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Protection afforded silks) above the value of 102

by the Carriers Act,

11 G. 4&1 W. 4, c. 68.

livery thereof at the office, of such carrier, or to his se carried, the value and natu been declared, and such in mentioned, or an engagemen by the person receiving su tion, therefore, thus briefly carrier from liability is abs preliminary thereby made in the owner of the goods. 2nd section, declared to be receive over and above the o conveyance of the species o when above 10%.; such increa by some notice to be affixed i office, warehouse, or receivin ceived for carriage. By sect. notice or declaration shall exer at common law, for the loss of than those in the 1st section such other articles, his liabilit main, notwithstanding such n as to the liability of the carrier rated, it seems impliedly to f are, protection is afforded to forth. By sect. 8 it is enacte be deemed to protect such ca any servant in his employ, n liability for any loss or injur or misconduct. The former no more, at least consistent w duct short of felony the car it is obvious, that, before t would have been liable for

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Mandamus to compel a Company to

we are not in the habit of supposing that persons required complete a Railway. to obey the Queen's writs issuing from this Court, will in

cur the penalty of contempt for contumacy, or be advised to evade the known and ancient process of the law.

Objections were also raised to a mandamus for insuring the execution of these works. Under this head it was, in effect, insinuated, that similar acts of Parliament entail no duties whatever on those who may procure them; that they do but offer a boon which the projected company may accept or reject, or partially accept and partially reject, at their sole will and pleasure. The assertion, appearing in them all, that they have provided the means of executing the intended works, was treated as no proof, even primâ facie, that they have sufficient funds for that purpose. The provision for disabling the company from taking land, after the lapse of a certain term, was put forth as a proof that they had full power to proceed with their works or abandon them, without any regard to the interest of others. Some decisions of the Court of Chancery, which have injoined companies not to take possession of certain lands peculiarly circumstanced, were called inconsistent with any power in this Court to require that possession should be taken of lands under circumstances entirely different.

"We think it right so far to advert to these remarks, that we may wholly disavow them as having at all conduced to the judgment which we are about to pronounce. When we made the rule absolute, we expressed our conviction that the case was, in some respects, new, and that its circumstances admitted of some doubt whether our power ought to be applied to them. We shall keep our minds open for the discussion of all such doubts on every proper occasion; but we do not yield to them, nor is it necessary to advert to them in coming to our present decision. We neither hold the Court incompetent to enforce execu

tion of an act under the circumstances disclosed to us in the affidavits, nor think any of the reasons which we have enumerated are conclusive against making our mandamus peremptory. Those points will be as much open to argument hereafter as they were when the rule was obtained. But, it will be perceived, on adverting to what was said on the former occasion, that we considered the facts then stated to afford strong evidence, that the company, having obtained an act for a particular purpose, had stopped short of effecting it, and satisfied themselves with doing less than one half of what they had undertaken to do, and represented themselves to be capable of doing. It was by that undertaking and representation that they obtained the act, and the great powers of occupying land and raising money which it bestowed. We could not recognise their right to say to those who had contracted with them, and to the public, Our undertaking does not bind us, because our statements were untrue: we have nothing to consider but the pecuniary interests of the Company, and claim to exercise an unlimited option over these works, and every part of them.' The rule was made absolute, and the writ was directed to go, on the supposition that they had no intention to proceed bonâ fide with their works, and had on the contrary abandoned all intention to complete them. But the prosecutors of the writ have stated no such facts. What they state may raise a suspicion on the subject, but falls far short of proof."

And in a still later case than the foregoing, a peremptory mandamus was issued to compel the trustees of a turnpike road to fence a road made by them on the land of a private individual; and the Court decided, that the liability to fence the road, imposed on all trustees of turnpike-roads by stat. 4 Geo. 4, c. 95, s. 66, was not excused by a return which alleged that the trustees had no funds to make the fences.

Mandamus to compel a Company to

complete a Railway.

Other Cases in which Writs of Mandamus have been issued.

It was said, by the Court, that, "if the trustees had not adequate funds to make the fence, they ought not to have made the road (n)."

The principle, therefore, seems now to be established, that, if a company of individuals, whether incorporated or not, obtain an act of Parliament for executing public works, which are capable of being executed, and the works are commenced, the Company are bound to proceed with the whole undertaking, under the penalty of being compelled so to do by a writ of mandamus.

Writs of mandamus have also been issued, requiring public companies to perform duties imposed upon them by acts of Parliament in the following instances:-To repair and amend the banks and bridges of a river course (o); to make alterations and amendments in sewers, to prevent an offensive sewage from being discharged into a floating harbour (p); to restore a turnpike-road carried over a railway by a bridge, to its former width (q); to excavate a road over which a bridge had been built, so as to leave a headway of sufficient height under the bridge (r); to make proper watering places for cattle in lieu of ancient watering places destroyed by the railway works (s),

In all the foregoing cases, which are given by way of illustration only, the writs issued to compel the execution of en

(n) Reg. v. The Trustees of Luton
Roads, 1 Q. B. 860.

(0) Reg. v. The Bristol Dock Co.,
2 Q. B. 64; S. C., 1 Railway Cases,
2 Id. 599; ante, 388; Rex v.
The Ouze Bank Commissioners, 3 A.
& E. 544.

(p) Rex v. The Bristol Dock Co.,
6 Barn. & Cress. 181; ante, 387.

(q) Reg. v. The Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co., 2 Q. B. 47; S. C., 2 Railway Cases, 694; ante, 375; Reg. v. The London and Bir

mingham Railway Co., 1 Railway Cases, 317; ante, 374. And see the other cases, ante, 360.

(r) Reg. v. The Manchester and Leeds Railway Co., 3 Q. B. 528; S. C., 1 Railway Cases, 523; 2 Id. 711; ante, 372; Reg. v. The Eastern Counties Railway Co., 2 Q. B. 569; S. C., 3 Railway Cases, 22; ante, 377.

(s) Reg. v. The York and North Midland Railway Co., 14 Law J., Q. B., 277; ante, 396.

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