders, and the accounts laid before them did not show the true position of the company. The shareholders were, however, informed that the increased claims upon the company had so reduced the margin of profits that the directors were unable to recommend the payment of any dividend for the past year. Held (per Lord Cairns and Lord Hatherley, affirming the judgment of Lord Chancellor Hatherley; Lord Chelmsford and Lord Colonsay dissentientibus), first, that the transfer from B. to M. was valid; and, secondly, that the accountant ought, in his report, to have made an allowance for the value of the goodwill, and that in the absence of such allowance, the proof of the occur rence of the contingency contemplated by the deed of settlement, failed. Sect. 30 of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, enacts that the discovery of any defect or Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., Whitehorne, T. A. Roberts, | a considerable creditor of the intestate for goods and Charles Walker for debenture-holders, opposing the petitions. Davey, for the trustees of a deed securing the debentures. supplied, being unable to obtain payment of his debt from the plaintiff, sent round to some of the weavers who had pieces in their possession, paid them the debts for which they held the pieces as security, and they gave up the pieces to him, and these he endeavoured to sell or otherwise make available for his debt, to the prejudice of the defendant and other bonâ fide creditors of the in Sir G. JESSEL made the usual order to wind. up the company, as no evidence was before him as to what had been done since the last adjournment, and he must therefore assume that the respondents had neglected to avail them-testate. Under these circumstances the plaintiff selves of the indulgence extended to them on the error in the appointment of a person acting, or who may have acted, as a director, or that such person was disqualified, shall not invalidate acts done by him either alone or jointly with other directors before such discovery. Per Lord Cairns. -That the error of the directors in being satisfied with the execution of the transfer by a person becoming a director instead of requiring the execution of a deed, was such an error as was contemplated by the above section, and that all the acts done by the directors before such discovery were consequently valid and binding on the company. The case having been decided after so much difference of opinion, and the parties having been to a great extent responsible for the irregu-Lewis, Munns and Longden. larity and confusion that occurred, no order as to costs was made. (Murray v. Bush, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 217. H. of L.) former occasion. Solicitors, H. W. Vallance; Wilkinson and Son, REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DEBENTURE PAYABLE TO BEARER-NEGOTIABILITY PROMISSORY NOTE.-A debenture of a limited company, registered under the Companies Act 1862, payable to bearer on a particular day in the year 1872, with interest in the meantime, but liable to be "drawn" and paid off before MISSING WILL-PRESUMPTION OF REVOCAthat time, was sold by the company to M. in MayTION-EVIDENCE-DECLARATION OF TESTATOR. 1869, and stolen from him in July of the same -A will, which had remained in the custody of the testator since the time of its execution, was year. Plaintiff, at the end of the year 1871, purchased from one S., who had since absconded, pounded, and evidence of declaration was admitted not forthcoming at his death. A draft was prothis debenture, which had been "drawn in Oct. to show an intention to adhere to the will. On 1871, and demanded payment thereof from the the other side evidence was offered to show that company; but the company, having received the testator did not intend to leave his property notice from M. of the debenture having been in the manner in which it was disposed of by his stolen from him, refused to pay it to the plain- will, and that he had destroyed it by burning it. tiff, who brought an action against the company Held, that such declarations were admissible, not to recover the amount of it. It was found at the as evidence of destruction, but of intention not trial that the plaintiff had become the holder of to adhere to the will: (Keen ▼. Keen and others, the debenture for value, and without notice, and 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 247. Prob.) that similar instruments had been treated as negotiable: Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Even if the instrument had not been under seal it would not be a promissory note on account of its liability to be drawn and paid off before the t me mentioned; and the custom of treating such instruments as negotiable, being recent, could not alter the general rule of law: (Crouch v. The Credit Foncier of England (Limited), 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 259. Q.B.) SETTLED ESTATES-INTERIM INVESTMENT OF PURCHASE MONEYS.-The purchase-money of land sold under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act is cash under the control of the court for the purposes of investment under the General Order made in pursuance of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 10. Re Thorold's Settled Estate (L. Rep. 14 Eq. 31), followed; Re Boyd's Settled Estates (L. Rep. W. N., 1873, p. 113; 55 Law Times, 100), dissented from: (Re Taddy's Devised Estates, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 243. V.C. M.) PORTIONS-ADVANCEMENT-GIFT OF SHARE OF RESIDUE BY WILL SATISFACTION. A grandfather's will contained a trust term for CORPO-raising portions for his son's younger children, and provided that in case the son should at any time during his life advance or pay any sum of money to or for the use of any of his younger children, then, unless the contrary should be directed by him, any sum so advanced should be in full or part satisfaction of the portion to which the younger child would have been entitled under the grandfather's will: Held (reversing the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that a gift by the son's will of a share of residue to one of his younger children was not a payment or advancement within the meaning of the proviso: (Cooper v. Cooper, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 321. Ch.) ROLLS COURT. Saturday, Nov. 8. Re LONDON AND AUSTRALIAN AGENCY RATION (LIMITED); Ex parte BLAKE, COOK, AND CLAPHAM. Company Voluntary winding up-Three petitions -Liquidators-Supervision order. IN August last Mr. Blake, a holder of twenty-five shares in this corporation, presented a petition for a compulsory winding-up order. Two other petitions-one by Mr. Cook and one by Mr. Clapham-by much larger shareholders, were filed about the same time praying for a supervision order. Summonses to appoint liquidators were adjourned in order to give the company time to hold meetings. Accordingly a very numerouslyattended meeting was held, when it was resolved to wind-up voluntarily, and to appoint the secretary, Mr. Latchmore, and Mr. Ford liquidators. At a subsequent meeting these resolutions were confirmed. The petitions now coming on to be heard, Roxburgh, Q.C. and F. C. J. Millar, in support of a compulsory winding up, contended that the appointment of liquidators was invalid, as having taken place at the first meeting, and asked that any order to be made should be made on Blake's petition as having been the first advertised, though not the first presented. Waller, Streeten, Southgate, Q.C. (Graham Hastings with him), Fischer, Q.C. (Somers Lewis with him), Langworthy and Law for other parties. Sir G. JESSEL made one order on the three petitions for continuing the winding up under the supervision of the court, and gave the costs of the three petitions. The carriage of the order was given to Mr. Cook, though advertised after Mr. Blake's petition. Solicitors: J. J. Darley; Mercer and Mercer. COUNTY COURTS. BRADFORD COUNTY COURT. (Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q.C., Judge.) HARTLEY (Administratrix) v. THOMPSON. Administration-Transactions with adminis trators. A transaction with a person entitled to adminis. tration not validated after administration un less for the benefit of intestate's estate. After a decree in Chancery for the administration of the intestate's estate, the administratria is not at liberty to ratify, or refuse to allow an action to be brought in her name to defeat the transaction: (see Williams on Exors. 391, and the authorities there referred to.) Phillips, instructed by Dawson and Greaves, Bradford, for plaintiff. Robinson (Berry and Robinson), Bradford, for defendant. Re WESTERN OF CANADA OIL, LANDS, AND WORKS COMPANY (LIMITED). Company-Adjournment of petitions to wind-up-for No steps taken-Order made. THE two petitions in this matter now came on for hearing, having been adjourned by the Lord Chancellor on the 4th August last, as reported in our issue of the 9th August, with a view to giving the company an opportunity of inquiry or arrangement. It will be remembered that the petitions had been filed by debenture-holders in respect of interest due on their charges. It now appeared that nothing had in the mean time been done, except sending to Canada a person who has not yet made any final report. Bagshawe, Jackson, Q.C., and Locock Webb for the petitioners. Hon. R. Butler supported the petitions. His HONOUR.-This was an action of detinue the illegal detention by the defendant of certain stuff pieces, the damages being laid at £50. The plaintiff is the administratrix of Joseph Hartley, who died on the 13th Sept. 1872, intestate and insolvent. He was a stuff manufacturer in a small way of business, and employed weavers who wove his pieces at their own homes on commission. The defendant was one of such weavers, and at the intestate's death was a creditor for work done as a weaver, for £40, or thereabouts. Several of the other weavers in the village were creditors for work done as weavers, and had woven pieces in their possession which they claimed and were entitled to retain by way of lien as security for their debts. Shortly after the intestate's death, one Bently, who was and the defendant, on the 2nd Oct. 1872, consulted Messrs. Dawson and Greaves, of Bradford, as to the proper course to be adopted to protect the estate for the benefit of the creditors, and the advice given was that the plaintiff should take out letters of administration with as little delay as possible, and that in the mean time money should be found by some friend to take the pieces out of the hands of the weavers on payment of the debts due to them, and thereby secure the surplus value of the pieces for the benefit of the estate, and the suggestion was made that the defendant should find the money for the purpose, but he did not then agree to do so. The solicitors then received instructions from the plaintiff and defendant to prepare the necessary documents for The defendant agreed to be one of the sureties in the obtaining letters of administration. administration bond, and a Mr. Waterhouse was named as the other. On the following day (3rd Oct.) the plaintiff, defendant, and Waterhouse, called and executed the bond and other necessary papers, and the grant of administration 27th Oct., some delay having occurred in remitwas afterwards duly obtained, but not until the ting the money required for payment of the stamp and official fees. On the 7th Oct. the defendant, of the weavers who held pieces, upon which they accompanied by the plaintiff, went round to several had liens, paid them the sums due to them, and took from them the pieces they then held. The sum paid by the defendant amounted to £15 28., and the pieces taken by the defendant are the pieces for the detention of which the action is brought. Early in November 1872, an administration sum. mons was taken out in Chancery by a creditor for the administration of the intestate's estate. This summons was served on the plaintiff. She took it to her solicitors, Messrs. Dawson and Greaves, who appeared for her upon it; and on the 11th Nov. the common decree for the administration of the intestate's personal estate was made. The usual advertisements were afterwards issued for creditors, and under them the defendant made a claim as creditor for £61 10s. 6d. (which included the £15 2s. paid by him to the weavers), and this claim was duly allowed. The defendant having the pieces in his possession, Messrs. Dawson and Greaves, as solicitors of the plaintiff, by the direction of the chief clerk, applied to the defen. dant to deliver the pieces to them for the purposes of the administration, offering to pay him the money he had advanced to pay off the weavers with interest and costs. The sum actually offered (and which Messrs. Dawson and Greaves were ready to pay defendant) was £18, which was more than sufficient for those purposes. The defendant refused to receive the money or to deliver the pieces. He insisted upon retaining them; his words were, "He would not have the money; he would stick to what he had got." He was then asked whether he had the pieces in his possession. He said he had sold some, not saying how many or for how much, and the rest he had, and they were worth £40 and £50. This course of proceeding by the defendant having been communicated to the chief clerk, Messrs. Dawson and Greaves, as solicitors for the plaintiff, were directed to bring this action in the name of the plaintiff. After being served with the summons the defendant communicated with the plaintiff, and prevailed upon her to endeavour to stop this action by giving a notice to the registrar of this court that the action had been brought without her authority, and he procured an attorney at Leeds to draw up a notice to that effect, and which the plaintiff signed, and this notice has been put in evidence by the defendant, with some correspondence which afterwards passed between the attorney and Messrs. Dawson and Greaves upon the subject. If the plaintiff had adhered to the notice she was thus induced to sign, she would through her ignorance have been led into committing a contempt of the Court of Chancery, for which she would have been liable to be committed, and if not actually imprisoned, would have subjected herself to the payment of what to her would have been a large sum for costs. The facts as stated by me have been proved upon the evidence of the plaintiff and Mr. Greaves, and the plaintiff, as far as she could, showed her willingness to acknowledge a right in the defendant to retain the pieces to cover his own debt. And on behalf of the defendant it was urged that, as the defendant took possession of the pieces in question with the authority of the plaintiff, although that transaction took place before the grant of administration, yet as such grant was afterwards obtained, and before the name. withdrawing from the case, and it was not for his Marshall submitted that it rested with an at- NORTHAMPTON COUNTY COURT. Wednesday, Nov. 3. Ex parte RINGROSE; Re GIBSON. Bill of sale-Stock in trade purchased since the bill-Liquidation. THIS case raised some important points in connection with the subject of bills of sale. It ap peared from the affidavits filed in the case, that Mr. John F. Gibson, draper, of Long Buckby, in consideration of £120 advanced to him by Mr. John Ringrose, of the same place, assigned by bill of sale to the latter gentleman, in May 1872, all the stock in trade and furniture which to him were or thereafter should be on his premises, as security for the repayment of the said sum. There was a power given to Ringrose to take peaceable possession of the property after default made by Gibson in payment on demand. On the 4th August in this year Ringrose demanded payment of the £120 to be made on the 8th. Gibson did not pay, house, and told him he intended to realise and on the 9th Ringrose went to Gibson's his security. On Gibson's representations, however, Ringrose consented to wait until the 11th to see if Gibson could find a person to purchase the goods privately, so to enable him to repay Ringrose. No purchaser being found, on the 11th Ringrose said he should at once realise his security. There wes some conflict of testimony as to what passed at the latter interview; but it appeared that early on the morning of the 12th Gibson went to Northampton after sending a letter to Ringrose to inform him of the fact. Ringrose at once instructed Mr. North, an auctioneer, to take possession and sell the goods. North proceeded to Gibson's house at ten in the morning of that day, and, finding the house locked, was unable to seize the property. At two p.m. Gibson filed his petition for liquidation of his affairs; a receiver was at once appointed, and at about six p.m. the receiver took possession, and was immediately followed by rose. It appeared that nearly all the stock in trade then on the premises had been purchased since the execution of the bill of sale. as decree in the administration suit was made, the transaction which would have been good at law if it had been completed after the grant, would be validated by relation, and Williams on Executors, p. 391 (6th edit.), was relied on as an authority for that proposition; but on examination it will be seen that the cases there referred to are exceptional instances and do not support the defendant's contention. And in the same work the cases of Doe v. Glenn (1 Ad. & Ell. 49) and Morgan v. Thomas (8 Ex. 302) are cited, which show that the relation exists only in those cases in which the act done is for the benefit of the estate, or there be fraud; as where a man takes goods as executor de son tort, sells them, receives the purchasemoney, then takes out administration and brings an action to recover the very goods he has sold and been paid for. Here the estate was benefited only to the extent of the money paid by the defendant to redeem the pieces from the weaver's, and that money the defendant has been offered before action brought and he refused it, insisting upon retaining the pieces for his whole debt, thus doing the very wrong which he complained of when done by Bently, and thus making his detention a wrongful act as to the whole. There being evidence that the value of the pieces he now has is between £40 and £50, and the defendant not having given any evidence as to how many pieces he sold or what he received for them, I am justified as against the defendant as a wrongdoer in treating the value of the whole of the pieces detained by him as £50, and judgment will be entered against him for that sum, with costs. Although the defendant refused the offer to pay him his advances, he may still have a claim in equity to be repaid that sum, which claim he may bring forward in the administration, but over that I have no jurisdiction or control. If, however, the plaintiff is authorised and consents to make the deduction now, and the amount can be agreed upon, the judgment may be reduced accordingly, and the judgment may be still further reduced, if the defendant will give up the pieces he now holds In this case the plaintiff is a road-maker, and the North, who also put in a man on behalf of Ringand their value can be agreed upon, such value being the amount of the further deduction, but unless these matters are consented to, the judgment will be entered for £50 and costs; and the defendant will take such further steps elsewhere as he may be advised. If the Judicature Act were now in operation I could give complete relief, but at present I have only the jurisdiction of a Court of Common Law. CHELTENHAM COUNTY COURT. (Before C. SUMMER, Esq., Judge.) Costs in interpleader-Application. F. Marshall applied for costs in this case. His Honour would remember that a short time ago he committed a young gentleman named Maule for a term for non-payment of a judgment debt. It having come to Mr. Solomon's knowledge that Mr. Maule had an interest in a horse, the animal was seized instead of executing the warrant of commitment, but Mr. Morse subsequently claimed it as his, and under circumstances that led him (Marshall) to believe it was nothing less than a conspiracy between two or three who were concerned in it to make out the horse to be his property, and not Maule's. He had had a great deal of trouble in getting up the case, and had examined fifteen witnesses, several of whom he subpoenaed, and it was only within the last three days that Mr. Gabb, Mr. Morse's attorney, had sent him a note saying he disclaimed the horse. He therefore asked his Honour to order costs as in an ordinary case. Gabb, on behalf of Mr. Morse, submitted that it was not a case in which his Honour ought to order costs, the circumstances being somewhat peculiar. The Registrar explained to his Honour the circumstances under which the action was brought. The horse was seized by Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Morse paid the amount into court, under protest, in order to recover possession of it, and then brought the present action, which he had since withdrawn from. Marshall said the action was withdrawn last Tuesday, after all the work had been done. Gabb then submitted whether his Honour had power to order costs. The money which Mr. Morse had paid to redeem the horse had been paid into court, and then they had withdrawn the case, and had given notice they had withdrawn it. It was a case in which Mr. Marshall's client ought to think himself very fortunate if he got the money at all, and if it had gone on, there was some doubt what the result would have been. His HONOUR.-So Mr. Marshall says. Gabb, resuming, said at all events the matter was arranged, and there was no object in bringing it into court. There were, he submitted, no rules to enable his Honour to order costs as in an ordinary action. The plaintiff had the power of His HONOUR had no doubt he had the power to allow costs in a case of interpleader, as well as other actions. He thought for this purpose the 174th rule made summonses in interpleader cases operate exactly as summonses in ordinary cases. He therefore thought that the notice of abandonment not having been given within five days, the execution creditor was entitled to costs. With regard to the point Mr. Gabb stated that it was necessary he should ascertain what witnesses were material, it would be very inconvenient for him to do so. He thought the much more convenient course was to leave it to the Registrar, and if either party was dissatisfied the matter might then come before him by way of appeal; and if it should be considered necessary, he should be glad to confirm the ruling of the Registrar. Costs to follow, as in ordinary cases. WILLIAMS v. CHESSHYRE. Liability of attorney for expenses of witness. defendant a solicitor. The action was brought to in which he alleged Mr. Chesshyre required his recover £2 2s., the plaintiff's expenses in a case attendance. Stroud, who appeared for the plaintiff, stated that the case arose out of an interesting law. suit, in which his friend was concerned for Mr. J. B. Ferryman, who was summoned before the magistrates at the instance of the town commissioners, for not paying the demand made upon him for the making of certain roads in Nauntoncrescent. His friend carried the case to a successful issue, and before the case came on at the police-court he employed the plaintiff. Chesshure: "Mr. Ferryman emploved him."] Well, Williams's case was that Mr. Chesshyre employed him, and that he told Mr. Chesshyre he had several men at work at Prestbury, but Mr. Chesshyre said, "You go along and see this road, and I will pay you what is fair and reasonable." Upon that his friend took Williams to the locus in quo, and there he made his investigation, and afterwards attended before the magistrates, and he (Stroud) believed that Williams was one of the chief means whereby his friend obtained his triumph at the police court. For that Williams had made his charge of two guineas, and his Honour would say whether it was reasonable. The other question was whether Mr. Chesshyre was liable. The plaintiff was sworn, and bore out this statement. He created laughter by stating that the reason Mr. Chesshyre would not pay him was because he would not swear there was only lin. of stone on the road when there were 3in. Chesshyre said, "You come, and whatever you charge I will pay you." Mr Chesshure, the defendant, was sworn, and stated that he was concerned in the case referred to for Mr. Ferryman, who was a gentleman of fortune. Before the case came on he recommended Mr. Ferryman to have a road-maker to examine the roads, and accordingly Mr. Ferry. man himself went to Mark Williams, and they went together to the road. He wrote to Williams and told him that Mr. Ferryman would pay him what was right, but a charge of two guineas was absurd. He said he would advise Mr. Ferryman shyre) never promised to pay him personally, to pay what was reasonable, but he (ChesMr. Ferryman was a gentleman of fortune and able to pay his own witnesses, and was quite willing to pay any reasonable charge. His HONOUR, with regard to the general question as to the liability of an attorney to pay a witness's expenses, said he was not liable unless he made himself so. He did not like to decide the case simply on the ground that the plaintiff was bound to make it out, and had left it in doubt. He thought he ought to take the bolder course, and say the defence was made out. He did think that Williams believed he was employed for Mr. Ferryman; but he could not see why he preferred Mr. Chesshyre's credit to the principal's in the Hensman (Norfolk circuit), instructed by Leake, of Long Buckby, now asked the court for an order that the furniture and the proceeds of the stock in trade, which had been since sold, should be given up to Mr. Ringrose. He argued that although at law goods not in existence could not be assigned, yet that there was a sufficient "new act on the part of Gibson to show his intention that the after acquired goods should pass to Ringrose, but if not, such goods, as soon as they came on to the premises, passed to him in equity. That being so, were they the goods of sition of the bankrupt, with the consent of the true another person in the possession, order, and dispoThe bankruptcy commenced at two p.in. on the owner at the commencement of the bankruptcy? all that was lawful and reasonable in trying to 12th August, but at ten a.m. Ringrose had done take possession. He therefore did not consent to Gibson's possession. Shoosmith, on behalf of the trustee for the that Ringrose had not done all he could to get creditors, opposed the application, and contended possession until the last moment. He ought to possession. He had allowed Gibson to remain in have seized on the 8th of August. As to the after acquired goods, Gibson had not consented to their passing to Ringrose. The property in them therefore remained with Gibson. Numerous cases were quoted during the argument. His HONOUR said the case was one of conit had lasted a long time its nature fully justified siderable importance and difficulty, and although that fact. He was of opinion, however, after carefully considering the arguments, that Ringrose was entitled to the whole of the stock in trade and furniture on the premises at the commencement of the bankruptcy, and made an order accordingly. READING COUNTY COURT. (Before J. H. STONOR, Esq., Judge.) WILSON v. GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COM PAVY. Carriage of goods-Personal luggage. THE plaintiff in this case is a horse dealer living in Reading, and the action was brought to recover £14, the value of some horse clothing belonging to the plaintiff which the defendants lost at Chester, in course of conveyance from Reading to Holyhead, on the way to Dublin. Gledhill appeared for the plaintiff. The defendants were represented by Mr. Mason, from their Paddington office. Gledhill stated that the plaintiff was from time to time going to Ireland to purchase horses, and in the winter time he took with him sets of horse clothing, which he put upon the horses he purchased. He had taken them as passengers' lug. gage. On 30th Sept. 1872 plaintiff took a third class ticket to Dublin, seeing the horse clothing put into the van at Reading and at Chester, where, in the removal from one train to another, the clothing was lost. Plaintiff looked for it in the Holyhead train and missed it. The nature of passengers' luggage was decided in the case of McCrow v. The Great Western Railway Company. The facts were not disputed. No objection was raised to the quantity, and the defendants had notice that it was horse clothing. Mr. Mason contended that by 5 & 6 Will. 4, Great Western Railway Act, a passenger could only take with him 40lb. weight of articles of personal clothing, and the company were not answerable for merchandise or anything else. He argued that this horse-clothing was merchandise. His HONOUR: I don't think it is creditable for the company to take such a course. It is right that it should be generally known that nothing is safe on the Great Western Railway except articles of personal clothing. If a gentleman, say a barrister, takes books, or another gentleman a gun, they are not safe on the Great Western Railway. Gledhill I take it that this Act must have been repealed; a first-class passenger is now allowed 112lb., a second-class passenger 70lb., and a third-class passenger 561b. His HONOUR.-I will adjourn the case, if you like, to look into the law. Gledhill.-Will your Honour go into the facts of the case? It has been adjourned two courts from no fault of plaintiff's, and the facts are not disputed; so as to avoid the necessity of his coming here again. The plaintiff was then examined by Gledhill. He said: I took a ticket on 30th Sept, 1872, to go to Dublin, with four sets of horse-clothing, rolled up in the ordinary way. I gave them to the porter, and saw them labelled to North Wall, Dublin. I had been in the habit of travelling by defendants' line to Dublin for two or three years. I always take horse-clothing in the winter time. I have not been refused to be allowed to take them as luggage, nor has the weight been complained of. I saw the luggage in the van at Reading. I asked the porter to remove the clothing at Chester into the Irish train. I found it was not removed into the Irish train, and "blew" the porter up, and told the station master, and he said he would telegragh for them, and I asked him to send them to Dyson's repository, Dublin. I went to Balinasloe fair, which lasted a week. The horse clothing was not forwarded to Dublin. When I got back to Chester the station master said it was forwarded to Dublin. Then they asked me where they should send it to, and I gave them my address. I have not seen it to this time. His HONOUR refused to allow Mr. Mason to cross-examine the plaintiff, stating that the company ought to be represented by a professional SWANSEA COUNTY COURT. Monday, Nov. 3. (Before T. FALCONER, Esq., Judge.) LEWIS AND WIFE v. WILLIAMS. Construction of will-Vesting of legacy. Arthur Williams, of the South Wales Circuit, instructed by Brown and Collins, appeared for the plaintiffs. Howell, Llanelly, for the defendant. His HONOUR gave the following judgment: In this case I forced on the hearing at the last court, and the result illustrates how easily the facts of a case can be ascertained without the formality of pleadings. One David Williams, who died in 1855, in his will dated the 24th May 1863, devised and bequeathed to his wife Anne, a certain farm called Ffolsyrefel, and an annuity of £6 for the term of her natural life should she continue unmarried, and he devised the same farm to the defendant, his grandson William Williams, and his heirs after his wife's decease, on condition that the first two years' rent should be paid to the testator's daughter, Anne Morgan, widow, and subject to a sum of £14, to be paid annually to his son William, during his life, which was to commence two years after the defendant had possession of the said farm. Anne, the wife of the testator, died in 1870, but Anne Morgan, the widow and the daughter of the testator, died two years before her mother-namely, in 1868. It is alleged by the plaintiffs, who are the personal representatives of Anne Morgan, the daughter, that during two years next after the decease of Anne Morgan, the testator's widow, the said farm was let for £50 a year, and it is prayed that it may be declared that the defendant is a trustee of this amount of the rents for the two years next after the decease of Anne Morgan, the daughter of the testator, for the plaintiff, Sarah Anne Williams. There is no interest given by the will to the The plaint was therefore dismissed. BANKRUPTCY LAW. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Selborne) and Ex parte COTE; Re DEVEZE. daughter Anne until after the death of Anne, the | R. Wilson, a draper in Warrington, filed a petition THIS was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Regis- De Gex Q.C. and Winslow for the appellant. WARRINGTON COUNTY COURT. "There was |