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having proceeded upon that in Hutton v. The Scarborough Cliff Hotel Company (13 L. T. Rep. 57; 2 Dr. & Sm. 521), which had recently been overruled by the Court of Appeal in Andrews v.Gas Meter Company (noted ante, p. 338), was no longer a binding authority, and the reduction should be confirmed by the court.

[Re James Colmer Limited. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. March 6.Counsel: Levett, Q.C. and Wace. Solicitors: Routh, Stacey, and Castle, agents for Adam and Thring, Bath.]

Costs Taxation—Agency Charges-Country Solicitor and London Agent -Solicitor and Client-Disbursements-Complete Bill-Particulars of Agency Charges-Solicitors Act 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73), s. 37.—This was a summons for taxation of a bill of costs delivered by the respondents more than twelve months before the application for taxation. The applicants, a partnership firm, had employed the respondents in certain separate matters, and the bill of costs, as delivered, contained the various items of charges under the respective headings of the several matters. The amount due under each head could be ascertained by reference to the account in the particular matter, and the total amount due on the whole bill of costs for professional charges was the sum of £140. There were certain items under each heading for agency charges (including disbursements, &c.), for which no particulars were given, but the total amount of such items did not exceed one-tenth of the whole bill. In one instance, however, the item for agency charges, of which no particulars were given, amounted to about one-fourth of the charge under the particular heading relating thereto. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that, having regard to his Lordship's decision in Re Pomeroy and Tanner (75 L. T. Rep. 625), there was no substantial item complained of which would prevent the bill from becoming a complete bill. Held, that the court should consider whether the bill furnished the applicants with all such detailed information as would enable them to form a fair opinion as to whether they ought to proceed to a taxation or no, and that the fact that in one or more instances the charge complained of represented a substantial proportion of the amount under one or other of the particular headings, the whole bill must be regarded as incomplete, and an order for taxation must be made.

The

[Re Pomeroy and Tanner, No. 2. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. March 3.— Counsel for the applicants, Graham Hastings, Q.C. and Edward Ford; for the respondents, Buckley, Q.C. and Henry Terrell. Solicitors: J. J. Harlow, for J. H. King, Bristol; Carthew and Wheeler.] Lunatic-Person in Bavaria of unsound Mind so found by Court of competent Jurisdiction-Fund in Court standing in Name of Lunatic— Transfer to Deposit Commission of Bavarian Court-Special Circumstance-Payment out of Court of corpus-Jurisdiction of English Court. -This was an application for the payment out of court of a considerable sum of money standing in the name of the applicant Baroness V. de L. The sum had been paid into court under the Trustee Relief Act by the trustees of the marriage settlement of the applicant's parents, her father being a German and her mother an Englishwoman. applicant was domiciled in Germany and was resident in that country, and had in 1894 been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction in Bavaria to be of unsound mind; she now sued by her next friend, a judge of the Royal Bavarian Court at Nösdlingen, of which court the applicant was a ward. It was in evidence that all persons having any interest in the fund in court were German subjects, that the fund in court formed the only property of the lunatic, and that according to Bavarian law the Court of Justice as Court of Trusteeship was entitled to accept and receive all the property of its wards. It was also in evidence that the Deposit Commission of the Court could take charge of and give receipts for all property belonging to a ward of court. The next friend of the applicant was one of the Deposit officials. It was contended that under the circumstances an English court would be justified in acceding to the application. Held, that the application was really in substance, though not in form, a request from the Court of Bavaria asking this court to direct a transfer of the funds, and having regard to the fact that the former court acted in an administrative capacity and had full power to give receipts on behalf of the lunatic, and generally to the circumstances of the case, the jurisdiction which this court undoubtedly possessed might be exercised and the order made. His Lordship intimated that the difficulty he had felt in chambers (the application having in the first instance been made in chambers) as to making such an order, having regard to the case of Re Barlow (57 L. T. Rep. 95; 36 Ch. Div. 287), was removed now that he had had an opportunity of considering the judgment of Lindley, L.J., in Re Brown (73 L. T. Rep. 375; (1895) 2 Ch. 666).

[Re De Lindan; or Re Spurrier De Hayn v. Garland. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. March 4.-Counsel: Graham Hastings, Q.C. and W. C. Druce. Solicitors: West, King, Adams, and Co.] Married Woman - Marriage Settlement prior to Married Women's Property Act-Will of Father made subsequent thereto-Contingent Interest under Will-Addition of separate Use by the Act-Married Women's Property Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), ss. 5 and 19.-By a marriage settlement made prior to the passing of the Married Women's Property Act a fund was settled upon a lady for life to her separate use without power of anticipation, and after her decease, in the event of her surviving her husband, for herself, her executors, administrators, and assigns, but in the event of her husband surviving her as she should appoint, and in default of appointment to her next of kin. By his will, made subsequently to the Act, her father bequeathed a third of his residuary estate to the trustees of the settlement to be held upon the trusts therein expressed and declared. On a summons taken out by the lady, asking for a declaration that her contingent interest under the will was held by her to her separate use: Held, that the incident of

separate use was added by the statute, and that her contingent interest under the will was, therefore, disposable by her. Re Lumley; Ex parte Hood-Barrs (75 L. T. Rep. 236) applied.

[Re Williams; Williams v. Grant. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. March 2. Counsel: Hastings, Q.C. and Phillpotts; Baines; E. C. Macnaghten. Solicitors: Mear and Fowler; Field, Roscoe, and Co.]

Settled Land-Repairs-Farms-Capital Money-Jurisdiction -Settled Land Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38), s. 25-Settled Land Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 69), s. 13, sub-sect. 2.-Summons by trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts 1882 to 1890, of a settlement, namely, the will of P. Hawker, dated the 21st Nov. 1843, for the determination among others of the following question, namely, whether the applicants, as trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts, should apply the capital moneys in their hands or under their control, consisting of a sum of £2442 3s. Consols, or any part thereof, in or towards carrying out on certain agricultural property in Hampshire the works and improvements specified in a report of certain land agents and surveyors, and thereby by them recommended to be done. The defendant was P. T. R. Hawker, the tenant in tail, an infant, who appeared by his mother as guardian ad litem. The remainderman to save expense was not added as a defendant, but his concurrence could be obtained. Under the will of the said P. Hawker the above-mentioned estates and property stood limited to uses under which the infant defendant was beneficially entitled in possession as tenant in tail. The question was whether the court had power, independently of the Settled Land Acts, to sanction the expenditure of capital money on the estate in Hampshire for objects other than those within the Settled Land Acts. Held, that, if the judge was satisfied that the proposed works were for the benefit of the infant, he had jurisdiction, with the concurrence of the tenant in tail in remainder, to sanction the expenditure of capital money; that the inherent power of the court was not taken away by the Settled Land Acts, and remained untouched in the absence of special words in the Act to that effect; but in the present case the evidence was not sufficient.

[Re Hawker's Settled Estates; Duff v. Hawker. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. March and 4.-Counsel: S. Dickinson; T. Arnold Herbert. Solicitors: Garrard, James, and Wolfe.]

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

Bankruptcy-Revocable Mandate-Fraudulent Preference-Conveyance of Real Estate and Deposit of Shares to repair Breaches of Trust— Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 48.-The bankrupts, New, Prance, and Garrard, had for many years been in practice at Evesham as solicitors and scriveners. On their own petition a receiving order was made against them on the 31st March 1894, which was followed by an adjudication. Two days prior to the filing of the petition, Prance conveyed the Longdon Hill estate, of which he was the owner, to the defendant Hunting (since dead) upon trust to apply the same towards making good breaches of trust committed by Prance as trustee of the estates, set forth in the schedule to the deed. The firm of New, Prance, and Garrard had been insolvent for some years. The deed recited that breaches of trust had been committed, and that it was executed by Prance "to rectify such breaches of trust as far as may be, and thereby to shield and exonerate himself as far as possible from liability to the proceedings he is now or may at any time hereafter be exposed by reason of such breaches." He had also deposited some share certificates to cover other breaches of trust. There was no evidence of any pressure or of any threats of legal proceedings. The trustee in bankruptcy claimed in this action a declaration that the deed was void as against him, (1) on the ground that it was a revocable mandate, (2) that it was a fraudulent preference. The deposits of shares were sought to be avoided as fraudulent preferences. Held, (1) that the legal transfer did not fall within the doctrine of Garrard v. Lauderdale (3 Sim. 1), and was not revocable; (2) that no creditor was preferred.

[The Trustee of New, Prance, and Garrard v. Hunting and others. Q. B. Div. Williams, J. Feb. 25, 26, March 4, and 6.-Counsel: Muir Mackenzie and R. Harington; Upjohn; Clayton; Van Neck. Solicitors: Burton, Yates, and Hart; Rowcliffes, Rawle, and Co.; R. White; M.H. Prance.]

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. PROBATE BUSINESS. Administration-Intestacy-Next of Kin abroad-Business in EnglandDifficulty in communicating with Next of Kin-Probate Act 1859, s. 73 -"Special Circumstances "- -Grant ad interim to Stranger.-Where it appeared that a deceased intestate, who was the owner of a considerable import business, which he had carried on in London, and to which consignments of raw produce were continuing to arrive, and bills falling due or requiring acceptance in connection therewith; and where it was stated that the next of kin of the deceased could not be com municated with in less than about six weeks by telegram, or about four months by letter; the court, in view of the special circumstances of the case, decreed a general grant of administration, under sect. 73, to an accountant nominated by the only relative of the deceased in England, the grant to be limited till such time as the next of kin should appear and apply for a grant; and the administrator to find justifying sureties. [In the Goods of Francisco Suarez (deceased). P. and D. Div.: Barnes, J. Feb. 18.-Counsel: Inderwick, Q.C. and Barnard. Solicitors: Goldberg, Langden, Barrett, and Newall.]

DIVORCE BUSINESS.

Divorce Suit-Costs-Co-respondent.-In a suit for divorce by the husband, the co-respondent pleaded that at the time when he first

became improperly intimate with the respondent he was not aware that she was a married woman. There was no evidence to the contrary, but it appeared that about a month after the first act of adultery the co-respondent had reason to believe that the respondent was a married woman. He, nevertheless, continued the adulterous intercourse. It was conceded, on behalf of the petitioner, that no damages could be awarded, upon proof of the facts above set forth; but it was argued that costs might, under the circumstances, be properly given against the co-respondent. On the other hand, counsel for the petitioner relied on Priske v. Priske and Goldby (29 L. J. 195, P. and M.). The Court held that the law was quite clear, and that the co-respondent could not be condemned in the costs. There would be a decree nisi, but no costs.

[Newby v. Newby and White. P. & D. Div.: The President (Sir F. H. Jeune). March 1.-Counsel: for the petitioner, Powles; for the co-respondent, Groser. Solicitors: for the petitioner, C. R. Enever; for the co-respondent, Smith and Gofton.]

Judicial Separation-Petition for Permanent Alimony and Allowance for Children-Prior Separation Deed-Bar-Inquiry as to Means to proceed-Leave to appeal-Costs.-The wife, who had been living apart from her husband since 1892 under a deed of separation, instituted a suit and obtained a decree of judicial separation, with custody of the children, on the ground of her husband's adultery, and afterwards applied for an order for permanent alimony, and for an allowance for the children. The registrar was of opinion that the petitioner was not entitled to any order for permanent alimony, on the ground that the case was governed by the case of Gandy v. Gandy (46 L. T. Rep. 607; 7 P. Div., 168), and, on the petitioner appealing to the judge in chambers, his Lordship adjourned the summons into court for further argument. Held (reversing the registrar), that as the parties were no longer living apart under the terms of the deed of separation, but under the decree of the court, and the petitioner by order of the court having the legal custody of the children of the marriage, all the provisions of the deed were practically at an end, and the court was not debarred by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Gandy v. Gandy (ubi sup.) from exercising the powers conferred by sect. 17 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85); and, that where there is no specific covenant in the deed restraining the petitioner from seeking an order for increased alimony, the court may justly award such increase as the means of the respondent allow; and that the mere fact that the adulterous husband may not be able to support an application to set aside his contract to pay alimony, and, if his means decline, reduce the amount which he had covenanted to pay under the deed, is not enough to deprive the court of the powers conferred upon it by statute. Held, therefore, that the order of the registrar must be reversed, and that the petitioner have leave to file her petition for permanent alimony and allowance for the children, and to proceed with the inquiry thereon as to means. The respondent was ordered to pay the petitioner's costs, and also to find security for the petitioner's costs upon the appeal, leave for which was asked for and (if needed) given.

[Judkins v. Judkins. P. & D. Div: Barnes, J. Feb. 8 and March 2. -Counsel: for the petitioner, Barnard; for the respondent Priestley and Dill. Solicitors: for the petitioner, H. B. Wade; for the respondent, Arnold, Williams, and Co.] Substituted Service-Written Demand for Cohabitation prior to Institution of Suit for Restitution of Conjugal Rights-Rule 175, Divorce Court (Additional) Rules and Regulations 1869 Order for Service on Husband's Solicitor.-A wife, in contemplation of proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights, wrote a letter to the address where she knew or believed her busband to be staying, in compliance with rule 175 of the Divorce Court (Additional) Rules 1869. She at the same time sent to him a duplicate letter, addressed to his place of business in the city. Both letters were returned unopened through the husband's solicitors. The solicitors for the wife thereupon wrote to the husband's solicitors, asking for the respondent's present address, and stating that the wife desired to serve her husband with a written demand for resumption of cohabitation, in compliance with the rule. The Court, upon motion, ordered substituted service of the letter of demand upon the husband's solicitors. [Re the Petition of Tucker. P. and D. Div.: Barnes, J. Feb. 22.Counsel: Newson. Solicitors: Rose-Innes, Son, and Crick.]

OUR LITERARY COLUMN.

STORIES FROM THE LAW REPORTS.

XIII. THE STORY OF THE FOUR WOMEN WHO WERE LED TO THE ALTAR BY ONE MAN.

(From Reg. v. Willshire, 44 L. T. Rep. 222; 6 Q. B. Div. 366.)

"I TELL you he's my husband." "No-he's mine."

The speakers were standing in the Buckingham Palace-road. One of them, a tall, fair woman, had just left one of the houses in this road, where she had found the other, a short, dark, unhappy-looking woman, stood waiting for her. The individual about whom they were having words was looking out of the window, regarding the interview which the tall fair woman was having with her dark companion with great dissatisfaction. If he had known who the dark woman was, he would have regarded it with greater dissatisfaction still.

"Where are your marriage lines?" asked this tall, fair woman.

"I'll show you them to-morrow, if you will meet me here," answered the other.

"I will wait for you here."

The tall, fair woman-Edith was her name-mounted the stairs again with a heavy step, determined to show no distrust of her husband until the other woman should have satisfied her that she was speaking the truth. Five minutes earlier she had been very happy. For she had been married not many months since to a man who was kind to her, and of whom she was proud as a husband. She was willing to believe in him if she could do so still; but her heart was chilled by the calm certainty and apparent sincerity with which the other woman had spoken. What motive, she wondered, could that other woman have had for inventing this shocking story that Edith's own husband had previously married herself.

Edith had first met her husband when she was a cashier at a wholesale house in the City. He had come to make purchases, and in that way the acquaintanceship had begun. He had said that he was an officer in the Intelligence Department of the War Office. His story was, that he had once been in the 3rd Hussars, but that, having been shot in the eye and in the chest, he had been removed from active service. He had added that he had been twelve years in the East, but that he used to come home for eighteen months. His father he had represented to be a general in the army, who lived at Uxbridge, and who had his name in the Army List "David Willshire." His own name he said was "Henry Willshire." He had a cousin who was a knight. His duties were sometimes at the War Office, sometimes at the town, sometimes at Aldershot or Woolwich. Edith had certainly had letters from those places from him. His income he said altogether amounted to £350 a year. It was paid, he asserted, once a quarter, although it had for some reason or other not been paid regularly of late. He was paid on Sundays as well as other days. He had to be away one night in a week, and that would entitle him to 14s. on each occasion, so long at any rate as it was thought that he was unmarried. He had at first expected to be ordered to Malta.

That was why the marriage had been hurried on. He said that he was going to be an under-secretary; he had not accepted another appointment which he might have had, because it was for five years. His last idea was that they would probably be ordered to Port Natal.

Such was the story which he had told her; and she had never suspected till to-night that it was untrue in any particular. It was a rise in life for the poor cashier to marry a man who had three hundred and fifty pounds a year, and whose connections seemed to be so very aristocratic. Besides, the man seemed so good and so kind. She had been very willing for him to marry her. Since the marriage he had been always kind to her. He could not have been better. At any rate there could be no doubt of this: that he had not married her for her money, for she had no money of her own when she was married. He had given her ten pounds as a wedding present, and had promised her fifty more. He had actually given her twenty pounds one day lately, but it was true that he had borrowed this last sum of her brother.

"I do not believe that horrible woman's tale," she said to herself; and she went in to the sitting-room and kissed her husband. But she still dreaded the advent of the next evening in case the other woman should indeed bring her marriage lines.

Her fears were but too well founded. Nine o'clock had been fixed as the time of meeting, and as Big Ben struck the hour the figure which Edith most feared to see was to be observed hurrying along towards the spot.

Edith flew to meet her. Her husband-the man whom she supposed to be her husband-was out, away from home on this particular evening. The woman came towards her. "Here is what you wanted to see," she said simply, and held out a document to her.

It was a certificate of the marriage of Harley Henry Willshire to Charlotte Georgina Lavers on the 7th Sept. 1879, and it came out of an envelope upon which a few words were written descriptive of the document in a handwriting which Edith knew only too well.

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"I cannot believe what you say," said Edith. I was married to him at Trinity Church, Newington, almost exactly a year later than the date which is shown upon this document."

"If so, he has committed bigamy. I am his wife," said Charlotte. "Oh!" said Edith, "I cannot and will not believe it; he has been very kind to me."

"He was very kind to me at first," said Charlotte.

Just at this moment the individual in question came along the road, walking at a brisk pace toward the house in which he was living with Edith.

As soon as he saw what was going forward, he broke into an oath, "Charlotte!" he said, "by all that's- !" Edith fell on the doorstep in a swoon.

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Edith did not want to prosecute him for the cruel deception which he had practised upon her. No more did Charlotte. All that either of these women would ever willingly say of him was, "he was very kind to me." But the police were upon the trail, and on the 8th Jan. Police-Inspector Languish arrested Willshire at 12, Buckingham Palace-road. He told him that he was arresting him upon a charge of feloniously marrying Edith Maria Miller during the lifetime of his wife. He said. "I expected as much. You come well prepared. You must think me a fool to resist." The police-inspector then removed him to the police-station. Both the women were told to attend the trial at the Old Bailey at the coming of the February Sessions.

When the day came, the Common Serjeant took his seat upon the bench, and Willshire was duly arraigned.

The first witness was Edith Maria Miller, who told reluctantly the story of her deception by the prisoner, and consequent marriage at Trinity Church, Newington, by which she had believed she became his wife, willingly adding the little she could find to say in his favour-always repeating" he was very kind."

The next witness was the solicitor's clerk, who proved the certificate of the marriage of the prisoner with Edith on the 23rd Sept. 1880, which he had obtained from the registrar at Somerset House, and also a certificate of the marriage of Harley Henry Willshire with Charlotte Georgina Lavers on the 7th Sept. 1879. He had obtained that also from the registrar of Somerset House; and had in both cases examined the copy with the original. The next witness was Eliza Lilian Chandler. She was the wife of a cab proprietor, and the sister of Charlotte. "I was present," said she, "at St. Stephen's Church, Marylebone, on the 7th Sept. 1879, when the prisoner married my sister. My sister is Charlotte Georgina Willshire. That is her photograph. She is present. They first lived at Hammersmith, then at Gunnersbury; the prisoner took a house and furnished it. I was there several times. The house is empty now. Most of the furniture was on hire. The prisoner got a hundred pounds with my sister." Then she added (it was by Charlotte's special request) "He was very kind to my sister. She did not wish to prosecute him."

The police inspector was then called to prove the arrest and what the prisoner had said. The prosecution closed their case. And the prisoner's counsel rose to open his.

What would he say, wondered Ellen-hoping to hear something which would explain the apparently cruel conduct of the man to whom she had given herself, and whom she had loved and trusted. And Charlotte likewise would have dearly liked to hear something which might show her that the whole thing was some hideous mistake.

"I have one witness, my Lord." said the prisoner's counsel. "Who is he ?" said the Common Serjeant.

"Warder Donald Robertson," was the reply.

The warder was called and said: "I came here to prove that the prisoner was convicted at this court in 1868 for marrying Ada Mary Susan Leslie during the lifetime of his wife Ellen.

This, then, was the prisoner's evidence, and instead of making any excuse for marrying Edith in the lifetime of his wife Charlotte, he merely reminded the court that he had already been punished for marrying Ada in the lifetime of his wife Ellen.

Edith and Charlotte groaned at the intelligence of this fuller history of the man whom they had both regarded in the light of a husband. It seemed that Ellen and Ada had already regarded him in the same light many years before and with equal cause. Where were Ellen and Ada now?

And as they thought out this question, the meaning of what the prisoner's counsel was doing suddenly burst upon them. If Ellen were alive, then Charlotte was not Willshire's wife any more than Edith was. If Ellen had lived till after the marriage with Charlotte, but had died before the marriage with Edith, then Edith was his true wife after all and Charlotte never had been so. In neither of these cases would the indictment upon which, in the present case, the prosecution were proceeding be a good indictment. For it was an indictment for "feloniously marrying Edith Maria Miller during the lifetime of his wife Charlotte Georgina." But if Ellen were alive at the date of the first marriage Charlotte was not his wife, and the indictment could not be supported.

No one knew whether or no in fact Ellen were alive.

The prisoner's counsel, tberefore, said: "I submit that, as the prisoner was convicted in 1868, his wife Ellen being then alive, the presumption is that she is alive still: and, therefore, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove her decease. Otherwise the present indictment, which assumes that Charlotte Georgina is the wife of the prisoner, is a nullity."

The counsel for the prosecution referred to a case in which it had been decided that the second marriage was not bigamous unless it was proved that the prisoner knew the first wife was alive within seven years of the second marriage, and argued that in this case the burden of proof that Ellen was alive lay with the defendant.

The Common Serjeant was perplexed; but, after consultation with Mr. Justice Grove, he held that it was for the defence to prove that Ellen was alive. The jury found the prisoner guilty, but judgment was respited in order that the Court for Crown Cases Reserved might consider the difficulty which had been raised.

The matter was therefore further argued, on a case stated by the Common Serjeant, before the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, who, after hearing the story of the four marriages-that with Ellen Earle on the 31st March 1864, that with Ada Mary Susan Leslie on the 22nd April 1868, that with Charlotte Georgina Lavers on the 7th Sept. 1879, and that with Edith Maria Miller on the 23rd Sept. 1880-unanimously came to the conclusion that Ellen Earle having been shown to be alive in 1868, it was for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the prisoner by showing that Ellen was dead at the time of the marriage with Charlotte. The question ought to have been left to the jury; and because it had not been left to the jury, the conviction was quashed, and the prisoner was discharged.

Legal proposition.-In a criminal case all the facts necessary to constitute the offence must be proved by the prosecution. Where, therefore, the defence can prove a life to have existed which was inconsistent with the commission by the prisoner of the crime charged, it is only for the prisoner to set up the life; it is for the prosecution to prove his guilt. Cf. Best on Evidence, 8th edit., p. 317, where the result of this case is thus summed up: "It was held to be a question of fact for the jury whether the wife of 1864 was alive or not when the prisoner married in 1879, and the conviction was quashed on the ground that the question had not been left to them." "In connection with this case," he con

tinues, "It should be observed: 1. The prisoner, if the case had been tried with the proper direction to the jury, would have owed his acquittal, if he had been acquitted, to the jury believing him to be guilty of a crime for which he was not indicted. 2. The strictness of criminal pleading prevented the charge being brought in an alternative form. 3. The strictness of criminal procedure prevented a new trial with a proper direction to the jury. 4. Although the prisoner could set up the presumption of the continuance of his wife's life in answer to indictments for ever so many marriages during the lifetime of any woman married to him after her, he yet could avail himself of her seven years' absence as a defence to any indictment for marrying again during her lifetime. On the general law cf. Rex v. The Inhabitants of Harborne (2 A. & E. 540) and Rex v. The Inhabitants of Twyning (2 B. & Ad. 386).

LAW LIBRARY.

English Statute Law Revised. By PAUL STRICKLAND, Barristerat-Law, London: William Clowes and Sons Limited, Fleetstreet.

THIS is a continuation of the work of this author which appeared last year. It is an analysis of the effect of the legislation of 1896 upon the earlier statutes relating to England. It should continue to prove of service in noting up text-books and statutes.

NEW EDITION.

The twenty-ninth edition of Stone's Justices' Manual, by George B. Kennett (Shaw and Sons, Fetter-lane; Butterworth, 7, Fleet-street), is greatly increased in size. In addition to all the latest decisions, it for the first time includes a table of Statutes which will be of much assistance to practitioners. "Stone has so long been a familiar guide in all magisterial courts that we need only say that in its extended form it will be found to contain all the information necessary to magistrates, their clerks, and practitioners.

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Bath, Thursday, and Friday (J.S. and Midhurst, Thursday
Reg., Bky.), at 10
Birkenhead, Friday, at 10
Birmingham, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes-
day, Thursday (A. & B), and Friday,

at 10
Blackburn, Monday and Saturday, at 10
Bolton, Wednesday and Saturday, at 9.30
Bournemouth, Thursday, at 10, and from
day to day if necessary to finish list
Bow, Monday and Friday

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Bradford (Yorks). Tuesday. Wednesday (Reg.), and Friday (Reg., Bky), at 10 Bridgwater, Friday, at 10

Brighton, Thursday (Reg., Bky), at 11; Friday, at 10

Builth, Monday

Burnley, Thursday, at 10

*

Neath, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday
Newark, Monday, at 10
Newtown, Thursday
Northallerton, Saturday, at 10
North Shields, Wednesday, at 10
Norwich, Monday, Tuesday, and Wednes.
day, at 10

Nottingham, Tuesday, at 9.45: Wednes-
day (A.O at 9.45; Bky at 11.80)
Okehampton, Wednesday, at 10
Oldham, Thursday and Friday, at 9.30
Oxford, Saturday (J.S.), at 11.30
Penzance, Tuesday, at 10
Pontypridd, Monday, Wednesday, and
Thursday

Bury, Monday, and Wednesday (Reg.), Poole, Monday, at 10

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PENOLOGY has always been a favourite science among Italian jurists. In fact, it may safely be said that since 1764, when Beccaria published his famous book on Crimes and their Punishments, penal science has been the branch of jurisprudence which has received most thorough and detailed study among the jurists of Italy.

It is hardly necessary to state here the influence exercised by Beccaria's book on the penal jurisprudence of all countries. Suffice that it had fourteen French and four German translations, besides others in Dutch, Spanish, Russian, and Greek. English jurists, too, felt its influence; it had three English translations, and it is well known in what high es eem Beccaria was held by Lord Mansfield.

The work of penal reform started by this book has been steadily carried on in Italy, finding its latest expression in the Italian Penal Code.

The political condition of Italy in the past century, and in the earlier part of this, tended, in some measure, to foster an interest in the study of

jurisprudence. The country was split up into small States, each having a more or less perfect system or code of laws. Conflict of laws frequently arose, and the widely differing political and economic conditions of the various States, as well as their physical proximity, offered excellent opportunities for a comparative study of their laws.

When the unification of Italy had been realised, it was one of the first thoughts of her builders to frame a Code of Laws for the new nation. Naturally the condition of Italy, previous to her unification, made such codification a most difficult and laborious task. Old codes had to be abolished and the jurisdiction of the new courts had to be adjusted with due regard to the jurisdiction of those then existing. Commission after commission was appointed under different ministries to study the various projects proposed. In 1876 Mancini, one of Italy's most illustrious jurists, was given the ministerial portfolio of justice. He pursued with great vigour the work of codification, and in November 1876 presented to Parliament a most learned report based on his own studies and observations, and on suggestions made by the various jurists and scientists whom he had consulted.

The work proceeded with more or less speed under various ministries till in 1881 Zanardelli was appointed Minister of Justice: he it was who, after various interruptions, had the honour of completing and having: approved by Parliament the Penal Code of the kingdom of Italy in 1888. There is nothing especially novel or interesting to the American student of law in the division or formal arrangement of the Italian Penal Code. It is divided into three parts or books, the first treating of crimes and their punishments in general, the second of the various kinds of felonies, and the third of misdemeanours, thus following out the well-established classification of crimes according to the instrinsic nature of the transgression.

But it is in the application of punishments that we shall find the most interesting difference between the Italian and the best American Penal Codes.

Even a cursory examination brings out the fact that the Italian Code omits the names of crimes, using the nomen juris only in the title of the section, and solely for the convenience of indexing. Even more practical is the plan adhered to throughout the Code of giving the extremes of crimes without defining them, except in so far as some idea of them must necessarily be expressed in words.

In providing punishments for the various crimes, the framers of the Code endeavoured to combine repression with sufficient latitude in the power of applying it; and the efficacy of the penalty as provided by the Code grows out rather of its intensity than out of its duration.

All punishments may be divided into two classes; i.e., those that are restrictive of personal liberty, and those that are not. Capital punishment (except under court-martial proceedings) does not exist. Italian jurists have almost unanimously been opposed to what Beccaria strikingly calls, "A war waged by the nation against one of her subjects."

Four of the six punishments provided for felonies and one of the three provided for misdemeanours fall under the first class above mentioned.

Felonies are punishable in any of the following six ways:

1. By the ergastolo, applied only in cases of life imprisonment; 2. by reclusione; 3. by detenzione, which, as we shall see, are distinct kinds of imprisonment applied to different kinds of crimes; 4. by confino, which is a sort of jail liberties; 5. by multa or fine; and 6. by exclusion from public offices.

Misdemeanours are punishable by, first, arrest; second, ammenda or fine ; and third, by suspension from the exercise of a trade or profession.

The most severe punishment known to the Italian law is the "ergastolo" or life imprisonment. The punishment is undergone in a special prison, where the condemned is obliged to pass the first seven years of his term at hard labour and in absolute isolation from others. At the expiration of the seven years he is allowed to work with others, but he must observe absolute silence till death ends his term.

The punishments known as "reclusione" and "detenzione" may be said to be parallel punishments; they are the same as regards their gradation and duration, but vary as to their nature and intensity. The difference is intended to carry out the distinction in the intrinsic nature of crimes (other than those punishable by the ergastolo), i. e., those crimes which result from a perverse or criminal nature, and those which result not from anything intrinsically dishonourable, but rather from the heat of passion or of strong affection. It must be stated, however, that reclusione is the normal kind of punishment, while detenzione is the exception which is applied in those special cases where circumstances and the nature of the case clearly show that severe reformatory discipline is unnecessary The punishment of reclusione may extend from three days to twentyfour years. It is undergone in special prisons, at hard labour. If it does not exceed six months, the entire term must be served in solitary confinement, which fraction must, however, be roless than six months nor more than three years. During the balance of the term, no conversation is allowed and there is solitary confinement at night.

The punishment of the detenzione may extend for the same period as in reclusione. There is, however, no solitary confinement except at night, and although hard labour is part of the penalty, yet the condemned has the privilege of choosing the kind of work. The period of actual imprisonment in both reclusione and detenzione may, after a certain fixed period of good behaviour, be changed into conditional freedom (i. e., licence to be at large) for the unexpired term.

The punishment of the confino consists in obliging the condemned to reside for a period, not less than a month nor more than three years, in some part of the kingdom at least sixty kilometers from the place where the crime was committed and from where the condemned and the family of his victim reside. Failure to keep within the prescribed limits changes the punishment of the confino into that of the detenzione for the unexpired term.

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Multa is a fine applied only in cases of felonies. It cannot be less than ten, nor more than ten thousand lire (two to two thousand dollars). Failure to pay, changes the multa into detenzione at the rate of one day for every ten lire; but such substituted punishment cannot exceed one year in toto. The condemned may, if he so desires, expiate such substituted punishment by labour on some public work, in which case two such days count as one of detenzione.

Lastly, felonies are punishable by exclusion from public office (interdizione). This may be perpetual or temporary. If the former, it deprives the condemned of his electoral franchise and of every other political right; it bars him from all elective or public offices and revokes all academic degrees, rights, privileges and honorary titles. It also cuts off every interest or income derived from any such position or title.

The suspension is temporary when it does not exceed five years. The severest punishment for a misdemeanour is that of arresto (arrest), which may be a period of from one day to two years. Hard labour is part of it, and so is solitary confinement at night. Women and minors, however, may, on their first offence, and if deemed advisable by the court, serve their term in their own house, provided such term does not exceed one month.

The ammenda is a fine of not less than one nor more than two thousand lire (twenty cents to four hundred dollars). Lastly, the punishment of suspension from the exercise from some trade or profession may be applied for a period not exceeding two years.

In certain well-defined cases, the punishment may consist in what the Code calls a “riprensione giudiziale,” which is an admonishment by the court and an explanation of the consequences of future misconduct. This judicial admonishment is made in public, and the accused must, of course, attend in person. Such admonishment is effectively supplemented by a bond or recognisance to keep the peace for a time not exceeding two years, executed by the accused with two sufficient sureties.

The Code also provides an elaborate system of special vigilance or surveillance to which criminals are subjected after the expiration of their term for a period not exceeding three years.

In crimes there are no degrees under the Italian Code; but provision is made by a simple and practical method to increase or diminish the punishment to be applied according to the presence or absence of extenuating circumstances. The Code simply fixes the extremes of punishments applicable, and then provides that when certain circumstances intervene, there shall be a fixed fractional increase or decrease of the punishment which would have been applied had not such circumstances existed. It is next to impossible to give, in a few words, a clear idea of this system which Zanardelli, in the face of more conservative, but less scientific, codes, introduced into the Italian law. All that can be done in this brief outline is to translate the seetion of the Code on this point and illustrate it by one or two examples.

Sect. 29 of the Italian Code reads, in part: "Whenever it is provided by law that a sentence shall be increased or diminished by a fractional part thereof, such increase or decrease shall be computed on that quantity of punishment which the court would apply if the circumstances which increase or diminish it had not existed. If various circumstances concur, the increase or decrease in the sentence, by reason thereof, shall be computed upon the quantity of punishment resulting from the preceding increase or decrease; if damaging and extenuating circumstances concur, the former shall be considered first. In every case the following circumstances are to be considered last and in the following order: Age, mental condition, circumstances under sect. 59, and second offence."

Let us now take some examples. Larceny, in its simple form, is punishable by a term not exceeding thirty months of reclusione. But suppose that the thing stolen is of great value; in applying sentence, the court must fix the punishment irrespective of such circumstance; if the court finds that in its simple form the offence should be punished by twenty-four months (thirty months being the extreme), it must then increase this by one-third, or make the total thirty-two months, one-third being the fractional increase provided by the Code when the circumstances of great value exists. Again, take the case of arson, which, where no special circumstances intervene, is punishable by a term of from five to ten years of reclusione. If committed at night, the Code provides that the punishment shall be increased by one-third. But before the court can consider this circumstance, it must weigh all other particulars connected with the offence, as, for example, the means used, the damage which resulted, the danger and alarm which it created, etc. Now, suppose the court finding the case a grave one, considers nine years an appropriate punishment (ten being the maximum), it must then, by reason of the crime having been committed at night, increase the punishment by one-third, making the sentence one of twelve years. Supposing instead that the jury finds the accused guilty of attempted arson, then the conrt, in passing sentence, would have to consider the attempt as consummated, and then apply the Code provision which makes attempted arson punishable by one-half the punishment provided for arson. So that, if the court considered nine years an approximate sentence if the attempt had been consummated, it must then reduce such sentence to four and one-half years so as to bring it within the penal provisions for attempted arson.

As to the effect of a penal sentence on the civil status of the condemned, the Code is explicit. A sentence to the ergastolo or to the reclusione for a period exceeding five years carries with it perpetual exclusion from public office.

The sentence to the ergastolo, being perpetual, deprives the condemned of all marital and domestic authority, renders him incompetent to make a will, and annuls a will executed previously to the passing of sentence.

The penal sentence does not merge the civil remedy against the offender and his estate, but the injured party or his representatives may join a civil suit for damages and costs with the criminal prosecution; in crimes which offend the honour of a person, the court may, moreover, give damages to

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the injured party, though none are proved. The offender is likewise obliged to pay the expenses of the prosecution.

In crimes involving the taking or damaging of property, the Code provides that, if the offender, before trial, returns the property or makes some reparation, his punishment shall be diminished, not as a matter of judicial clemency, but of statutory right.

And now, it will naturally be asked, "Does the elaborate system of punishments, provided by the Italian Penal Code, ensure the safety of the people and the suppression of crime in Italy?" The answer is, of course, that no code, however perfect, can suppress crime. But the fact is undoubtedly true (the popular American idea to the contrary, notwithstanding) that crime in Italy is steadily decreasing. Careful criminal statistics prove it beyond a doubt.

This is due, in a great measure, to the improved political and economical conditions of the country under the constitutional government of the House of Savoy. But it is safe to say that such decrease is due also, in a substantial measure, to the preventive and repressive influence of the new Penal Code. Less juggling with its provisions (and its provisions are so framed as to make juggling with them very difficult), a speedier trial of the accused than is had under our Codes, aud the certainty of fixed and well-defined punishments, with little or no abuse of executive clemency, have had the salutary effect of creating a proper regard for the majesty of the law among a people who, through centuries of foreign despotism and local misgovernment, had come to look upon it as either a false token or an instrument of tyranny; and this wholesome result must not only be the best test of the efficacy of the Italian Penal Code, but also the highest monument to the indefatigable labours of Mancini, Pessina, Zanardelli and all those who gave so much thought and study to its consummation. GINO C. SPERANZA.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN.

FRENCH (Maria), late of 53, Rue Tour, Notre Dame, Boulogne-sur-Mer, who was the daughter of Martin French and Anu French (formerly Ann Palmer), who died in 1845. Her next of kin living at her death, on June 26, 1895, or the legal personal representatives of such next of kin as have since died, to come in, by April 13, and prove their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice North. April 28, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating on such claims.

FURNELL (Thomas John), late of Thomond Gate, Limerick.-William Furnell and Catherine Furnall, adopted children of the above, to come in, within six weeks after Feb. 22, at the chambers of the Master of the Rolls, Four Courts, Dublin, and prove their claims as legatees under the will of the above T. J. Furnell. HANSON (John), jun., formerly of the Dun Horse, Kingsland-rd, Shoreditch.-George Hanson, formerly of 12, New-st, Bath-st, St. Luke's, dairyman, and Arthur Robert Poulter, formerly of 1, Browning-ct, Upper Chapman-st, St. George's-inthe-East, or their children or representatives, are requested to communicate as soon as possible with Messrs. Lickorish and Co., 11, Queen Victoria-st, the solicitors for the executrices of John Hanson, jun. A reward of £ and any reasonable expenses incurred will be paid to any person giving satisfactory proof within one month from Feb. 20 of the death of either G. Hanson or A. R. Poulter, or their children. PAVEY (George), Vine Cottage, Princes-st, Ware, Hertfordshire, contractor, who died on Feb. 8, 1896. Persons claiming to be his next of kin according to the statutes for the distribution of intestates' estates living at the time of his death, or the legal personal representatives of such next of kin as are now dead, to come in, by April 27, and prove their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice North. April 30, at the said chambers, at half-past twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the claims. Note.-It appears that John Pavey, jun. (a son of the testator's brother, John Pavey, deceased), left home many years ago, and was subsequently known to have been at Torquay, and was last heard of at Devonport, Devonshire, where he was engaged as a coachman. If living, he would be one of such next of kin.

WHITE (Eliza Peake), spinster. who died on Dec. 29, 1896. She was the only surviving child of Edward Peake White, deceased, late of 25, Grove-rd, Brixton, Surrey, gentleman, formerly of 18, Coventry-st, Haymarket, grocer, and of Elizabeth, his wife, also deceased, whose maiden name was White, and some of whose family are believed to have settled in India and Australia or New Zealand. Persons claiming to be the next of kin to the said E. P. White, who must be first cousins or nearer relatives and living on Dec. 29, 1896, or their legal personal representatives, if they have since died, to send in, by Sept. 1, the particulars of their claims to Messrs. Morley, Shirreff, and Co., solicitors, 53, Gresham House, Old Broad-st.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. AFRICAN SEARCH COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 5, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. A. R. Hanson, Broad-st-av, the liquidator of the company. Chave and Chave, Broad-st-av, solicitors to the liquidator. ALBION (TRANSVAAL) GOLD MINES LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 17, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. F. J. Searle, 4, Sun-ct, Cornhill, the liquidator of the company.

ANGLO-MEXICAN AND WESTERN TRUST LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 10, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. W. H. Salmon, 20, Bucklersbury, the liquidator of the company. R. Furber, 8, Gray's-inn-sq, solicitor to the liquidator. BRICE AND CO. LIMITED.-Order for continuation of voluntary winding-up subject to the supervision of the court made by Mr. Justice Byrne on Feb. 22 on both petitions presented; also that George Ashdown, of 56, Gresham-st, chartered accountant, be appointed liquidator of the company jointly with Augustus Cufaude Palmer, one of the voluntary liquidators thereof, Mr. Butcher, the other voluntary liquidator, consenting to retire. Le Brasseur and Oakley, 12, New-ct, Lincoln's-inn, agents for Stone, King, and Co., of Bath, solicitors for the first petitioners.

BRITISH GOLD FIELDS OF WEST AFRICA LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard March 17, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Wyatt, Digby, and Co., 5 and 6, Clement's-inn, Strand, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition, must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the abovenamed not later than six o'clock on March 16.

BURY CARRIAGE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by April 1, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. C. R. Scholes, Silver-st, Bury, the liquidator of the company. J. Wood, 10, Bolton-st, Bury, solicitor for the liquidator. EVENING NEWS LIMITED (the old Company).-Creditors to send in, by April 16, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. H. Harmsworth, the liquidator of the company. FLEETWOOD ICE COMPANY LIMITED (in voluntary liquidation).-Creditors to send in, by April 30, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and

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