is to be given by the bond of the trustee and some guarantee company or responsible person approved by the court. Any premium payable by the trustee to a guarantee company may, by direction of the court, be paid out of the income of the trust property. As to the amount of the security, it is proposed by rule 10 (4) that, "if the court is satisfied that sufficient provision is made for the safety of the capital of the trust property, the amount of the security shall, in ordinary cases, be an amount exceeding by twenty per cent. the income of the trust property as estimated by the court." This is a little vague as to capital, though unexceptionable as to income. The amount of security which may be required in event of the court not being "satisfied," &c., appears to be unlimited. We think that the rule should not only fix some limit, but in some way suggest the kind of evidence which should be required to satisfy the court that the safety of the capital is sufficiently secured. It must be remembered that a trustee has always been, and will still continue, liable for his criminal defaults to the utmost farthing of his private property, and that he will usually be a person of known solvency and respectability; so that, to exact a security equal to the capital in amount, much less doubling the capital, as in the case of administration bonds--which, of course, are in force for merely short limited periods would not seem to be desirable.

CUSTODY OF DOCUMENTS.-By rule 11, where a judicial trustee is appointed, a separate account for receipts and payments must be kept in the name of the trustees in some bank approved by the court: and all title deeds, and all certificates and other documents, which are evidence of the title of the trustee, are to be deposited with that bank, or in such other custody as the court directs, and not to be delivered over to any person except on a request signed by the judicial trustee, and countersigned by the "officer of the court" (i.e., the Chancery master, district registrar, or County Court registrar, as the case may be); but any person authorised by the officer of the court in writing is to be allowed to inspect them during business hours. This rule appears to include, and to be intended to include, bonds or debentures payable to bearer; but we think it should be drawn so as expressly to include them.

PAYMENT OF TRUST MONEY INTO BANK.-A judicial trustee must by 'rule 12 pay all money coming into his hands on account of his trust without delay to his trust account at the bank, and if he keeps any such money in his hands for a longer time than the court considers necessary, he becomes liable to pay interest upon it at such rate not exceeding 5 per cent. as the court may fix for the time during which the money remains in his hands. As at present drawn, this rule allows the court to exact the 5 per cent. interest irrespective of the time during which, beyond that which the court may consider necessary, the trustee may have kept the money in his own hands; but we incline to think that the words " per annum have been omitted from the rule by a mere clerical error. Perhaps, also, an exception might reasonably be made for sums not exceeding £20, and the judicial trustee might be allowed to keep such small sums in any way he pleases, even at his own private bank.

AUDIT. It is proposed that accounts are to be made up yearly for audit by the "officer of the court," questions of difficulty being referred to a professional accountant for report. The accounts are to be filed, and "the court may" by rule 16 (4), "having regard to the nature of the relation of the applicant to the trust, allow any person applying to inspect the filed accounts so to inspect them on giving reasonable notice to the officer of the court."

PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE.-It will be remembered that by sect. 4 (10) of the Act rules are specially authorised to be made "for preventing the employment by judicial trustees of other persons at the expense of the trust, except in cases of strict necessity"; and in exercise of this special authority it is proposed by rule 17 that a judicial trustee shall not be allowed any deduction on account of the expenses of professional assistance or his work or professional outlay, "unless the deduction has been authorised by the court in pursuance of the Act." Travelling expenses should have been mentioned in this rule, either to include or exclude them as might be thought desirable. We incline to think that travelling expenses should in every case be allowed. But no person should consent to be nominated judicial trustee till he has carefully considered what effect rule 17 would have upon his case, looking to all the circumstances connected with the trust.

DIVORCE COURT JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE. THE application made by the petitioner in Shorthouse v. Shorthouse to the President of the Divorce Court on the 31st March raises a very important question. Apparently the reasons which made the President dismiss the application were twofold: the first, that the facts of the particular case did not warrant his intervention; and, secondly, that he had no jurisdiction, that it was contrary to the practice of the court to make the order asked for. The facts were these: The petitioner obtained on the 30th March a decree nisi for dissolution, on the ground of cruelty and adultery, and custody of five children. The respondent had for many years carried on business as an engineer, but the business had been sold under an order in the Chancery Division, and the receiver was about to be paid the purchase price, the respondent's share amounting to a sum of about £30,000, and the application by the petitioner was that the respondent should be restrained from dealing with the £30,000, or such part thereof as the court should deem reasonable, so that the petitioner's order for permanent maintenance, when obtained, might be effectual. The application was supported by some evidence to the effect that the respondent had threatened to leave the jurisdiction with this money, when obtained, and thus defeat the order for maintenance. The President, however, did not think that this threat had been proved as the serious expression of an intention. The importance of the matter does not lie in Second Sheet.

the view taken of the facts, but in the apparent holding of the President that he had not jurisdiction at that stage to make the order, or that even if he had jurisdiction the practice of the court prevented his interference.

We propose to deal first with the jurisdiction, secondly, with the practice founded doubtless to some extent upon the jurisdiction.

Apart from decisions on the point itself, the legal position is this: By obtaining a decree nisi the petitioner is at once empowered to file a petition for maintenance. The amount to be paid or secured is referred to the registrar upon the petition for maintenance, answer, and further pleadings, if any. The registrar fixes the amount, and reports to the judge, who confirms or alters the report, and on it makes an order. This order becomes operative after the decree nisi is made absolute. It could hardly, we venture to think, be disputed that the liability to pay something is established by the decree nisi, and that the machinery used for obtaining the order is merely the ascertainment of the amount. The relationship of husband and wife is, of course, on a different basis from that of contractor and contractee; but, as between the petitioner spouse upon obtaining a decree nisi and the respondent spouse, the position is analogous. The petitioner has established a legal right to be paid at a future period a sum of money, the respondent is a party to a proceeding before the court against whom the court will pronounce the order for the payment of such sum. Has the court jurisdiction under the Judicature Act (sect. 25, sub-sect. 8) to make an order, either by restraining the respondent, or by appointing a receiver to keep sufficient part of his property in statu quo to meet the subsequent liability to pay? The jurisdiction depends upon whether such an order is "just and convenient." Upon these words there has been expended much judicial learning; but in substance the result is that they do not give a jurisdiction to impose a new and unknown liability. It is really a section dealing with interlocutory orders, and it has often been attempted unsuccessfully to extend its operation for the purpose of execution. As the expression of interlocutory jurisdiction, the real limit is this-could the order sought for be made upon the final adjudication? if it could, then there is interlocntory jurisdiction; if it could not, then there is no jurisdiction. In North London Railway Company v. Great Northern Railway Company (48 L. T. Rep. 695; 11 Q. B. Div. 30) the Court of Appeal held that the court could not grant an interlocutory injunction where, upon a final judgment, it could not grant a permanent injunction. Such a proposition seems self-evident, and yet it would appear from Newton v. Newton (11 P. Div. 11) that Lord Hannen was to some extent influenced by that authority in holding that he had no jurisdiction.

If we are right in saying that the interlocutory jurisdiction depends upon the jurisdiction upon final decree, then the question is not jurisdiction in the abstract, but whether the facts warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. Let us take the case of contract. The rule here is, if the plaintiff makes a primâ facie case as to the subject-matter the courts will by interlocutory order keep that subject-matter in statu quo. What is the legal distinction between the case of contractors, and that of petitioner after decree nisi and respondent? The prima facie liability to a specific thing in the former case is, in the latter case, an absolute liability to something not ascertained but ascertainable, and that something is an aliquot part of a definite subject-matter, viz., the respondent's property. Although the fact that such aliquot part is not ascertained might prevent an order charging any particular property being made, there is no reason in law or good sense why it should hinder an order in personam restraining the respondent from dealing in such a way with his property, so as to defeat the petitioner's right to one-third or one-half in accordance with the discretion of the judge pronouncing the decree nisi. Although further consideration by the registrar may modify or increase the exact share to be secured to the petitioner, the judge has sufficient material, e.g., the number of children and other considerations, to enable him according to well-recognised rules to allocate approximately the proportion which should be safeguarded.

Let us now see the practice which at present is observed. It is this: The judge will make, not apparently as of course, but upon reasonable proof that the money may be dissipated, an order by way of charge or injunction after, or simultaneously with, an order for a fixed amount of alimony or maintenance: (Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 69 L. T. Rep. 618 (1893) P. 284; Newton v. Newton (1896) P. 36. It is to be observed that these orders fixing the amount are not operative till after final decree. The judge will not make such order unless the amount of alimony has been fixed.

The decision upon which this latter proposition is based is the above quoted case of Newton v. Newton (11 P. Div. 11).

The petitioner in that case had obtained no decree, but she had in accordance with the practice petitioned for alimony pendente lite. The respondent had under order filed an answer to this petition, and while this petition was pending, and before adjudication, the petitioner moved to restrain the respondent from moving his property out of the jurisdiction. Lord Hannen held he had no jurisdiction, stating, "it has been decided that the Judicature Act does not give any enlarged powers to the court in this respect; it is not competent for a court merely quia timet to restrain a respondent from dealing with his property." He differentiates the decisions of Sidney v. Sidney (17 L. T. Rep. 9) and Noakes v. Noakes and Hill (4 P. Div. 60) on the ground that there were in them existing orders.

It appears from this judgment that the report in 4 P. Div. 60 is deficient, omitting apparently the most important fact, viz., that an order had been made.

The proposition as to jurisdiction quia timet is, we think, too broad, and if accurate to support that proposition by referring to the absence of the orders, is illogical. The interlocutory jurisdiction quia timet does not depend upon an order for payment. It depends upon the court being con

vinced that there is a prima facie right which the court can enforce by a final decree. As we before pointed out, the real difficulty in stating affirmatively that a judge has jurisdiction in these cases arises from the fact that, although there is after decree nisi not merely a prima facie liability but an actual liability, the quantum is not fixed. Apparently by the combined effect of sect. 30 of the Act of 1851 and rule 92 the judge has an immediate jurisdiction to himself fix the quantum payable after decree absolute. The difficulty, therefore, as to jurisdiction is more apparent than real, and if the judge exercise this power as to quantum, subject as he might to subsequent reference under the rules, the full interlocutory jurisdiction exercised daily in the other courts is plainly established.

It is not easy to see the exact reason why the President refused the application in Shorthouse v. Shorthouse. Apart from absolute jurisdiction, there is a middle position put in personal narration, thus: "I may have jurisdiction. I am not convinced that there is a serious danger, therefore I will not interfere. If there is danger the practice is to expedite the reference to the registrar, and I will not alter the practice. With all deference to the admirable execution of their delicate and difficult duties, we venture to think the judges of the Divorce Court might seriously consider an amendment of the practice in this respect. It must not unfrequently happen in matrimonial disputes that, up to the hearing of the petition, there is in one or other party a hope, perhaps a desire, to settle. Till the decree nisi is pronounced, this sentiment restrains the delinquent party--the chance of reconciliation made hopeless by any act of either party that could not be subsequently rectified. When the decree nisi is pronounced that tie is broken-the spouse is free; and it is expecting too much of human nature to presume the same course of conduct in matters financial. A man with property may well hold his hand if he thinks his wife at the end will not pursue her legal rights. It is one thing to be generous and careful with a view of possible reconciliation; it is another to be just so that a stranger for the future may have a permanent share of his fortune.

How then does the practice meet this somewhat copy-book generalisation of human motives? The practice allows the parties a free and unfettered control; the food and existence of an injured wife and of innocent children are left absolutely unprotected. Surely this requires careful consideration. A slight amendment could effect it. Let the practice be that upon decree nisi, unless the respondent proprio motu secures the proportion that upon the facts then proved appears quite against the subsequent order, the judge should, as a matter of course, in pronouncing the decree nisi make such order not quia timet, but ex majori cautela, as will legally prop up that sense of justice which is not perhaps very universal even outside the Divorce Courts.

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MARRIED WOMEN'S REVERSIONARY INTERESTS. THE mention of the reversionary interests of married women suggests a somewhat thorny subject which shows the piecemeal legislation by which married women have been emancipated from their disabilities. By the common law a husband and wife together could not assign her reversionary choses in action (Lush, 2nd edit., p. 58), but could effectually dispose of her real estate by means of a fine levied by them both (ibid. p. 32). The fine was a cumbersome mode of proceeding, and the Fines and Recoveries Act of 1833, by sect. 77, enabled a married woman "to dispose of lands of any tenure, and money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands, and also to dispose of any estate to which she alone, or she and her husband in her right, may have in any lands," &c., by deed acknowledged by her in which her husband concurred. Reversionary personalty was still subject to the old disability, until Malins' Act, passed on the 25th Aug. 1857, provided that every married woman, with her husband's concurrence and by deed acknowledged, should be able to dispose of "every future or reversionary interest, whether vested or contingent, of such married woman, or her husband in her right, in any personal estate whatsoever to which she shall be entitled under any instrument made after the 31st Dec. 1857" (20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, s. 1). The Act does not apply to any reversionary interest to which she is entitled by virtue of any instrument by which she is restrained from anticipating the same (sect. 1), or to which she is entitled under any settlement or agreement for a settlement made on the occasion of her marriage (sect. 4).

Under both Acts it will be seen that the husband's concurrence is necessary, and that the wife must acknowledge the deed. But the provisions of Malins' Act are much narrower than those of the earlier Act. The realty may have been granted at any time, and may be the subject of her marriage settlement, but the personalty must have been given to her under an instrument made after the 31st Dec. 1857, and must not be settled on her by her marriage settlement. It is stated in Shelford's Real Property Statutes that the qualification, added to the similar Irish statute preventing a married woman disposing of her realty on which there is a restraint on anticipation, has been said to be an expression by the Legislature of what was meant by the English Act (9th edit., p. 295). But leaving that question out of consideration, it is obvions that if a married woman married before the commencement of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, wishes to dispose of personal property to which she will be entitled, under an instrument executed before the 1st Jan. 1858, or under her marriage settlement, on her husband's death, as she cannot do so under Malins' Act, she must endeavour to bring it within the Fines and Recoveries Act, and she can often do so. To begin with, sect. 77 applies in terms to “ money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands," and by the interpretation clause of the Act (sect. 1) such money "shall include money, whether raised or to be raised, and whether the amount thereof be or be not ascertained, and shall extend to stocks and funds, and real and other securities, the produce of which is directed to be invested in the purchase of lands."

to any interest, charge, lien, or incumbrance in, upon, or affecting money subject to be Invested in the purchase of lands."

In Briggs v. Chamberlain (21 L. T. Rep. O. S. 218; 11 Hare 69) a testator devised all his real estate upon trust for sale without directing or empowering his trustees to re-invest the proceeds in land. By deed acknowledged one of the beneficiaries, who was a married woman, joined with her husband in mortgaging her share in the testator's residuary estate. Vice-Chancellor Page Wood held that the mortgage was a good one, though the property had been in equity converted into money. A still greater use has been made of the wide definitions of the statute in Miller v. Collins (74 L. T. Rep. 122; (1896) 1 Ch. 573). A married woman was entitled under a deed executed before Malins' Act to a reversionary life interest. The property thus settled was realty, but the trustees of the deed had power to sell and to invest the proceeds in the public stocks or on mortgage, but had no power to invest in the purchase of land. Part of the property was sold and invested upon mortgage of real estate, and subsequently the married woman and her husband by deed acknowledged assigned their interests therein. Mr. Justice Stirling held that this could not be brought under the Fines and Recoveries Act, and Lord Justice Kay agreed with him, but the majority of the Court of Appeal held that it could, and that the assignment was effectual to pass the wife's interest.

It would seem that a mere expectancy, such as the possible interest under the will of a living person, cannot be assigned under either of the Acts to which we have referred. (See judgment of Stirling, J. in Alleard v. Walker, 74 L. T. Rep. 487; (1896) 2 Ch. 369.) It was decided under the old law in Ravald v. Russell (Younge, 9) that where a husband and wife conveyed property by lease and release, but no fine was levied, the deed was invalid as to the wife, but effectual to convey the marital rights of the husband. A similar effect would presumably be caused if the conveyance by husband and wife was not acknowledged by the wife.

It is needless to say that women married since the Act of 1882 can dispose of their reversionary interests, if they are not restrained from anticipating them, without their husband's concurrence or acknowledged deeds. The case which has tempted us to discuss this subject here is the very recent one of Re Williams (noted ante, p. 439), where, before the last-mentioned Act, a fund was settled by the lady's marriage settlement, in the event of her surviving her husband, on her absolutely, or after her decease in her husband's lifetime as she should appoint. Under a will made subsequently to the Act, a share of residue was bequeathed to the trustees of her settlement, to be held upon the trusts therein expressed. Mr. Justice Stirling determined that the incident of separate use was supplied by the statute, so that the married woman could dispose of her contingent interest under the will. Conveyancers sometimes guard against this power by inserting a clause in settlements which forbids married women during coverture to dispose of their reversionary interests (2 Key and Elphinstone, 5th edit., p. 443).

COMMENTS ON CASES.

SECT. 24, sub-sect. 5, of the Settled Land Act provides that, where there are two estates settled to the same uses and trusts, one of which is subject to incumbrances while the other is not so subject, then, upon sale of the free land under the Act, and the reinvestment of the proceeds in other land, the land thus acquired shall not be subjected to the charges affecting the other estate. In analogy to this provision, in the case of Re Contract between the Duke of Marlborough and the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty (noted ante, p. 509), it was contended that, where heirlooms had been sold under the Act, and the purchase money invested in freehold houses, the latter being conveyed to the trustees subject to the provisions of a certain settlement whereby jointures and portions were chargeable, the family charges thus created did not affect the houses purchased by sale of the heirlooms. Mr. Justice Romer, before whom the case was heard, acceded to this contention on the ground that it would be an extraordinary thing, and a result not intended by the Legislature if heirlooms, which before sale were not subject to charges, upon sale and reinvestment in land should become, whether with or without consent, subject to such charges. Sub-sect. 2 of sect. 24, in reference to settling the land acquired purchase, enacts that freehold land shall be conveyed on the trusts of the settlement, or as near thereto as circumstances permit. These words seem to be very applicable to the facts of this case. His Lordship came to a like conclusion by another process of reasoning based on the judgment of Lord Justice Lopes, in Re The Duke of Marlborough's Settled Estates (54 L. T. Rep. 914, at p. 918; 32 Ch. Div. 1), in which he was himself counsel. Lord Justice Lopes there contemplates that heirlooms are, upon the construction of sect. 37, to be regarded as land, notwithstanding that in his opinion the Act as originally drafted was not intended to apply to the case of heirlooms, but the addition was made at a subsequent stage. If regarded as land, then sect. 24, sub-sect. 5, would apply, with the result that the houses were acquired by moneys accruing from the sale of land not affected by a charge, and accordingly not subject to the incumbrances affecting the other estates.

THE proposition at p. 483 of Dart on Vendors and Purchasers (vol. 1, 6th edit.) to the effect that, upon the sale of a public-house as a going concern, if the vendor cannot, by the day appointed for the completion of the purchase, procure a transfer of the licence under the Licensing Act, the purchaser may repudiate the contract," is, it appears from the recent judgment of Mr. Justice Romer, in Tadcaster Tower Brewery Company v. Wilson and others (noted ante, p. 509), misleading. Vide also Talbot on Law and Practice of Licensing, p. 30, where it is laid down that it is an implied term that the vendor will procure a transfer in the strict sense, and not merely the grant of a transfer licence under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14. Mr. Justice Romer has decided that the vendor, in the absence of a special agreement that the licence should be renewed at the brewster sessions, or that he would obtain from the magistrate a transfer or interim authority to use the licence, was only bound to have an effectual licence on the day fixed for completion in respect to which the purchaser could himself apply for interim protection. There is, therefore, in contracts for sale of licensed premises as going concerns no warranty by the vendors of interim protection.

By the Solicitors Act 1843, s. 37, a complete bill delivered by the solicitor to the client cannot be taxed after the lapse of twelve months except on proof of special circumstances. The doctrine that these " special circumstances were confined to pressure and overcharge, or overcharge which amounted to fraud, was abolished in the case of Re Norman (54 L. T. Rep. 143), and in that case it was held that the court can look to all the facts of the case, and has a discretion in ordering a bill of costs to be taxed, if it contains items unreasonably large, charges requiring explanation, or gross blunders. But the bill must be complete; that is to say, it must furnish the client with such detailed information as to enable him to decide whether he shall proceed to taxation or no. These two points have been recently raised before Mr. Justice Stirling, in the cases of Re Pomeroy and Tanner (75 L. T. Rep. 625; 76 L. T. Rep. 149). In those cases items were given in the bills as disbursements which were in fact payments made by the country solicitors to their London agents. No details of such charges were given, and it was held that until such had been stated there had been no delivery of a complete bill capable of taxation so as to enable the solicitor to rely on twelve months having elapsed since its delivery, so as to preclude the client from proceeding to taxation. As Mr. Justice Stirling laid it down, "What is done by the London agent is part of the work done by the country solicitor for the client. He may do part of his work through a London agent, but, as between the country solicitor and the client, the whole of the work is done by the country solicitor." This seems to be the proper construction on the law, for as between the client and the London agent there is no privity. Except as an officer of the court, the agent is under no obligation to the client.

FROM time to time, when no statutory power seems to apply, we hear of the inherent jurisdiction of the Chancery Division being invoked to further some good object. Thus, in Re Hawker's Settled Estates (noted ante, p. 439), where the carrying out of certain works and improvements on land, of which an infant was beneficially entitled in possession as tenant in tail, could not be brought under the Settled Land Acts, Mr. Justice Kekewich said that, with the concurrence of the tenant in tail in remainder, he could have authorised the expenditure of capital money on it. In that particular case the learned judge did not do so, as he was not satisfied that the proposed works were for the benefit of the infant.

According to Lewin on Trusts (9th edit.): "Independently of the powers of the Settled Land Act a trustee holding an estate for the benefit of a person absolutely entitled, but incapable from infancy or otherwise to give directions, may make necessary repairs, but he must not go beyond the necessity of the case, as by ornamental improvements, or the expense will not be allowed. If trustees, without any special power to authorise it, lay out money in improving the estate, they cannot justify the expenditure, but, on the other hand, the cestuis que trust cannot take the benefit and repudiate the whole outlay, but the trustees will be liable only for the loss to the estate": (pp. 644-5, and see Jesse v. Lloyd, 48 L. T. Rep. 656). As the directions of the court can now be obtained cheaply and expeditiously, trustees should not, as a rule, be advised to run any risk of not being recouped, but should apply to the court for advice.

TIED houses occupy a very prominent position just now, and it appears that in many cases licensing justices refuse to renew licences attached to them unless the licensed person can prove that he is to a certain extent independent of his landlord. White v. Southend Hotel Company, therefore a decision of the Court of Appeal, which we recently noted (ante, p. 508)-requires careful consideration. In that case a wine and spirit merchant let an hotel for thirty years at £1500 a year, the lessee covenanting with the lessor and his assigns not to buy wine or spirits except gin" except from the lessor or his successors or assigns, and the lessor covenanting to allow an abatement to the lessee of £75 from each quarterly payment of rent, so long as the covenant of the lessee should be performed. The lessor died, his executors sold his business, and the lessee assigned the lease. The assignee of the lease went on buying wine and spirits from the purchaser of the business, and claimed the abatement of rent accordingly from the representatives of the lessor. They, however, contended (1) that the ownership of the business and the ownership of the reversion having been severed, the covenant to purchase from the lessor, his successors or assigns only, ceased to be binding, and the benefit of the abatement of rent fell with it; and (2) that the same result followed from the assigns of the lessee not being mentioned in the covenant to purchase. Mr. Justice Kekewich held that the assignee was entitled to the benefit of the proviso for abatement so long as the covenant to purchase was complied with. The Court of Appeal has taken the strong, and, on the whole, we think correct view, that the assignee had both the burden of the covenant and the benefit of the proviso. But, looking to the extreme difficulty of the case, and to the fact that the object of the covenant when originally entered into was that the lessee, who had to buy spirits, should in a certain sense work together with the lessor who had spirits to sell, and looking also to the general importance of the decision in relation to the tied house system, we think that it would be an advantage if the opinion of the House of Lords could be obtained on the points involved.

OCCASIONAL NOTES.

Lord Herschell has arrived at Dresden.

Lord Morris has gone to Ireland until the end of the month.

The Master of the Rolls and Lady Esher are passing the Easter Vacation at their country house, Heath Farm, Watford.

Lord Justice Lopes has left London for his place in Wiltshire for the Easter Vacation.

Lord James of Hereford and Miss James have left London for Ferne Salisbury.

Sir Richard Webster, Q.C., M.P., has left town for Ireland, where he will remain for some days. On his return he will visit the Isle of Wight. Sir Edward Clarke, Q.C., M.P., has left London for the South of France.

Sir Frank Lockwood, Q.C., M.P., has left town to spend the Easter vacation at Biarritz.

The Lord Chancellor of Ireland will hold his levée on Wednesday, the 21st inst.

Mr. Haden Corser, at Worship-street, is the subject of a sketch in the Morning Leader of the 8th inst.

The Temple Church was opened for a short service at 5 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday last, the first week days in Holy Week.

The largest police-office in the world is New Scotland Yard, in which 3000 officers can be accommodated.

Mr. Justice Byrne will preside over the annual dinner of the Old Boys of King's College School, to be held on Friday, the 30th April, at the Criterion Restaurant.

Adjourned summonses, before Mr. Justice Kekewich, will be in the paper after motions on the first day of next sittings, Tuesday, the 27th April, and will be continued throughout the week.

The Gazette announces that the Queen has been pleased, by letters patent under the Great Seal, to grant to Sir Arthur Charles, late one of the Justices of the High Court of Justice, an annuity of £3500 for life. The United Law Clerks' Society will hold their sixty-fifth anniversary festival on Tuesday, May 18, at the King's Hall, Holborn Restaurant. Mr. Justice Collins will preside.

Sir John B. Monckton (Town Clerk of London) has consented to preside at the 37th anniversary festival of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association, to be held at the Hotel Cecil, London, on Monday, the 24th May, at 7 o'clock p.m.

The County Court Offices at Derby will be removed on the 29th April from No. 10, Fall-street, to the new premises, No. 20, St. Peter's Churchyard, where all business connected with the court will be transacted. The judge will also sit in the new buildings, instead of at St. Mary's-gate.

Sir John Bridge, the chief metropolitan magistrate, has returned from Cannes considerably benefited in health, and is now enjoying the remainder of his leave of absence at his country house at Headley Grove, Epsom.

Mr. S. T. Evans, M.P., barrister, of the South Wales Circuit, has practically recovered from the effects of his recent accident while travelling on the Great Western Railway, and purposes leaving town for Wales, where he will spend the Easter recess.

A contract to give all one's property at death to a niece in consideration of her living with and taking care of the promisor, is denied specific performance in Owens v. McNally (Cal.) (33 L. R. A. 369), where the promisor had subsequently married and left a wife surviving him who did not know of the contract when she married him.

Lord Russell of Killowen, when at the Ba, and several other prominent members of the Profession assisted, some ten years ago, a number of law clerks to form a building society to enable them to purchase houses for occupation or investment. Lord Russell became a shareholder, and has remained one to the present day. At the annual meeting of the society on the 9th inst., Lord Russell was successful in the ballot, and became entitled to an advance of £400, free of interest, repayable in twelve and a half years. This is the second time that his Lordship has obtained an appropriation. The name of the society is the United Legal Building Society.

The prosecution of personal injury suits has grown to be a business by itself. Those engaged in it rarely have any other occupation. There are several corporations and many law firms and brokers in the city of Chicago, as in other cities, doing a speculative business in these claims. They employ runners as a commercial house employs travelling salesmen. These runners have business relations with saloon-keepers near manufacturing works or railway crossings, and surgeons and police officers may be found in many parts of the city having their connection with this business. Sooner or later the runners succeed in obtaining admission to every public hospital in the county. It rarely happens that an accident is mentioned in the newspapers, but the unfortunate person who may be injured, or his family, in case of his death, is at once overrun with applicants desiring to procure an assignment of the claim. It will be remembered that under a recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court-a decision which happily the court has again taken under advisement-a personal injury claim is property, capable of being put on the market and transferred from hand to hand, like stock in a corporation. In most cases, the runner who has succeeded in procuring an assignment of the claim has it transferred to some person as trustee. This trustee represents the runner, the saloon-keeper, the hospital nurse or other person through whom he may have procured the claim, the attorney, surgeons, and other witnesses who may be called upon to testify, and who will therefore have a right to share in the proceeds, and, incidentally, the injured person.-North American Review.

The rights of individual labour and of labour organisations are clearly defined in a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, says the Albany Law Journal. The case was that of Charles Curren v. Louis Galen, chief of the Rochester Assembly of the Knights of Labour. Curren, it appears, was employed by a Rochester brewing company, which belonged to the Ale Brewing Association. This association had an agreement with the Brewery Working Men's Local Assembly, 1796, Knights of Labour, under which the former bound itself not to employ for a period exceeding four weeks men not members of the latter. Curren refused to join the assembly after the period named above had expired, whereupon representatives of the assembly called upon the brewing company, notified them of his refusal, and procured his discharge from employment. This question in due course of proceedings went up to the Court of Appeals, which holds that the agreement referred to above operated as a threat to keep persons from working at a particular trade, and to procure their dismissal from employment; that it is clearly unlawful and militates against the spirit of our Government and the nature of our institutions. "If," says the opinion, " organisation of working men is in line with good government, it is because it is intended as a legitimate instrumentality to promote the common good of the members. If it militates against the general public interest, if its powers are directed towards the repression of individual freedom, upon what principle shall it be justified?' This opinion, it will be seen, denies the legality of all agreements or measures the effect of which will be to deprive a citizen of the right to pursue his business calling as an individual, independent of membership in or connection with labour, trade, or business organisations. It is an assertion

of the legal and constitutional individual rights of citizens, and contravenes the assumption that any order or body of men has the right to forbid or prevent a citizen from working because of failure to become a member of such an order.

WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined, tested, and reported upon by an expert from Messrs. Carter Bros., 65, Victoria-street, Westminster. Fee quoted on receipt of full particulars. (Established 21 years.)-[ADVT.]

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL Courts.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Company-Winding-up—Adjustment of Rights of Contributories inter se-Shares issued at a Discount-Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 38—Companies Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 131), s. 25.-The articles of association of a limited company empowered the directors to allot shares at a discount. Additional share capital was created by the issue of shares at a discount, some of which were allotted to the appellant, who was an original shareholder. The company was ordered to be wound-up, and all creditors and costs were duly paid before the whole of the share capital was called up. Held, that, in adjusting the rights of the various classes of shareholders inter se, the holders of shares issued at a discount were liable to pay up their shares in full. Judgment of the Court of Appeal (71 L. T. Rep. 682; (1895) 1 Ch. 255) affirmed. Lord Herschell dissenting.

[Welton v. Saffery. H. of L. April 8.-Counsel: Swinfen Eady, Q.C., Eve, Q.C.; Renshaw, Q.C., F. Whinney. Solicitors: Slaughter and May: C. T. Whinney.] Payments-Appropriation-Rule in Clayton's case. The rule in Clayton's case (1 Mer. 572) as to appropriation of payments is not an invariable rule of law, but the circumstances of a case may afford ground for an inference that the transaction is not intended to come within it. The principle cannot be applied to two transactions of identically the same date merely because one precedes the other in the paper on which they are recorded. Judgment of the Court of Appeal reversed.

[Cory and Co. v. Steamship Mecca. H. of L. April 8.---Counsel: Sir W. Phillimore, Bucknill, Q.C., G. Ince; Pyke, QC., A. E. Nelson, Henriques. Solicitors: Ince, Colt, and Ince; Lowless and Co.]}

COURT OF APPEAL.

Arbitration-Submission-Contract of Service- Wrongful Dismissal Stay of Action-Arbitration Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49), s. 4.-In June 1896 the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant company whereby it was agreed that he should serve them as manager of their electric lighting and water supply at Queen Anne's Mansions, Westminster, for a term of five years. The contract also provided that, if at any time any dispute, difference, or question should arise between him and the company, touching his or their rights or liabilities under the contract or otherwise in relation to the premises, it should be referred to the president for the time being of the Institute of Civil Engineers as sole arbitrator. In Dec. 1896 the company dismissed the plaintiff for gross misconduct in allowing the engines to run without governors. The plaintiff thereupon commenced this action for wrongful dismissal. The company then took out a summons asking that the claim should be referred for arbitration to the President of the Institute of Civil Engineers, in accordance with the submission contained in their agreement with the plaintiff. Day, J. at chambers made an order referring the claim to arbitration. The plaintiff appealed. He relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Davis v. Starr (60 L. T. Rep. 797; 41 Ch. Div. 242), and contended that, the defendants having taken upon themselves to dismiss the plaintiff without waiting for the decision of the matters in difference by arbitration, the court ought not now to grant the application to refer the action. Held, that the order of Day, J. was right. Davis v. Starr was distinguishable on the ground that in that case the defendant was not ready to refer the whole case to arbitration. Appeal dismissed.

away.

[Renshaw v. The Queen Anne Residential Mansions and Hotel Company. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R. and Chitty, L.J. April 6. -Counsel for the plaintiff, Bigham, Q.C., T. Willes Chitty, and Schiller; for the defendants, Dickens, Q.C. and R. Younger. Solicitors: Broughton, Norton, and Broughton; Lee and Pembertons.] Contract-Statute of Frauds-Memorandum in Writing-Name of Plaintiff-Letter and Envelope.-The defendant was the owner of a bed of gravel lying in situ near Croydon, which he agreed to sell to the plaintiff for £60. The plaintiff was to dig up the gravel and carry it The action was brought for a breach of this agreement. The defendant pleaded that either the agreement was for the sale of an interest in land within sect. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, or was for the sale of goods within sect. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, and that the action was not maintainable on the ground that there was no memorandum or note in writing of the contract sufficient to satisfy the requirements of either of those two sections. The action was tried before Grantham, J. with a jury. The plaintiff put in evidence a letter containing the terms of the contract, and commencing with the words "Dear Sir" and signed by the defendant. This letter did not contain the name of the plaintiff, but he gave evidence that it had reached him by post, and that it came in an envelope addressed to him and bearing his name. Upon this the learned judge ruled that there was a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the requirements of the two sections relied on by the defendant, and upon the findings of the jury he gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant moved for judgment or a new trial upon the ground that the ruling of the learned judge was wrong. He contended that there was nothing to connect the letter with the envelope, and the absence of the plaintiff's name from the letter made the letter insufficient as a memorandum of the contract such as has been held necessary to satisfy the requirements of the two sections. Held, that upon the evidence the letter and the envelope must be considered as together forming one document, and that there was there

fore a sufficient memorandum of the contract to satisfy the requirements both of sect. 4 of the Statute of Frauds and of sect. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Application dismissed.

[Pearce v. Gordon. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. April 8.-Counsel; for the plaintiff, Atherley Jones, Q.C. and Compton-Smith; for the defendant, Blake Odgers, Q.C. and Forman. Solicitors: Hicklin, Washington, and Pasmore; Grundy, Izod, and Grundy.]

English Patent Goods manufactured Abroad and sent to England by Post Infringement by foreign Manufacturer. Goods made according to an English patent were manufactured abroad by a foreigner and delivered by him to a forwarding agent at the place of manufacture, with instructions to hold them at the disposal of a customer in England, in order that the agent might pay the forwarding charges, and send the goods by post to the customer, who in his order for them to the manufacturer had desired him to send them by post. The goods were delivered to the customer in England by post, who paid, through the post, the forwarding charges of the agent, which included the agent's commission, although there was no evidence to show that the customer when he paid the charges knew that he was paying anything to the agent. It was admitted that the goods infringed the English patent, and that was the reason the manufacturer delivered them to the forwarding agent at the place of manufacture, instead of posting them to England himself. Held (Rigby, L.J. dissenting), in an action by the owner of the patent, that the foreign manufacturer had done nothing which amounted to making, issuing, exercising, or vending the invention of the plaintiff in this country, and therefore had not infringed the plaintiff's patent. Decision of North, J. (76 L. T. Rep. 21) reversed.

[Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Henry Johnson and Co. and The Basle Chemical Works, Bindschedler. Counsel: Moulton, Q.C. and W. N. Lawson; Upjohn. Solicitors: J. H. and J. Y. Johnson; Ward, Perks, and McKay.]

Mandamus-Action for Mandamus Local Authority Refusal to approve Plans. The plaintiff, who was the owner of land within the district of the Chorley District Council, deposited with the district council plans of houses which he proposed to erect upon his land. The district council honestly and bona fide came to the conclusion that the proposed building amounted to the laying out or constructing of a new street, and refused to approve of the plans upon the ground that such new street would not be in accordance with their bye-laws relating to new streets. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action against the Chorley District Council, claiming a mandamus commanding the district council to approve of the plans. The action was tried by Kennedy, J., with a jury, at Manchester, and the jury found that the proposed building by the plaintiff did not amount to the laying out of a new street. Upon further consideration, the learned judge held that the action could not be maintained, and ordered judgment to be entered for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. Held (affirming the judgment of Kennedy, J.), that an action will not lie for a mandamus to compel a local authority to approve plans which, after an honest and bona fide consideration of the matter, they have refused to approve.

[Smith v. The Chorley District Council. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ. April 5.-Counsel for the appellant, E. Sutton; for the respondents, C. A. Russell, Q.C. and F. H. Mellor. Solicitors for the appellant, Rowcliffes and Co., for Jackson and Son, Chorley; for the respondents, Crowders and Vizard, for Stanton, Chorley.]

:

Trustees

National School -"Owners"-Road-Street-paving-CostCharge on School-Enforcement by Sale or Mortgage-Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), 88. 4, 257-School Sites Act 1841 (4 & 5 Vict. c. 28), 88. 6, 7, 15.-The trustees of school premises which are conveyed to them under sect. 6 of the School Sites Act 1841 are "" owners within the meaning of sect. 257 of the Public Health Act 1875, and the court will make a declaration that the amount of the proportion of metalling and making good a street due from the trustees, together with interest, are a charge on the land and school premises. Decision of Kekewich, J. (74 L. T. Rep. 415) affirmed. But the sum so charged cannot be raised by sale or mortgage of the property free from the trusts as long as the premises remain a site for the school, and are used as such. Decision of Kekewich, J. (75 L. T. Rep. 684) reversed.

[Hornsey District Council v. Smith. Ct. of App.: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. April 2.-Counsel: Macmorran, Q.C. and Beaumont for the plaintiffs; Dibdin for the defendants. Solicitors: Leonard J. Tatham; Lee, Bolton, and Lee.]

Practice-Inspection-Documents referred to in Affidavits-Order XXXI., rr. 15, 16, 17, and 18.-Disputes which had arisen between Fenner and Lord were, in accordance with the terms of an agreement, submitted to arbitration before two arbitrators. The arbitrators made their award. Lord gave notice to Fenner of a motion to set aside the award on the ground of alleged misconduct on the part of one of the arbitrators. Fenner thereupon prepared some affidavits with the view of using them at the hearing of the motion, and, before the motion came on, he gave copies of them to Lord. One of these affidavits was sworn by the arbitrator accused of misconduct, and contained a reference to some correspondence which had passed between him and Fenner's solicitors. The affidavit was not filed. Lord thereupon applied to Fenner for inspection of this correspondence, and being refused took out a summons under Order XXXI., r. 18, for an order that Fenner might be directed to give inspection. Lawrance, J., at chambers, refused the application. Lord appealed. Order XXXI., r. 15, provides that every party to a cause or matter shall be entitled at any time by notice in writing to give

notice to any other party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any document, to produce such document for the inspection of the party giving such notice; and that any party not complying with such notice shall not afterwards be at liberty to put any such document in evidence on his behalf in such cause or matter unless the court or a judge shall allow it. Rule 17 directs the party to whom such notice is given to deliver to the party giving the same a notice stating a time within three days from the delivery thereof at which the document may be inspected. By rule 18, if such notice of a time for inspection be not given, the court or judge may, on the application of the party desiring it, make an order for inspection. Held, that the case came within rule 15, and that under rules 17 and 18 the learned judge at chambers ought to have made an order for inspection. Appeal allowed.

[Re an Arbitration between Fenner and Lord. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R. and Chitty, L.J. April 6.-Counsel: for Fenner, Channell, Q.C. and C. E. Jones; for Lord, Boxall. Solicitors for Lord, Nye and Moreton, for Nye and Treacher, Brighton; for Fenner, A. S. C. Doyle, for Jones and Son, Colchester.]

Vexatious legal Proceedings instituted prior to the Passing of the Vexatious Actions Act 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 51)-No reasonable Ground. -During the past five years C. had brought forty-eight different actions, some in the High Court and some in inferior courts, against various judges of the High Court and of County Courts, the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Archbishop of Canterbury and other trustees of the British Museum, officials of the Houses of Parliament, and other persons occupying official positions. In one of the actions C. had recovered a small sum of money. In the other cases the causes of action included conspiracy by judges and others to defeat the ends of justice, assault, refusal to accept C.'s petitions to Parliament, and refusal to allow him to use the reading rooms in the British Museum. Some of these actions had been stayed as vexatious, some had been dismissed, and some were still pending. All the actions except one had been commenced before the 14th Aug. 1896, the date of the passing of the Vexations Actions Act 1896. Sect. 1 of that Act provides as follows: "It shall be lawful for the Attorney-General to apply to the High Court for an order under this Act, and if he satisfies the High Court that any person has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings, without any reasonable ground for instituting such proceedings,. whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons, the court may, after hearing such person, or giving him an opportunity of being heard, after assigning counsel in case such person is unable on account of poverty to retain counsel, order that no legal proceedings shall be instituted by that person in the High Court or any other court unless he obtains the leave of the High Court or some judge thereof, and satisfies the court or judge that such legal proceeding is not an abuse of the process of the court, and that there is prima facie ground for such proceeding. An application was made by the Attorney-General under the foregoing section against C. It was decided by the Divisional Court (Wright and Bruce, JJ.) that an order under the Act might be founded upon vexatious legal proceedings commenced before the passing of that Act; and that in dealing with an application for such an order the court would consider the number, general character, and results of the proceedings alleged to be vexatious, and might make the order, although there might have been reasonable ground for the proceedings in each case considered by itself. The application was accordingly acceded to. On appeal: Held, that the decision of the Divisional Court was perfectly right, and that, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

[Re Alexander Chaffers. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L.JJ. April 12. The appellant in person. Counsel for the respondent, Sir Richard Webster (A.-G.) and Sutton. Solicitors: for the appellant, The Official Solicitor; for the respondent, Hare and Co.,. agents for The Solicitor to the Treasury.]

Will Precatory Trust Gift beneficial or in Trust-Gift to Wife absolutely "in fullest confidence that she will carry out my wishes" Beneficiary mentioned by Name. In order to determine whether a precatory trust is imposed the whole will must be considered, and unless it appears from the whole will that an obligation was intended to be imposed, no obligation will be held to exist. In some of the older cases obligations were inferred from language which in modern times would be thought insufficient to justify such an inference. Testator, after a small specific bequest, gave the residue of his estate to his wife absolutely, "in the fullest confidence that she will carry out my wishes in the following particulars, namely," that she paid the premiums on a certain policy belonging to her on her own life, and left the money payable under it, and also the money payable at testator's death in respect of a policy on his own life to his daughter L. Held (Rigby, L.J. dissenting), that the widow took an absolute interest, and that the doctrine of precatory trusts did not apply. Decision of Romer, J. affirmed.

[Re Williams; Williams v. Williams. Ct. of App.: Lindley, Smith, and Rigby, L JJ. April 5. Counsel: Neville, Q.C. and A. Rutherford; Levett, Q.C. and F. J. Lewis; Medd. Solicitors: Norris, Allens, and Chapman, agents for J. M. Quiggin and Brothers, Liverpool; Maples, Teesdale, and Co., agents for Hugh Roberts, Mold; Simpson and Co., agents for Kelly and Keene, Mold.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Fixtures-Mansion House-Tenant for Life in Possession-Natural History Museum-Stuffed Birds and Animals-Cases fired to the Wall.-The plaintiff, the fourth Viscount Hill, the tenant for life in possession of a mansion-house and estates, and W. S. the surviving trustee of the settlement of the family estates dated the 17th June 1887, brought