A case of great importance to the commercial world was decided at Leeds Assizes on Saturday, when Mr. J. W. Pennington, wool merchant, of Bradford, sued Messrs. J. Crossley and Sons, carpet manufacturers, of Halifax. for £509 for wool sold. It appeared that in due course defendants posted a cheque for the amount mentioned, but it never reached plaintiff. being stolen in transit and afterwards paid into a bank at Leeds by a man who represented himself as Mr. Pennington, opened an account, and drew £200 in gold. The defendants' contention was that the sending of the cheque by post cleared them from any further liabilities, the postoffice being the common agent for both parties. Mr. Justice Grantham decided that plaintiff must suffer the loss, as it was shown that in the trading between the parties it had been customary for defendants to pay by cheque.

Mr. William Willis, Q.C., was entertained at a complimentary banquet, given at the Trocadero Restaurant, on Saturday evening, by a number of his friends at the Bar, to celebrate his appointment as County Court Judge. Sir R. E. Webster, Q.C., M.P. occupied the chair, and among those present were Messrs. J. C. Bigham, Q.C., M.P.; F. A. Bosanquet, Q.C.; R. A. Bayford, Q.C.; Lord Coleridge, Q.C.; A. M. Channell, Q.C.; F. O. Crump, Q.C.; A. Cock, Q.C.; H. F. Dickens, Q.C.: Cyril Dodd, Q.C.; Bargrave Deane, Q.C.; Lewis Edmunds, Q.C.; F. Fitzgerald, Q.C.; H. D. Greene, Q.C., M.P.; R. O. B. Lane, Q.C.; Pitt Lewis, Q.C.; J. M. Moorsom, Q.C.; Sir H. Poland, Q.C.; E. G. Pyke, Q.C.; A. H. Ruegg, Q.C.; Lush Wilson, Q.C.; J. G. Witt, Q.C., and Messrs. W. H. Leese, Adam Walker, C. C. Scott, Dunlop Hill, S. Macaskie, Reginald Brown, Rose-Innes, F. K. North, P. Blackwell, G. Elliott, J. Robins, R. J. Willis, C. W. Williamson, R. M. Bray, Boydell Houghton, W. D. Benson, Lloyd Morgan, H. A. Forman, J. Wedderburn, G. Stephenscn, E. Boyle, C. J. Willock, H. W. Loehnis, H. Sutton, F. Lemon, H. Croft, W. T. Barnard, F. H. Willis, W. O. Willis, Horace Avory, Percival Clarke, T. M. Stevens, W. J. Dixon, R. A. Yelverton, E. Hansell, Hume-Williams, William Graham, A. Statham, J. A. Pickering, S. H. Day, A. Denman, J. P. Rawlinson, Temple Franks, H. H. Haldinstein, Courthorpe Munro, W. Raydon, T. T. Payne, W. Boxall, Lynden Bell, Edgar Foa, W. F. Barry, Charles Mathews, Herbert Russell, H. C. Biron, H. J. Cohen, L. D. Powles, Cecil Chapman, Ernest Pollock, English Harrison, J. Eldon Bankes, and E. Lewis Thomas.

At Cork Assizes, on the 19th inst., Chief Baron Palles, in the City, and Mr. Justice O'Brien, in the County Court, referred at some length to the action of the Treasury in having refused to sanction the expenses of the usual military guard at the judges' lodgings during the holding of the assizes, on the ground apparently that the expenditure could not properly be charged to either the civil or military list, though it had been going on for centuries. The Chief Baron said there had been a departure at the present assizes from the constitutional usage which had existed as far back as our judicial records in this country went. Personally, he thought it a very small matter indeed, but he felt bound not to allow any privilege that belonged to the judges of assize to be lost. It was a matter of importance that everything which ancient usage had ordained in reference to their proceedings should be observed until it was altered in the only mode in which it could be altered-namely, by Act of Parliament. They thought it right to communicate with the Lord-Lieutenant, and to request that immediate directions should be given by him in reference to the matter. His Excellency investigated the matter, and that morning they received a reply, in which it was explained that the sheriff made the usual requisition for a military escort and received a reply that it would be provided if the sheriff made arrangements for the accommodation of the In conjunction with his learned brother, Mr. Justice O'Brien, he had considered the question, and he did not hesitate to say that the action on the part of Her Majesty's Treasury was utterly unwarranted in law, Mr. Justice O'Brien, referring to the same subject, said that the demand made upon the sheriff for the expense of the accommodation was entirely groundless in point of law, and the duty should not in any degree be undertaken by the sheriff.

men.

The case of the Grand Junction Waterworks Company v. Cowley came before his Honour Judge Bagshawe, of the Brentford County Court, sitting at the Middle Temple, on Saturday, the 13th inst. This was a test case arranged in order to decide the question whether the company had a right to charge a fixed sum for a garden supply irrespective of the size of the garden. The company sued Mr. Victor Cowley, of Ealing, the secretary of the Ealing Water Consumers' Protection Committee, for " the sum of £1 18., which the defendant is, under contract expressed or implied, bound to pay to the plaintiffs for water of the plaintiffs used by the defendant for garden purposes during the season of 1896, or alternatively, for £1 1s. damages for the use by the defendant of water for such purposes for such period."-Ram, who appeared for the company, said that in 1894 the company issued notices to the defendant and other consumers that for the future there would be a minimum charge of £1 18. per season for water used in gardens by means of a hose. It was admitted that in 1896 the defendant did use the company's water in his garden, and Mr. Ram, therefore, contended that this involved acceptance of the company's terms and was an implied agreement to pay.-Turner, who represented the defendant, replied that the Act provided that water should be supplied for garden purposes at a price to be agreed between the consumer and the company. There could not be said to be an agreement when the company said to the consumer, "We alone can supply you with water for your garden, and we will only let you have it at a certain price." It was sheer coercion; not agreement. The company was only entitled to claim damages proportionate to the loss sustained. On this point he pointed out that the defendant's garden was a mere patch of 785 superficial feet, and that the guinea claimed by the company represented 28,000 gallons at the company's meter price of 9d. per gallon- a quantity which it was quite impossible the defendant could have used. The

defendant estimated the company's loss at 58., and he had paid that amount into court. It was agreed to call no evidence on either side, the case being merely argued.--His HONOUR, in giving judgment for the company for the amount claimed, said that he found the offer to supply water to gardens by means of a hose for the sum of one guinea was reasonable, and therefore the use of the water was an implied acceptance of the terms. The quantity of water used on an average in a garden would be very difficult to measure. In fixing the charge the company were obliged to take into consideration not merely the minimum amount of water used, or the amount used even by the reasonably-minded consumer, but also that taken by the many consumers who construed their rights with the greatest liberality towards themselves. Considering all this, he held the charge of one guinea fair.-The company were awarded costs upon the highest scale, and his Honour certified, for the purposes of an appeal, that the matter litigated was of importance to a class or body of persons-to wit, consumers of water belonging to water companies, and of general and public interest."

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Mortgage-Tenants in Common-Power of Sale-Sale to one of several Mortgagors. The appellant and D. were owners, as tenants in common, of a property which they mortgaged to T. By arrangement D. managed the property, collected the rents, paid the interest on the mortgage, and other outgoings, and accounted to the appellant. T., in a proper and bond fide exercise of the power of sale contained in the mortgage deed, sold the property to D. for a sum equal to the amount due for principal, interest, and costs, without notice to the appellant. Held, that the transaction must be treated as a sale and not as a redemption, and that its validity could not be impeached. Judgment of the Court of Appeal (74 L. T. Rep. 599; (1896) 1 Ch. 762) affirmed.

[Kennedy v. De Trafford. H. of L. March 19.-Counsel: Farwell, Q.C. and Maberly; Warmington, Q.C. and Clarkson; Astbury, Q.C. and Dodson. Solicitors: Chester, Mayhew, and Co., for Crofton, Craven, and Worthington, Manchester; L. W. Byrne, for Taylor, Kirkman, and Colley, Manchester; Pritchard, Englefield, and Co., for Boote and Edgar, Manchester.]

COURT OF APPEAL.

Building Contract-Power to Building Owner to order Extra WorksClause as to Penalties for Delay in Completion of Works-Waiver of Penalties by ordering Extras.-By a written contract the plaintiff, a builder, agreed to make certain alterations in the defendant's house for £664 as set forth in the specification and according to the general conditions annexed thereto. By clause 1 of the general conditions "the whole of the works, and any other works that may be ordered as additions to this contract, are to be executed and completed in the best and most workmanlike manner, and with the best materials of their several kinds, and everything to be done to the full spirit and intent of this contract, which is intended to comprise everything necessary to the perfect completion of the works. Every part of the works to be done to the satisfaction of the architects, and their direction to be followed in every respect, and their opinion on all questions relating to the works or contract to be final and conclusive." By clause 4, "any authority given by the architects for any alteration or addition in or to the works is not to vitiate the contract, but all additions, omissions, or variations made in carrying out the works for which a price may not have been previously agreed upon are to be measured and valued and certified by the architects, and added to or deducted from the amount of the contract as the case may be, according to the detailed schedule of prices on which the contract was formed. By clause 24, "the whole of the works to be completed by the 1st June 1892 under a penalty of £2 a week for every week that any part of the work remains unfinished after that date as liquidated damages." Extra works were ordered by the architects to the amount of £22 18s. 6d., and the whole of the works were not completed until twenty-seven weeks after the 1st June 1892. The present action was commenced by the builder to recover the balance due to him from the defendant under the contract. The defendant admitted the claim, but counter-claimed for £50 as liquidated damages for the delay in the completion of the works; estimating the delay caused by the extras at two weeks, he claimed this £50 as the damages due under clause 24 for twenty-five weeks' delay. The action was tried in the Shropshire County Court, and the judge, holding that the ordering of the extras was a waiver of the stipulation to pay damages for delay in completing the works, gave judgment for the plaintiff on the counter-claim. On appeal to the Queen's Bench Division, the Court (Wills and Wright, JJ.) were divided in opinion, and the judgment of the County Court judge was therefore affirmed. The defendant appealed. Holme v. Guppy (3 M. & W. 387), Westwood v. The Secretary of State for India (7 L. T. Rep. 736), and Jones v. St. John's College, Oxford (23 L. T. Rep. 803; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 115) were cited. Held, that by ordering the extra works the defendant had deprived himself of his right of claiming penalties for the delay in completing the works. Appeal dismissed.

[Dodd v. Churton. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. March 19.-Counsel for the plaintiff, Loehnis; for the defendant, E. Honoratus Lloyd. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Rowcliffes,

Rawle, and Co., for A. E. Whittingham, Nantwich; for the defendant, Cunliffes and Davenport, for J. W. Churton, Whitchurch.] Company-Application by Shareholders to the Board of Trade-Examination of Affairs of Company-Inspector appointed by Board of Trade -Prohibition-The Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), 88. 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, and 61).-Upon the application of several shareholders in the Grosvenor and West End Railway Terminus Hotel Company Limited, holding not less than one-fifth part of the shares in the company, the Board of Trade appointed F. Whinney to act as inspector to examine into the affairs of the company under sect. 56 of the Companies Act 1862. After the inspector had held several sittings for this purpose, one of the shareholders who had made the application to the Board of Trade commenced an action on behalf of himself and other shareholders against the company, the directors, and another person, to recover damages for fraudulent conspiracy. The company then applied to the Board of Trade to put a stop to the further examination by the inspector. The board refused. The inspector also refused an application by the company to discontinue the inquiry. The company then took out a summons at chambers for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Board of Trade and the inspector from further proceedings in the matter of the inquiry into the affairs of the company. Lawrance, J. refused to make any order, and gave leave to appeal. The company appealed. They contended that they were obliged to supply documents and information to the inspector which would be used by the plaintiff in the action which he had commenced, and that the proceedings before the inspector embarrassed and prejudiced the action being carried on in the High Court, and that, therefore, the writ of prohibition ought to issue. Reg. v. The Local Government Board (48 L. T. Rep. 173; 10 Q. B. Div. 309) and Re The Local Government Board; Ex parte The Commissioners of the Township of Kingstown (16 L. Rep. Ir. 150) were cited. Held, that the writ of prohibition must be refused. An inquiry before an inspector appointed by the Board of Trade under sect. 56 of the Companies Act 1862 is not a proceeding of such a kind as to be the subject-matter of a writ of prohibition. Appeal dismissed.

over.

[Re The Grosvenor aud West End Railway Terminus Hotel Company Limited. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. March 22. Counsel: for the company, Sir Edward Clarke, Q.C., Pollard, and T. M. Stevens; for the Board of Trade, The AttorneyGeneral (Sir R. E. Webster, Q.C.) and Sutton; for the inspector, Bigham, Q.C. and Whinney. Solicitors: Mossop and Rolfe; Solicitor to the Board of Trade; C. T. Whinney.] Company-Winding-up-Issue of paid-up Shares-Registered ContractContributories-Companies Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 131), s. 25. W., M., and others, who carried on the business of cab proprietors and livery-stable keepers, became desirous of turning their business into a limited company, and on the 10th Jan. 1894 a contract was entered into between W. and M., as representing the vendors, and the company (in which all the vendors were to become the shareholders), for the sale to the company of the business, plant, &c., for the sum of £46,000, to be paid as follows: £7000 in cash, £3000 in first mortgage debentures, £6000 in second mortgage debentures, £10,000 by the company taking over certain mortgage liabilities, and the balance of £20,000 in fullypaid shares of £10 each. The consideration was by the agreement allocated as follows: £6000 for goodwill and trade marks, £12,000 for freeholds, £500 for leaseholds, £27,000 for coaches, horses, &c., £250 for contract rights, &c., and £250 for the rent of the property taken The agreement was filed with the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies before the issue of any shares. The company afterwards getting into difficulties, was ordered to be wound-up compulsorily. In the books of the company, the figure at which the coaches, horses, &c., were set down at the time of the formation of the company was about £15,000, and the official receiver now sought to recover from the vendors the difference between that sum and the £27,000 allocated to this item in the agreement-a sum of about £11,000-on the ground that to this extent the consideration was a sham. The summons taken out by the official receiver was twofold: the first portion claiming the amount from the respondents as damages for their misfeasance as officers of the company; the second asking for a declaration that they were liable as contributories to make up this amount as unpaid on their shares. decided by Williams, J. (75 L. T. Rep. 652) that, there being admittedly no damages proved, the claim for misfeasance failed; and that, the official receiver having failed to establish that there was no contract here capable of registration under sect. 25 of the Act of 1867, and having made out no case on the facts to induce the court to go behind the registered contract and draw the conclusion that the consideration here, so far as it related to the £11,000, was merely a colourable consideration, the second branch of his summons also failed. The official receiver appealed. Held, that, although the shares in a limited company could not be issued at a discount (The Ooregum Gold Mining Company Limited v. Roper, 66 L. T. Rep. 427; (1892) A. C. 125), and the technical doctrine that payment by a debtor to his creditor of a less sum than was due did not discharge the debt had been invoked in aid of the law which prevented the shares of a limited company from being issued at a discount, yet this technical doctrine, though often sufficient to decide a particular case, would not suffice as a basis for the wider rule or principle that a company could not effectually release a shareholder from his statutory obligation to pay in money or money's worth the amount of his shares. Held also, that it had never yet been decided that a limited company could not buy property or pay for services at any price it thought proper, and pay for them in fully paid-up shares, and, provided that it did so honestly and not colourably, and provided that it had not been so imposed upon as to be entitled to be relieved

It was

from its bargain, agreements by a limited company to pay for property or services in paid-up shares were valid and binding on the company and its creditors. Re Heywood Company; Pell's case (L. Rep. 8 Eq. 222; L. Rep. 5 Ch. App. 11), Re Wedgwood Coal and Iron Company; Anderson's case (37 L. T. Rep. 560; 7 Ch. Div. 75), and similar decisions, considered and applied. Held further, that the transaction of issuing shares at a discount, and paying for property or services in shares at a price put upon them by a vendor and agreed to by the company, were essentially different, the one being ultra vires, and the other intra vires. Held, therefore, that the appeal failed, and must be dismissed with costs. Decision of Williams, J. affirmed.

[Re E. J. Wragg Limited. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. Feb. 26 and March 2, 4, 5, and 19.-Counsel: for the appellants, Sir Robert Finlay (S.-G.), Buckley, Q.C. and Ingle Joyce; for the respondents, Herbert Reed, Q.C. and Ward Coleridge; Eve, Q.C. and A. H. Carrington. Solicitors: for the appellants, The Solicitors to the Board of Trade; for the respondents, Young and Sons; Colyer and Colyer; A. E. Greville.]

County Court-Execution-Goods claimed-No Deposit or SecurityGoods sold-Title of Purchaser-County Courts Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 156.-The County Courts Act 1888, by sect. 156, provides that: "Where any claim shall be made to or in respect of any goods taken in execution under the process of the court, the claimant may deposit with the bailiff either the amount of the value of the goods claimed, such value to be affixed by appraisement in case of dispute, to be by such bailiff paid into court, to abide the decision of the judge upon such claim, or the sum which the bailiff shall be allowed to charge as costs of keeping possession of such goods until such decision can be obtained, or may give to the bailiff in the prescribed manner security for the value of the goods claimed, and in default of the claimant so doing, the bailiff shall sell such goods as if no such claim had been made, and shall pay into court the proceeds of such sale to abide the decision of the judge." Under an execution in an action between other parties, a horse belonging to the plaintiff had been seized by the County Court bailiff. The plaintiff duly claimed in writing that the horse was his. The high bailiff duly sent him notice requiring him to make a deposit, or give security, in accordance with sect. 156, but the plaintiff failed to comply with that notice. The bailiff sold the horse by auction to the defendant, and duly paid the proceeds of such sale into court. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action in the County Court against the defendant to recover damages for wrongful conversion of the horse. The County Court judge gave judgment for the plaintiff, upon the ground that the sale by the bailiff gave the purchaser no better title than the execution debtor had. Upon appeal the Divisional Court (Wills and Wright, JJ.) reversed the decision of the County Court judge, holding that a sale under sect. 156 conferred a good title upon the purchaser. The plaintiff appealed, with leave. Held (affirming the decision of the Queen's Bench Division), that the sale by the bailiff under sect. 156 of the County Courts Act 1888 conferred a good title upon the purchaser.

[Goodlock v. Cousins. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. March 17.-Counsel: for the appellant, Cranstoun; for the respondent, Stroud. Solicitors: for the appellant, Peacock and Goddard, for Lamb, Cheltenham; for the respondent, W. H. Martin and Co., for Heath, Cheltenham.]

Local Government-Sewers-Duty of Local Authority to provideRemedy for Default-Complaint to Local Government Board-Mandamus-The Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 15, 21, 299. -The Public Health Act 1875 provides, by sect. 15, that "every local authority shall keep in repair all sewers belonging to them, and shall cause to be made such sewers as may be necessary for effectually draining their district for the purposes of this Act;" and, by sect. 21, that the owners and occupiers within the district may drain into the sewers of the local authority; and, by sect. 299, that "where a complaint is made to the Local Government Board that a local authority has made default in providing their district with sufficient sewers the Local Government Board, if satisfied, after due inquiry, that the authority has been guilty of the alleged default, shall make an order limiting a time for the performance of their duty in the matter of such complaint. If such duty is not performed by the time limited in the order, such order may be enforced by writ of mandamus, or the Local Government Board may appoint some person to perform such duty." The plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants, the local authority, alleging that they desired to cause their drains to empty into the sewers of the defendants, and to carry into such sewers the liquids proceeding from their factory, but that the sewers within the district were not such as were necessary for effectually draining the district for the purposes of the Public Health Act, and in particular for draining their premises, so that they were unable to cause their drains to empty into the said sewers. The plaintiffs claimed a mandamus commanding the defendants to cause to be made such sewers as might be necessary for effectually draining their district for the purposes of the Public Health Act 1875, and in particular their premises. Charles, J. gave judgment for the plaintiffs, granting a mandamus in the terms of the above claim. The defendants appealed. Held (reversing the decision of Charles, J.), that the duty to make sewers imposed by sect. 15 of the Public Health Act 1875 could not be enforced by mandamus, the sole remedy being by complaint to the Local Government Board under sect. 299 of the Act.

[Peebles v. Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. March 18.--Counsel for the appellants, Joseph Walton, Q.C. and Danckwerts; for the respondents, Bigham, Q.C. and C. A. Russell, Q.C. Solicitors for the

appellants, Soames, Edwards, and Jones, for Costeker, Darwen; for the respondents, Pritchard, Englefield, and Co., for Boote and Edgar, Manchester.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Action against Administrators-Injury committed by Deceased-Continuing Injury-3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 2.—This was an action by the plaintiff, as owner of certain freehold houses, against the administrators, with the will annexed, of Viscount Clifden, alleging that Viscount Clifden had, by erecting buildings opposite to the plaintiff's houses, obstructed or diminished access of air and light to the windows of the plaintiff's houses, and claiming damages, an injunction, and other relief. The Viscount died on the 28th March 1895. The buildings complained of were finished in Aug. 1894. The plaintiff's right of action depended upon the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 2, which provides (inter alia) as follows: "An action of trespass, or trespass on the case, as the case may be, may be maintained against the executors or administrators of any person deceased for any wrong committed by him in his lifetime to another in respect of his property real or personal, so as such injury shall have been committed within six calendar months before such person's death, and so as such action shall be brought within six calendar months after such executors or administrators shall have taken upon themselves the administration of the estate and effects of such person." The defendants contended that, as the buildings were completed more than six calendar months before the death, the action could not be maintained. Held, that the question was not as to when the wrong was committed, but as to when the injury was committed, and the injury was committed, not by the wrongful construction only, but by the continuance of the wrong done from day to day. Each day that the wrong continued an injury was done. The action was, therefore, maintainable within the statute.

[Jenks v. Viscount Clifden. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. March 16.Counsel: Renshaw, Q.C. and Rowden; Warrington, Q.C. and George Lawrence. Solicitors: Foyer and Hordern; Lewis and Lewis.] Company-Winding-up—Register of Mortgages and Charges-Right of Creditor to Inspection-Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), 88. 43, 156. The L. S. Company was being wound-up under the supervision of the court, and a summons was taken out by a creditor and debenture-holder for leave to inspect the company's register of mortgages and charges under sect. 43 of the Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89). Held, that sect. 43 had no application after the commencement of the winding-up, and that the applicant had no statutory right to obtain the ir spection asked for.

[Somerset v. Land Securities Company Limited. Ch. Div.: Williams, J. March 17.-Counsel: C. E. E. Jenkins; A. R. Kirby. Solicitors: Brooks, Jenkins, and Co.; Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, and Co.] Infant-Guardian ad litem-Bankrupt-Removal-Costs.-Motion for infant defendant by his next friend that the father of the infant, who was guardian ad litem, might be removed and a proper person appointed, and the costs of the motion might be paid by the father. Proceedings had been instituted for the administration of a testator's estate, in which the infant had an interest. Evidence was given that the father did not live with his wife, and was an undischarged bankrupt. The trustee of the bankrupt was not a party to the proceedings. The Court made an order removing the father, and appointed the official receiver in his place, and ordered the father to pay the costs of the motion, though it was not the practice to make a bankrupt pay costs.

[Re Thomson; Thomson v. Thomson. Ch. Div. Kekewich, J. March 12.-Counsel: Warrington, Q.C. and R. F. Norton; Talbot Crossfield. Solicitors: Chester, Mayhew, Broome, and Griffithes, for Wright and Brown, Carlisle; Valpy, Chaplin, and Peckham.] Settled Land-Trustees-London Houses-Pulling down-Rebuilding -Infants-Jurisdiction.--Summons by trustees of a settlement for the determination of the questions: (1) whether in the opinion of the court it would be for the benefit of the infant defendants, and any unborn children of the defendant, the tenant for life, that the messuages and premises, Nos. 82, 83, and 82A, Grosvenor-street, and No. 130, New Bond-street, London, W., held upon the trusts of the settlement, should be taken down and rebuilt in accordance with a scheme proposed by an architect at a cost of not more than £8500, to be raised by mortgage of the property; (2) whether the plaintiffs were at liberty to raise the sum required for the purpose of such taking down and rebuilding by a mortgage of the property; (3) costs. It was proposed to pull down the whole of the premises, which were old and out of date, and build on the site, which was a corner site, first-class shops fitted with all modern requirements. The trustees, by the settlement, had a power of sale, also to obtain a renewal of the lease, and for that purpose were at liberty to raise, by sale or mortgage of the premises, such sums as should be required to meet the fine or other expense of or incident to such renewal, or incurred in relation thereto, including all such costs of repairing, rebuilding, or reinstating the premises as might be required for the purpose of obtaining such renewal. There was evidence that the value of the property would be greatly increased by taking down and rebuilding the premises. Held, that the original jurisdiction of the court touching the expenditure of money on land, is not ousted by the Settled Land Acts, but that whatever the court may have from time to time done in cases of salvage, or whatever may have been done without full consideration of the question of jurisdiction, the court has never asserted a jurisdiction to spend money in pulling down and rebuilding houses; the cases tended to show that the jurisdiction does not exist; no order on the application as to costs or otherwise.

[Re Montagu; Derbishire v. Montagu. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J.

March 6 and 16.-Counsel: Warrington, Q.C. and B. B. Rogers; H. E. Wright; T. A. Nash. Solicitors: Cree and Son; Wood, Bigg, and Nash.]

Vendor and Purchaser-Sale as Going Concern-Time Essence of Contract -Negotiations continued after Date fixed for Completion-Action by Sub-Purchaser against original Purchaser-Lis pendens-Ten Days Notice to complete-Reasonable Notice.-The agreement for sale of a public-house as a going concern provided that the purchase should be completed on the 31st Dec. 1896. Shortly after the date of the agreement the purchaser sold the benefit thereof to another person, who, after considerable delay, sold his interest to a third person, and the original vendor had notice of these transactions. In addition to this an action, of which the original vendor had notice, was subsequently commenced against the original purchaser by a fourth person for specific performance of an alleged agreement for the sale of the public-house to him by such purchaser, and was registered as a lis pendens, which prevented the original purchaser from borrowing on the security of the premises the money necessary to complete her purchase. Meanwhile negotiations between the original vendor and purchaser continued after the date fixed for completion, and when the title had been accepted and the draft conveyance approved, the original vendor, on the 13th Feb. 1897, gave notice to the original purchaser to complete in ten days, to which the latter replied that she had already commenced proceedings to get the lis pendens vacated, and when this was accomplished would complete as soon as possible, and objected that a ten days' notice to complete was not reasonable under the circumstances. The original vendor, however, at the expiration of the ten days, notified to the original purchaser that the contract was at an end. Upon motion by the original purchaser for an injunction to restrain the original vendor from dealing with the property without regard to her rights under their agreement: Held, that the notice was reasonable under the circumstances, and the motion was dismissed.

[Smith v. Batsford. Ch. Div.: North, J. March 12.-Counsel: Henry Terrell; Swinfen Eady, Q.C. and A. Beddall. Solicitors = Trevor, Davies, and Marrable; Croft and Mortimer.]

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Factories-Workshop open on Sunday Persons of Jewish Religion

Open for Traffic"-Factory and Workshop Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vic. c. 16), 8. 51.-Case stated by a metropolitan police magistrate, sitting at the Thames Police-court. An information was laid by the respondent, an inspector of factories and workshops, against the appellant, charging that on the 20th Sept. 1896, at a certain workshop, of which the appellant was then the occupier, a woman was employed contrary to the provisions of the Factory Acts, and that the appellant having availed himself of an exception under Part 2 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, in the employment of the woman in the workshop, did not observe the condition of such exception, and that the workshop was open for traffic on that day being Sunday. The magistrate heard the case on the 17th Nov., when he convicted the appellant, and fined him one shilling and four shillings costs. The facts proved were these: The appellant was a button-hole machinist, his business being to make button-holes for master tailors. He was of the Jewish religion, and having his workshop closed on Saturdays had availed himself of an exception under Part 2 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, sect. 51, which entitled him if he thought proper to employ women and young persons on Sundays, subject, however, to the condition (inter alia) that his workshop should not be open for traffic on Sunday. The appellant's mode of doing business was as follows: He entered into arrangements with his customers under which he was to make button-holes on their garments at certain prices. They sent the garments to the workshop, and fetched them away when the work was done. The button-holes were not paid for at the time the work was left, or when it was fetched away, but accounts were kept aud settlements were made at times quite independent of these visits. The workshop was open on Sunday in order that such customers might send or fetch garments in pursuance of such prior arrangements, but the workshop was not kept open for the purpose of making an arrangement either with an old or new customer, or for the receipt of work from a casual customer, or for the payment for work already done, or for the settlement of any accounts with respect to work done or to be done. The appellant, on Sunday the 20th Sept., employed in the workshop a woman of the Jewish religion. The magistrate was of opinion that the facts stated brought the appellant's workshop within the words " open for traffic on Sunday," and convicted the appellant accordingly. The question was, whether the facts stated brought the appellant's workshop within the words " open for traffic on Sunday." Sect. 51 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 provides: "No penalty shall be incurred by any person in respect of any work done on Sunday in a factory or workshop by a young person or woman of the Jewish religion, subject to the following conditions: (1) The occupier of the factory or workshop shall be of the Jewish religion; (2) The factory or workshop shall be closed on Saturday, and shall not be open for traffic on Sunday." For the appellant it was now contended that the words open for traffic on Sunday" meant open for traffic or trade with outside persons coming to and from the workshop for the purpose of trafficking, such as the carrying on of a retail shop. Held, that the construction put by the magistrate upon the words "open for traffic" was too narrow, and that the workshop was not "open for traffic" within the meaning of the section. Conviction quashed.

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[Goldstein (app.) v. Vaughan (resp.). Q. B. Div. Cave and Grantham, JJ. March 13.-Counsel: Channell, Q C. and Israel Davis; H. Sutton. Solicitors: T. W. Moore; The Solicitor to the Treasury.]

Gaming-House, Office, or other Place used for Betting-Meaning of "Place"-16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, ss. 1 and 3.-Case stated by justices for the county of Surrey, siting at Kingston-on-Thames. At the Courthouse, Kingston, an information was preferred by John Hawke, the appellant, against Richard Dunn, the respondent, for that he on the 4th July 1896 did unlawfully use a certain place for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto upon certain events and contingencies of and relating to horse-races, contrary to 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, s. 3, of the Betting-house Act 1853. The information was heard on the 23rd July 1896, when the following facts were proved: A company, called the Hurst Park Club Syndicate Limited are the owners of certain land, many acres in extent, situate on Molesey Hurst, in the county of Surrey, and inclosed by a tall fence or paling, with gates at different points. During the year the said company hold a series of race meetings for horse races on the said land, on which are a racecourse, stands for viewing the races, inclosures, paddocks, and all the usual accessories of a racecourse. Access is obtained to the said land in the first instance by the general public through the said gates on payment of a shilling a head, and then afterwards, if desired, access is gained by an additional payment of £1 to a stand and inclosure known as the £1 inclosure or Tattersall's ring. This inclosure, which is in front of the stand, is a piece of ground about forty yards long by thirty yards broad, surrounded on three sides by an open iron fence or paling about breast high. A race meeting was held on the 4th July, at which many thousands of the general public were present. In the £1 inclosure there were present about one thousand of the general public, amongst whom were at least fifteen bookmakers or professional betting men (including the respondent), shouting out the odds against the horses running in the different races, and inviting all those resorting to the said inclosure to bet with them. The respondent named the odds he was willing to lay, received the money the backer wished to stake upon the horse in question, handed the backer a ticket with the bookmaker's name and a number upon it, and, after the race, if the horse backed won, the respondent, on presentation of the ticket, returned to the backer his original stake plus the odds in money laid by the respondent. A witness for the appellant proved making and losing three different bets with the respondent in the manner above described, and produced the tickets received from the respondent in respect of each bet. The respondent did not confine himself to any fixed spot, and had no stool, umbrella, or anything in the nature of a fixture to denote where he carried on betting, but moved about. The justices were of opinion that the case was governed by that of Snow v. Hill (14 Q. B. Div. 588), and that an inclosure thirty yards long by forty wide could not be considered a place within the meaning of sect. 3, which provides that "any person who, being the owner or occupier of any house, office, room, or other place, or a person using the same, shall open, keep or use the same for the purposes herein before mentioned," shall be liable to a penalty. They therefore dismissed the information. Held, on appeal, that the justices were wrong. Any area of inclosed ground (expressing no opinion as to uninclosed areas), covered or uncovered, which is known by a name, or is capable of reasonably accurate description, to which persons from time to time or upon any particular occasions resort, used by a professional betting man for the purpose of exercising his calling may be a place within the meaning of the statute. Metes and bounds are not essential; nor does it necessarily matter whether the bookmaker moves about or remains in one spot. But it is for the magistrates to decide in each case whether in fact the law has been violated.

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[Hawke v. Dunn. Q. B. Div.: Hawkins, Cave, Wills, Wright, and Kennedy, JJ. Dec. 18 and March 13. Counsel: for the appellant, Asquith, Q.C. and R. Brown; for the respondent, Bigham, Q.C. and G. H. Stuffield. Solicitors for the appellant, Malkin and Co., for James Bell, Kingston-on-Thames; for the respondent, T. Aldingham.]

Lunacy-Person detained in Asylum-Certificates by two Medical Prac titioners-Jurisdiction of Commissioners as to Order of DischargeLunacy Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 5), 8. 49. Rule calling on the Commissioners in Lunacy to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue, directed to them commanding them to make and issue an order in accordance with the provisions of sect. 49 of the Lunacy Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 5). to discharge a private patient from further detention under the reception order of the 19th May 1895, and made by a justice of the peace. This rule was obtained at the instance of the patient, who wished to obtain his discharge. The patient was, upon the certificates of two medical men, removed to a sanatorium for insane persons, at which sanatorium he has since remained, and is still detained, as a lunatic, though not so found by inquisition. Upon an application made to them on behalf of the lunatic the Commissioners in Lunacy, in Jan. 1897, by their order authorised two medical practitioners to examine the patient and report as to his condition. These two medical practitioners visited and examined the patient, and they certified that the patient did not require detention in an asylum, and they stated that, having made a thorough investigation into his mental condition, they were of opinion that he might be discharged without risk to himself or the public, and they certified accordingly. The Commissioners in Lunacy, however, were of opinion that the patient was still of unsound mind, and they wrote a letter to the applicant's solicitors stating that they had given the matter full consideration, and had made careful inquiry into the case, and that they must decline to make an order under sect. 49 of the Lunacy Act 1890 for his discharge. The solicitors for the applicant then applied for this rule for a mandamus to the commissioners to compel them to order the discharge of the applicant, contending that the word "may "in sect. 49 meant "must," and that therefore the commissioners were bound under sect. 49, upon the proper certificates of two medical practitioners being given-as had been done in this case-to

order the discharge of any patient. Sect. 49 of the Act provided: "Am order for the examination by two medical practitioners authorised by the commissioners, of any person detained as a lunatic in any institution for lunatics, or as a single patient, may be obtained from the commissioners upon the application of any person, whether a relative or friend or not, who satisfies the commissioners that it is proper for them to grant such order; and on production to the commissioners of the certificates of the medical practitioners so authorised, certifying that they are of opinion that the patient

may without risk or injury to himself or the public, be discharged, the commissioners may order the patient to be discharged at the expiration of ten days from the date of the order." For the application it wasnow contended that the words " may order" the discharge meant must order the discharge; whereas for the commissioners it was contended that the words gave them a discretion to act, or refuse to act, upon. the two certificates. Held, that the word " may" in this section did not mean "must," and that the commissioners had a discretion to order the discharge or not as they thought fit. Rule discharged.

[Reg. v. The Commissioners in Lunacy. Q. B. Div.: Cave and Grantham, JJ. March 13.-Counsel: H. Sutton; Tindal Atkinson. Solicitors: The Treasury Solicitors; Robbins, Billing, and Co.] Metropolis-" New Streets"-Cost of Paving-Metropolis Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 105; Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26Vict. c. 102), ss. 77, 112.-Case stated by justices of London. The respondents, the Hammersmith Vestry, served the appellant (Andrew Arter) with a notice requiring him, as the owner of certain premises referred to in the notice, to pay within fourteen days the sum of £295 11s. 4d., being the amount alleged to be payable by him as such owner of the estimated cost of paving an alleged new street or way known as "Beavor-lane." The appellant refused to pay, and was served with a summons. At the hearing it was proved that the appellant was the owner of the soil of Beavor-lane, and the public had no right over any part of it except a right of way over a narrow strip on the east side, which was paved. Beavor-lane was partly bounded on the east side by buildings, which had all been erected before 1855; there had been no fresh building on that side since then, nor had there been on that side any continuous line of buildings. There was no evidence when the houses and buildings on the west side were erected except that they had all been in existence for many years. On the west side there was at the north end a public-house, then a row of cottages bounded by one containing wall, and lastly, at the south end, an oil mill. All along this side of Beavor-lane the appellant had reserved and marked off, partly by a fence and partly by stones, with his name upon them, in the same straight line as the fence, a narrow strip of land a few inches wide between the roadway and the containing walls of the public-house, the cottages, and the oil mill respectively. There was no access or right of access into Beavor-lane from any of these buildings or houses, all of which had their backs towards the roadway, and the justices were of opinion that the said fences and stones were placed in the positions above described to prevent any such access being had. By sect. 105 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), the owners of the houses forming a new street, and, by sect. 77 of the Amending Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), the owners of the land bounding or abutting on such street are made liable for the expenses of paving it; and, by sect. 112 of the last-mentioned Act, a "new street" shall apply to and include all streets to be hereafter formed or laid out and also all streets, the maintenance and paving of the roadway where of had not, previously to the passing of this Act, been taken into charge and assumed by the commissioners or other authorities having control of the pavements or highways in the parish or place in which such streets are situate and also all streets partly formed or laid out. The magistrates held and determined (1) That Beavor-lane was a new street within the meaning of the Metropolis Management Acts; and (2) that the appellant was a frontager on Beavor-lane all along the west side, and ordered him to pay the said sum of £295 11s. 4d. Held (reversing the decision of the justices), that Beavor-lane was and remained an old road, and was not a new street within the Acts.

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[Arter v. The Vestry of Hammersmith. Q. B. Div.: Cave and Lawrance, JJ. March 15.-Counsel for the appellant, Russell, Q.C. and Mansfield; for the respondents, Macmorran, Q.C. and Lou Solicitors for the appellant, Cunliffe and Davenport; for the respondents, Watson, Son, and Room.]

IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy Banker and Customer-Declaration that Customer's Account belonged to Debtor-Payment of Cheques after Receiving Order before Declaration-Res judicata.-This was a motion by the trustee in bankruptcy for a declaration that the sum of £486 18s., being the amount standing to the credit of the account of the debtor's wife at the London and South-Western Bank at the date of the receiving order, was the property of the bankrupt, and for an order for the respondents to pay the sum of £216 to the trustee, being the amount of the moneys paid out by them after the date of the receiving order. In June 1895 the debtor s wife opened an account with the London and South-Western Bank, and with her assent it was arranged that all cheques should be initialled by the debtor. A receiving order was made against the debtor on the 25th Sept. 1895, and at that time there was £486 18s. to the credit of the account. On the 17th May 1896 the trustee gave a notice of motion for a declaration that the moneys standing to the credit of the account belonged to the bankrupt. An inquiry as to the dealings with the account was also asked for, but was abandoned at the hearing. On the 27th July 1896 a declaration to that effect was made by Williams, J., and the amount then standing to the credit of the account, viz.,

£270, was paid by the bank to the trustee. In this motion the trustee in bankruptcy asked for payment of £216 18s., the amount of the cheques honoured by the bank between the date of the receiving order and that of the declaration. Until the declaration was made the trustee had not seen the pass-book, and was unaware of the amount standing to the credit of the account or of the dealings with the same. Held, (1) that as between the bank and their customer it was the wife's account, and that the bank was bound to honour her cheques, and that they had in consequence a good discharge; (2) that the question might have been raised on the former motion, and was therefore res judicata.

[Re Montague; Ex parte Ward v. London and South-Western Bank. Q. B. Div. in Bank.: Williams, J. March 9 and 10.-Counsel: Muir Mackenzie and Mackintosh; Herbert Jacobs. Solicitors: Church, Rendall, and Todd; Hubbard, Son, and Eve.]

OUR LITERARY COLUMN.

STORIES FROM THE LAW REPORTS. XIV. THE STORY OF A RIDE FOR LIFE AND DEATH. (From Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105; 1 Sm. L. C. 136.) TOM BRATHWAIT had committed the crime of manslaughter. Shirley says, in his "Leading Cases," that it was murder, but it is perfectly certain that it was only manslaughter. For the story which we are about to tell can be verified by reference to very ancient reports. The Reports of Sir Henry Hobart, the learned Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas," printed for the good of the Kingdom and the Common Law -as also the reports of Moore and of Brownlow and Gordondistinctly state that the defendant had feloniously slain one Patrick Mahune. Now the words "feloniously slain" can only be used of manslaughter; if it was a murder the word "murder" must have been employed. "Felonice et ex malitia sua praecognita murdravit" was the correct form: and so strict was the law upon this matter that we read that where an indictment said "murderavit " instead of "murdravit " this was held to be a fatal flaw, and the prisoner was discharged accordingly. This, therefore, is certain-Pat was not murdered in the legal sense. It was manslaughter only; he was slain under circumstances which did not amount to murder.

Still it was a bad manslaughter. Manslaughter may be everything from next door to murder to next door to no offence at all. Tom's manslaughter was next door to murder. But he had not heen charged with murder; and a verdict of manslaughter had been returned. The judges were about to pronounce sentence, and Tom, fearing that the sentence would be death (yes, even although his crime was only manslaughter, the reason whereof will appear anon), turned an agonising face toward the public part of the court in search of a friendly face, which might offer him some sort of hope.

He saw among the crowd in the Guildhall a man in a position now far above himself, but whom he had known well at the time when they both started to mount the ladder of life. This man was a merchant of good fame, and supposed to have some little influence at court. Not that Antony Lampleigh-for such was his name was in any sense a courtier; but he was a prominent citizen of London, and had held the honours of the Shrievalty of the City. The King of England had in all times extended a little of the Royal favour to persons of this class, perhaps because to a large extent they control the financial situation of the day. And the present reigning sovereign, King James the First, was no exception to this rule. Lampleigh's intercession seemed to be Tom's last chance.

Lampleigh saw the poor man's look of entreaty, and came towards the dock. "Tony," said the prisoner, "I shall get hanged for this." "I am afraid you will, Tom," said the other. "Tony," he said, "you were always a good friend to me; try and do something for me now. I've been a disgraceful vagabond, while you have been raising yourself in the world. But save my life now, Tony, and I will be very grateful," and he clutched wildly at Lampleigh's arm. Lampleigh thought. "I am pressed," he said, "with business just now, else I would ride for you to the King; the King might do something for you, if I could get speech of him. But I cannot ride to-day; to-morrow, if possible, I will ride." "Put off your business, I entreat you," said Brathwait; "it is life or death to me. Surely your business can wait." It is easy to suppose that other men's business can wait when our own precious throats are in jeopardy. But it so happened that Lampleigh's business was really of immensely great importance to himself. Lampleigh was no longer as rich a man as he had been, for, though he had made a large sum of money in his day, he had been unfortunate of late, and he was one who liked to spend money lavishly as well as to make it. However, seeing the desperate terror in the prisoner's face, he took pity and said: "Tom, have you a horse, or any money to pay the expenses of my journey? "Ah, no-I have not," said he. "But don't desert me, Tony; we came from the same village in the country to this cursed London; your work prospered with you, while I went towards this evil end. Give me a new chance, Tom; try and get me the King's pardon, for I believe that, if you would, you could get speech of the King." "It may cost me dear," said Lampleigh, "but, so help me, I will go. I know your story, and can tell the King what there is to be said for you, if I can get speech of him. You are my countryman, and, so help me, I'll not desert you this day." "Then, for the love of heaven, Tony, lose no time. This cursed session is nearly over, and they'll dispose of us in batches at the end. And, perhaps, the next day I'll be -," he finished by touching his neck

with the horrible gesture which is so well known even to this day among the criminal classes, and smiled a faint ghastly smile.

Anthony remembered when Tom Brathwait had been his playmate at home upon the village green, and resolved to do his best for him. Even in the days of old there had been a social and intellectual gulf between them, Lampleigh being the son of a small farmer and Brathwait being the son of the village blacksmith. But when they had joined in those games of childhood these differences were forgotten, and none could have foretold how greatly their paths would widen apart, the one rising from being the heir to a small country homestead to being a prominent citizen of London, and the other sinking from pursuing an honest occupation to frequenting the company of the worst vagabonds and thieves of that same London, where honour and dishonour both attain their most extreme forms.

"It's a hard thing," said Lampleigh, "for honest men to have to spend their time and money racing about the country after pardons for knaves like you, but you shall not be hanged for want of my best endeavoursthe session can hardly by any possibility come to an end to-day, so I shall have time to go to the King, but I must, as you say, start at once, or as soon as my horse can be ready."

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"A thousand times I thank and bless you," said Brathwait; may the time come some day when I can repay your goodness. Ride, I pray you, as you never rode before. There may be some delay-the King may have moved a number of things may happen to cause delay, and then"

Lampleigh turned away, not wishing to see that horrible gesture again.

It was already late in the afternoon when Lampleigh left the Guildhall, and sought his stables, which were at no very great distance: for City men did not in those days have their business premises and their homes so far apart as now. However, it was three-quarters of an hour between the time that Lampleigh left the Guildhall and the time when he mounted in the saddle and began his ride to Roiston, where the King was said to be.

The horse he rode was a sturdy bay, who seemed well fitted for the work and Lampleigh rode hard, hoping to see the King the same evening, lest even on the morrow it should be too late. The session was evidently very near its close, and, if some of the cases should suddenly collapse, the time for sentencing the convicted prisoners might conceivably come even that very night. He thought Brathwait would then possibly be hanged before he could get speech of the King and return with the hoped-for pardon. The first part of his ride was the same as that which is well known to readers of the poet Cowper as the route taken by the famous John Gilpin in later years.

He rode over the rattling stones of Cheapside--and "all through merry Islington" and "till he came unto the Wash of Edmonton so gay." Lampleigh rode better than the celebrated "train-band captain"; for, although he also was a "citizen of credit and renown " at this time of "famous London town," he was originally a country farmer's son; and had ridden many horses bare-backed almost as soon as he could walk. Still he was now a staid and elderly person-little used to hard exercise, and even less used to anything like a ride for life and death. So that in his case also barking dogs and screaming children, and windows flying up, and turnpikemen throwing their gates wide open marked the course of a galloping horseman of a somewhat unusual fashion and appearance. But our present hero cared little for anyone "wond'ring much to see how he did ride," for, having once undertaken the mission, as he had, he was determined, if possible, to bring it to a successful issue. And so he rode wildly on through Hertfordshire; and Gilpin's Lane had thus, more than a century before Cowper, witnessed a scene not unlike that which that poet's pen has made so familiar. But when he came to Ware he did not allow his horse to stop: but spurred him on to further effort. On he went through Standing and Buntingford and Barkway, till he had crossed the border which divides the county of Hertford from that of Cambridge, when he was told that he would come to the little place called Roiston (now spelt Royston) after a mile or so more. And it was here that he hoped to find the King.

His horse was now steaming violently, and seemed inclined to dispute his master's control, when the latter, to his great joy, saw a church and a cluster of houses round it upon the near horizon; and the horse, at nearly the same moment, upon a word of encouragement, seemed to understand that rest was near. When a horse seems to understand that, everybody knows that whip and spur are no longer necessary. They were soon at what seemed evidently to be their place of destination.

This was indeed Roiston, but where was the King? The place seemed strangely quiet for the place which "the King delighted to honour." Royal progresses were affairs of great splendour in those days, for the fashion set by Queen Elizabeth in this matter had not yet died out. Lampleigh soon saw that his ride had been for nothing; there were no decorations nor signs of royalty-the King could not be there! An inquiry which he made from a passing countryman soon made this certain. The King was gone" to London" his informant believed. "Aye, 'tis said he went to London," was the general story.

Lampleigh wondered that he had not met the King and his retinue, nor heard of them upon the way. He inquired when the King had left, and he learned that it had been early that morning. Possibly, therefore, he thought, the King had arrived at London before his own departure, though, in that case, he had been strangely misinformed by those of whom he had inquired previously to his leaving the City.

Further inquiries in Roiston elicited no further information. He therefore went to the chief tavern in the place, and explained that he had urgent business with the King, that his horse was exhausted and unfit for further work to-night, and that it was imperative that he should have another horse, while his own was cared for by the landlord. Lampleigh had not provided for the contingency which had occurred; but fortunately