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1836.

REX

บ.

HYAMS.

It appeared from the evidence of the prosecutrix, that she went out, leaving her window shut down, but not fastened, though she admitted that there was a hasp which could have been fastened to keep it down. The entry was effected by raising the window.

For the prisoners, it was objected, that this was not sufficient evidence of a breaking, as the window was not fastened when it might have been, and that it was similar to that of pushing farther up a window left a little open, which had been held not to be a breaking.

Mr. Justice PARK and Mr. Justice COLERIDGE were of opinion that there was enough to constitute a breaking ; and the prisoners were convicted (a).

Payne, C. C. Jones, and Maguire, for the prisoners.

(a) It may be worthy of consideration whether the law of constructive breaking has not been carried somewhat too far. It surely can never have been the intention of the legislature, (for instance), that a little boy who breaks a

pane of glass in a shop window, and takes out a trifling article during the time when the streets are crowded, should be considered as guilty of an offence which is punishable with death.

JUNE SESSION, 1836.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE PATTESON AND MR. BARON GURNEY.

June 13th.

A prisoner was indicted under

the 7 & 8 Geo. 4,

c. 29, s. 10, for breaking and

REX V. NIXON and SCROOP.

THE prisoners were indicted for that they, on the 18th

of May, at the parish of Bishopsgate, a certain chapel

entering a chapel, and stealing several fixtures, and a bell not fixed. It appeared that the chapel was a Wesleyan chapel, and not a chapel of the church of England:-Held, that the case must be confined to the act of simple larceny for stealing the bell.

there situate feloniously and sacrilegiously did break and enter, and feloniously and sacrilegiously did steal, take, and carry away two gas burners, two glass holders, twelve hooks, and two brass knobs, belonging to Thomas Tagg and others, and then being fixed in the same chapel, and one bell of the goods and chattels of the said Thomas Tagg and others, then being there found; against the statute &c.

It appeared that the chapel mentioned in the indictment belonged to a society of Wesleyan Methodists, and that all the articles in the indictment were the property of a committee, consisting of Mr. Tagg and several other persons (a). The bell was the only thing not fixed in the chapel.

PATTESON, J., in summing up, told the jury that the case was not within the statute 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 10, which made it a capital offence to break and enter &c. any church or chapel, and referred to the case of Rex v. Warren and Spencer (b), as having decided that a dissent

(a) By the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 14, it is sufficient in cases of partners and other joint owners, whether they are partners in trade, joint tenants, parceners, or tenants in common, to name one person, and describe the property as belonging to that person and another or others, as the case may be. This, it seems, from the present case and several others, though it has never been distinctly decided, applies to committees of voluntary societies, and also to the societies themselves, however numerous they may be.

(b) Ante, Vol. 6, p. 335, note (a). The ground of decision in that, and also in the present case, was, that in the 2nd and 8th sec

tions of the very next act in the
statute book, viz. 7 & 8 Geo. 4,
c. 30, relating to malicious inju-
ries, in addition to the words
"church or chapel," are the words
"or any chapel for the religious
worship of persons dissenting
from the united church of England
and Ireland, duly registered or
recorded;" thereby shewing that
when the legislature intended to
include places of worship not
belonging to the establishment,
they specially named them. The
reason for the omission of dis-
senting chapels in the section on
which the indictment in this case
was founded, and which makes it
a capital offence to break and
enter &c. any church or chapel,

1836.

REX

V.

ΝΙΧΟΝ.

1836.

REX

บ.

ΝΙΧΟΝ.

ing chapel was not included in that act. His Lordship also held, that the case must be confined to the stealing of the bell, which was the only article not fixed to the building; for although the same statute (a) says that stealing fixtures may be the subject of larceny, yet it does not say that fixtures shall be considered as chattels, which they must be to bring them within the section upon which the indictment was founded.

Verdict--Nixon guilty; Scroop not guilty.

would seem to be, that, as dissent-
ing chapels are not consecrated,
such breaking and entering, &c.
would not be sacrilege, which was
the common law offence to which
the provision was intended to
apply.

(a) Sect. 44. The words used

in this section are 66
any glass or
wood work belonging to any build-
ing whatsoever, or any lead, iron,
copper, brass, or other metal, or
any utensil or fixture, whether
made of metal or other material,
respectively fixed in or to any
building whatsoever."

BEFORE THE RECORDER.

June 15th.

The phrase "bullock steal

ing," in the stat.

7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 28, relating

of rewards in certain cases

REX v. GILLBRASS.

THE prisoner was indicted for stealing a cow and a heifer, the property of Edward Pocock.

After the conviction of the prisoner, C. Phillips, for the to the allowance prosecution, applied to the Court to order, in addition to the usual expenses, compensation, in the nature of a reward, to be paid to the prosecutor, who it appeared had been very active, and incurred great expense in the dis covery and apprehension of the prisoner.

for the discovery of offenders, includes all cases of cattle stealing of that particular de

scription, e. g. ox, cow, heifer, &c.

On referring to the statute authorizing the payment of a reward in certain cases (a), it appeared that the only

(a) 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 28.

words at all applicable to the present case were "bullock stealing."

Upon this, Law, Recorder, who tried the case, doubted whether a cow or heifer would come within the meaning of the word" bullock," as used in the statute; but after further consideration, and a reference to the 25th section of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, which relates to the offence of cattle stealing, his Lordship thought that the words "bullock stealing," "horse stealing," and "sheep stealing," used in the 7 Geo. 4, were intended to describe the kind or class of offences in connexion with which rewards were to be allowed, and made an order for the allowance of compensation accordingly.

C. Phillips, for the prosecution.

1836.

REX

v.

GILLBRASS.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE PATTESON AND MR. BARON GURNEY.

REX v. HAYDON and CHUCK.

THE indictment stated that the prisoner Haydon, being servant to the prosecutrix, stole a purse containing 407., and that the prisoner Chuck received the same, well knowing it to have been stolen.

June 16th.

The driver of a hired for the day is not the

glass coach

servant of the party hiring it, so as to bring a him within the

pro

statute relating to larceny by

It appeared that the property had been stolen from glass coach which had been hired for the day by the secutrix, and of which the prisoner Haydon was the servants, 7 & 8 driver.

Clarkson, for the prisoner Haydon, objected that he could not be said to be the servant of the prosecutrix; and stated that in similar cases in this Court the Judges had always held that the relation of master and servant did not exist.

Geo. 4, c. 29,

s. 46.

1836.

REX

บ.

HAYDON.

Riddell, for the prosecution, referred to the case of Laugher v. Forister (a), in which the point was raised; but the Court of King's Bench were divided in opinion, and no judgment was given.

PATTESON, J., and GURNEY, B., held, that the relation of mistress and servant did not exist between the prosecutrix and the prisoner Haydon, and that the aggravated offence was therefore not proved.

Verdict-Haydon guilty of simple larceny, and Chuck of receiving.

Riddell, for the prosecution.

Clarkson, for the prisoner Haydon.

C. Phillips, for the prisoner Chuck.

[Attornies-Hayward, and Harmer & Co.]

(a) 5 B. & C. 547.

June 18th.

Biting off the
end of a per-
son's nose is
not a wounding
within the
meaning of the
stat. 9 Geo. 4,
c. 31, s. 12;

nor is biting off
a joint from a
person's finger;
as the statute
is intended
only to apply
to wounding
produced by
some instru-
ment, and not

REX v. ANN HARRIS.

THE prisoner was indicted under the statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 12, for wounding a female by biting off the end of her nose.

PATTESON, J., told the jury that in Rex v. Stevens, which had occurred a short time ago, the prisoner had been indicted under the same section of the same statute for biting off the joint of a policeman's finger, and the case having been reserved for the opinion of the fifteen judges, they had determined that the offence of biting off

by the hands or teeth, &c.

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