an action against B. the trustee in bankruptcy of the third Viscount Hill, and the plaintiffs claimed a declaration that certain articles in the mansion-house belonged to the mansion-house as fixtures, or as being in the nature of fixtures, and that the plaintiff Viscount Hill as tenant for life was entitled to the said articles. The articles in question consisted of, among other things, fixed cases with birds and animals, and other objects in the bird gallery or museum. The stuffed birds, which formed the principal part of the collection, stood and were fixed in open wooden cases or trays, most of them removable like a drawer, inclosed in heavy iron cases with glass doors, these iron cases being fixed to the wall of the museum by T irons let into the wall, which at the back of the cases was left in its original rough and unplastered state. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the iron and wooden cases and the stuffed birds and animals were "part of the architectural design" for the gallery or museum as distinguished from mere ornaments (D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, 3 Eq. 382), and were fixtures annexed to the mansion-house. Held, that the contents of the cases, and the other objects of a like character to the contents of the cases, in the museum, were not annexed to the mansion-house, but belonged to the defendant. [Viscount Hill v. Bullock. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. March 23, 24, and April 6.-Counsel: Renshaw, Q.C., Christopher James, and Horace J. Rowlands; P. O. Lawrence, Q.C. and M. Muir Mackenzie. Solicitors: Stibbard, Gibson, and Co., for Rowlands and Co., Birmingham; Pritchard, Englefield, and Co., for E. Bygott, Wem.] Jurisdiction of Colonial Court-English Company-Dividend Duty on Preference Stock-Incidence of Duty on different Classes of Stockholders. The Scottish Australian Investment Company Limited, which was originally formed by means of a contract of copartnery on the 5th Feb. 1841, and was on the 27th Oct. 1856 registered under the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, was established in England with its principal office in London. The object of the company was to acquire real and personal property in Australia and the British colonies, but it was not registered or incorporated under the laws of any colony. In April 1864 the capital of the company consisted of £300,000 stock fully paid-up. On the 28th of that month the company, under the power of their copartnery contract, by resolution created and issued £200,000, 6 per cent. guaranteed preference stock which was to bear, and be entitled to a guaranteed interest in perpetuity at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, and to have priority in all respects of all stock of the company. Certificates were issued declaring that the holders of this stock were entitled to receive a guaranteed interest of six pounds per cent. per annum in perpetuity out of all the profits of the company. In May and June 1879 the company created and issued £200,000, 5 per cent. guaranteed preference stock on similar terms to the 6 per cent. By an Act of the colony of Queensland (No. 10 of 1890) intituled "An Act to impose duties in respect of dividends," it was enacted that any company which had not its head office in Queensland should pay to the Colonial Treasurer a duty equal to the sum of 1s. for every 20s. of so much of the total dividends declared by the company during any year as might be proportionate to the average amount of capital of the company employed in Queensland during the year. On the 21st Aug. 1896, pursuant to a judgment in an action at the suit of the Attorney-General of Queensland, the company paid to the Government of Queensland £3553 as duty payable in respect of interest paid by the company to holders of their 6 and 5 per cent guaranteed preference stock. This was an action to determine (inter alia) whether the company were entitled to deduct from the interest payable to the holders of the guaranteed preference stock, both 6 and 5 per cent., the dividend duty paid to the Government of Queensland, and in what manner, as between the different classes of the holders of stocks both preference and ordinary, the duty ought to be borne and paid. Held, that the respective rights of the stockholders, domiciled in England, inter se were evidenced by the contract entered into by them, and that both the locus contractus and the locus solutionis being English the contract was subject to English law only. It was not, therefore, possible for a local colonial law to say that that contract could not be performed, which would be the result if the dividend duty on the 6 and 5 per cent. dividends were to be paid by the preference stockholders; consequently the duty must be borne by the company and not by the preference stockholders. March 30.-Counsel: [Spiller v. Turner. Ch. Div. Kekewich, J. Bramwell Davis, Q.C. and Upjohn; Renshaw, Q.C. and MacSwinney. Solicitors, Simpson and Co.] Licensed House-Lease-Covenant that no Business should be carried on other than that covered by the Licence, with Power of Re-entry-No implied Covenant not to surrender Licence-Injunction.-The tenant of a house having procured a licence for the sale of wine, beer, and spirits off the premises, the landlord, in 1879, granted him a lease thereof for twenty-one years, commencing from 1878 and expiring in 1899, which did not contain the covenant to preserve the licence which is usually inserted in the lease of licensed premises, but only a covenant that no business should be carried on there other than that covered by the licence, with a power for the landlord to re-enter in case the tenant should for seven consecutive days cease to carry on the licensed business. The licence was an annual licence, renewable every March on application to the magistrates at the licensing sessions, and the existing licence expired on the 5th April 1897, but a further licence had already been granted by the magistrates which would expire on the 5th April 1898. The value of the house with the licence was £10,000, but without it only £800. The tenant was owner of the adjoining house. In 1890, upon throwing the cellar of the adjoining house into the cellar of the licensed house, he obtained a licence to use the cellar of the adjoining house for the sale of wine, beer, and spirits; and, at the licensing sessions held in March last, applied to the magistrates for a licence for the whole of the adjoining house, which the magistrates granted on condition of his surrendering the licence of the already licensed house. This was a motion on behalf of the landlord of the latter house for an injunction to restrain the tenant from surrendering the licence of that house on the ground that there was an implied covenant in the lease thereof not to surrender such licence. An application was pending for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the magistrate to grant the licence for the adjoining house on the ground that it amounted to a removal, within sect. 50 of the Licensing Act 1872, of the licence of the alaeady licensed house. Held, that there was no implied covenant in the lease of the licensed house not to surrender the licence thereof, and the injunction was refused. [E. Lacon and Co. Limited v. Laceby. Ch. Div.: North, J. April 3. Counsel: Swinfen Eady, Q.C. and Begg; Vernon Smith, Q.C. and Lyttelton Chubb. Solicitors: Wellington Taylor; W. W. Young and Son.] Practice Frivolous and Vexatious Defence-Striking out Pleading-Abuse of Process of Court-Evidence.-Where a defendant put in a defence merely denying or refusing to admit the several allegations in the statement of claim, and not containing any substantial statement by the defendant, the plaintiff moved to strike out the defence as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court, and showed by affidavit that all the facts alleged in the statement of claim had substantially been admitted by the defendant in prior proceedings. Held, that, although as a general rule a plaintiff is not entitled on an application to strike out a defence to show by evidence that the statements in the defence are untrue, the court may receive evidence for the purpose only of showing that the defence is an abuse of the process of the court, and the defence ordered to be struck out as not being a real defence, but merely for the purpose of delay, and an abuse of the process of the court. [Remington v. Scoles. G. Lawrence; F. Russell. Clark.] Ch. Div. Romer, J. April 2.-Counsel: Solicitors: Darley and Cumberland; G. F. Specific Performance-Agreement for Sale of Land-Insufficient Description of Property-Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3). By an agreement in writing made between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff agreed to sell and the defendant agreed to buy, for £5000, "twenty-four acres of land, freehold, and all appurtenances thereto, at Totmonslow, in the parish of Dracott, in the county of Stafford, and all the mines and minerals thereto appertaining.” Held, in an action for specific performance, that the property was insufficiently described, that parol evidence was inadmissible to identify it, and that therefore the Statute of Frauds was a good defence to the action. [Plant v. Bourne. Ch. Div.. Byrne, J. March 29, 30, and 31.Counsel: Ere, Q.C. and J. Rolt; Astbury, Q.C. and A. J. Chitty. Solicitors: Vizard and Monk Smith; Pitman and Sons, for Bayley, Newcastle-under-Lyme.] Succession Duty-Marriage Settlement Appointment thereunder of so much of the Funds as shall be sufficient to raise the Net Sum of £— subject to Life Interest of Appointor-Appointment whether free of Duty. The question in this case, was whether certain appointments of sums under provisions in a marriage settlement to a child entitled him to have such sum raised and paid free of duty. By a marriage settlement in the usual form, certain funds were settled upon trust for the husband and wife for life, and afterwards for their children as they should jointly appoint, or in default thereof, as the survivor should appoint. The husband died in the lifetime of the wife, and no joint appointment was made. Pursuant to the power the wife, as survivor, made a series of appointments in favour of the plaintiff to the following effect, namely, that so much of the funds as should be sufficient to raise the net sum of £- should, subject to her life interest therein, thenceforth belong to the plaintiff. In these circumstances a summons was taken out by the plaintiff, asking for a declaration that he was entitled to receive the sum appointed free from all deductions. Against this view it was contended that the charges ought to be paid out of the sum raised. It was held that this was an appointment, not of a net sum, but of so much as should be sufficient to raise a sum. That in Banks v. Braithwaite (8 L. T. Rep. 80), a distinction had been drawn by Kindersley, V.C., between a gift of a clear annuity or legacy and a gift in this form, and that the principle which applied to a gift of a clear annuity or legacy was not applicable to such a case. That the present case fell within that decision, and that the gift did not carry with it succession duty, but that the appointor took subject to duty. [Re Saunders; Saunders v. Gore. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. April 8.Counsel: Medd; Godefroi; W. A. Peck; Peterson. Solicitors: Valpy, Chaplin, and Peckham: Williams, Roskell, Munster, and Wild; Hasties.] Vendor and Purchaser-Partnership-Judgment in Action for Dissolution and Sale-Purchase by one Partner of Moiety of other Partner-Copyholds described as Freeholds-Bona fide Mistake of both Parties-Compensation. In this case the plaintiff and defendant had been in partnership as brewers, with a number of tied houses attached to the brewery. In an action by one partner against the other, an order was made for dissolution and for sale of such houses by private tender. By the chief clerk's certificate the defendant was declared the purchaser of the moiety of the plaintiff by being the highest bidder. In the conditions of sale, which were approved by both the plaintiff and defendant and their legal advisers, it was stated that it was unnecessary to state the title to the properties, it being "well known to both parties," and no clause was inserted therein for compensation. It having been subsequently discovered that some of the properties which the plaintiff had undertaken to convey as freeholds were copyholds, negotiations took place between the parties and their legal advisers, and to prevent delay (the properties being in mortgage) the conveyance was executed by the plaintiff in the form settled by counsel. The defendant having had to pay a considerable sum for the enfranchisement of these copyholds, took out a summons, in which he asked that the plaintiff be ordered to pay to him half of such sum as compensation in respect of misdescription. Held, that the principle applicable to such cases, there being no reference to compensation in the conditions, was laid down in Mortlock v. Buller (10 Ves. 291) and Castle v. Wilkinson (5 Ch. 534), namely, that the purchaser could insist on having all that the vendor could convey, with a compensation for the -difference, but that that was limited to such cases as where the vendor knew the title and the purchaser did not; and that, therefore, it had no application to the present case, and that in those circumstances it became unnecessary to consider whether compensation could be enforced by a purchaser after the money was paid and the conveyance executed. The summons was accordingly dismissed. [Hopcraft v. Hopcraft. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Jan. 28, Feb. 18, 25, 26, and April 7. Counsel: Buckley, Q.C. and J. D. Crawford; Hastings, Q.C. and D. G. Begg. Solicitors: Hill, Son, and Rickards; Wellington Taylor.] Vendor and Purchaser-Vendor Transferee of Mortgage to Trustees of Building Society-Power of Sale contained in such Mortgage, whether exercisable by Transferee.-In this case certain premises had been purchased at public auction and the deposit money paid. Upon the title being investigated it appeared that the vendor was the transferee of six indentures of mortgage made by one Dawson in favour of the trustees of a building society, and which were in the usual form. Powers were therein contained for the trustees for the time being to sell and to give receipts for the purchase money. By the indentures of transfer not executed the trustees purported to assign to the vendor the benefit of the said mortgages and powers of sale, and to convey. the said premises to him subject to the equity of redemption subsisting therein. In these circumstances it was objected by the purchaser that the said transfers were ultra vires and void, and that the said powers of sale were not exercisable by the assigns of the trustees. A summons having been taken out by the purchaser asking for a declaration that a good title had not been shown, it was assumed by his Lordship without deciding it, on the authority of Ulster Permanent Building Society v. Glenton (21 L. Rep. Ir. 124) that the trustees of a building society were entitled to transfer a mortgage, but that making that assumption the question still remained whether the power of sale contained in the mortgage deed was a mere security for the debt exercisable in the absence of a contrary intention by any person who in equity could give a receipt for the purchase money. It was held that to give effect to this contention would be inconsistent with Bradford v. Belfield (2 Sim. 264), where, in the case of a mortgage in the form of a trust for sale to A. and his heirs, it was decided that the trust could not be executed by an assignee, and which case had never been overruled. That the rule of the courts now was, that trusts and powers were only to be exercised by persons designated for the purpose in the instrument which created them; and that, having regard to the form of mortgage in this case where the word "assigns" must be taken to refer only to subsequently appointed trustees, and where the power of sale and giving receipt for the purchase money was confined to the trustees for the time being, that a good title by the vendor had not been shown, and that the summons by the purchaser must succeed. [Re Rumney and Smith's Contract. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. April 7 and 8.-Counsel: Buckley, Q.C. and W. A. Jolly; Hastings, Q.C., E. Ford, and A. Willis. Solicitors: H. Rumney; Moon, Gilks, and Moon, agents for Amos Barnes, Swindon.] Will-Construction --Tenant for Life and Remainderman-LeaseholdsDevise and Bequest of Freeholds and Leaseholds to pay the Rents and Profits to A. for Life, and then to B. for Life (subject to Payment of Annuities), and then to the Children of B. equally-Power of Distress to Annuitants- Conversion Rule in Howe v. Lord Dartmouth. In this case the testator, after certain specific gifts and devises, directed, as to all the rest and residue of his real and personal estate, that the rents and profits arising therefrom should be paid to his wife for life, and, after her decease, he gave and devised the said real and personal estate (but subject to and charged with the payment of certain annuities) to G. G. for his life, and on his death he gave and devised the same (subject as aforesaid) to and equally between the children of G. G. as tenants in common; and he directed that each of the annuitants should have the same or the like remedy by distress for the recovery of the annuities as landlords had for the recovery of rent in arrear upon a common demise. The residuary estate consisted of five freehold and five leasehold houses, and, in these circumstances, the trustees took out a summons to ascertain whether, as to the leaseholds, the rule in Howe v. Lord Dartmouth (7 Ves. 137) applied, or whether the same were to be enjoyed by the tenant for life in specie. It was contended, on behalf of the tenant for life, that there were indications in the will of intention on the part of the testator that the above-mentioned rule should not be applied, namely, first, the direction that the rents and profits arising from the residue should be paid to the wife for life; and, second, the power of distress conferred on the annuitants. For the remainderman it was contended that neither of these was sufficient to prevent the application of the rule. With reference to the direction as to rents and profits, it was stated by his Lordship that the law appeared to be in a singular position, inasmuch as in Harris v. Poyner (1 Drew. 174) and Craig v. Wheeler (29 L. J. 374, Ch.) it had been decided by Kindersley, V.C. that such a direction did not amount to an indication of intention that the rule should not be applied, while in three other cases before Lord Romilly the reverse had been decided. It was held, (1) following the decisions above mentioned, that, where a testator made a residuary devise, including both freeholds and leaseholds, the use of the word "rents" was not a sufficient indication of intention that the leaseholds should be enjoyed in specie, inasmuch as that word might be well satisfied by reference to the freeholds; and (2) that, there being no indication of intention that the power of distress should be exercised on any property but the freeholds, which were ample for that purpose, that the rule in Howe v. Lord Dartmouth must be applied. [Re Game; Game v. Young. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. March 11 and April 8.-Counsel: Hastings, Q.C. and Theobald; Buckley, Q.C. and H. Terrell; Manby. Solicitors: Hartcup, Davis, and Cobbold; Marshall and Co.] Will-Construction-Tenant for Life and Remainderman-Leaseholds directed to be retained by the Trustees-Current Repairs and Outgoings, whether chargeable on Income or on Corpus. By his will, W. Redding, after appointing executors and trustees to arrange his affairs, manage his estate, and carry out his wishes and desires, and directing his debts and funeral expenses to be paid, requested the trustees to take in hand his various businesses, and manage the same until they could be advantageously put in the market. And as to certain premises held at ground rents, he desired them to be retained by his trustees, and let on lease or otherwise at fair rentals, the income derived therefrom to be devoted as thereinafter described. And, after directing them to get in all outstanding assets, and the proceeds of sale of the various premises, and invest the same, he authorised them to pay the whole of the income from such investments to his wife for life, for the benefit of herself and children, and after her decease to divide the whole of his estate among his children in manner therein mentioned. A summons having been taken out by the trustees asking whether the rents and profits of the retained leaseholds were payable to the wife, the tenant for life, without any deduction in respect of current repairs and outgoings, it was contended, on behalf of the remaindermen, that the costs thereby incurred were payable by the tenant for life, and that the decision in Re Baring; Jeune v. Baring (67 L. T. Rep. 702), ought not to be followed. On the other hand, on behalf of the tenant for life, the same case was relied on. It was Held, (1) that, on the true construction of the will, the power to manage the estate given to the trustees did not cover such expenses as these, and that, accordingly, the "income derived from such leaseholds meant net income, and that these expenses must be borne by the tenant for life; and (2) that, inasmuch as all these costs of repairs and outgoings were accruing subsequent to the death of the testator, that Re Courtier; Coles v. Courtier (55 L. T. Rep. 574), was distinguishable, and that they were properly payable by the tenant for life. Re Baring (ubi sup.) dissented from. [Re Redding; Thompson v. Redding. March 19 and April 3. Ch. Div. Stirling, J. Counsel: P. F. Wheeler, Whinney, CozensHardy. Solicitors: Sheffield, Son, and Powell for all parties.] : QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Costs Appeal from County Court-Security for Costs of Appeal.-Appli cation for security for costs. The plaintiff was a workman who had been severely injured while working for the defendant. He sued the defendant in the County Court, where the judge nonsuited him, holding the evidence to bring the case within the principle of volenti non fit injuria. The plaintiff appealed, and now the defendant applied that the plaintiff should be required to give security for the costs of the appeal, on the ground that he had no visible means of paying such costs if, in the result, the appeal failed; and that, as a matter of fact, he was at that moment receiving outdoor relief. No costs at present were owing to the defendant. Held, that the application should be refused. The County Court was established for the benefit of poor litigants, and the mere want of means was not sufficient in itself to justify the court in requiring security for costs, and so possibly preventing appeals, if there appeared to be reasonable grounds for appealing. Ex parte Pritchett v. Poole. Q. B. Div.: Cave and Lawrance, JJ. April 6. Counsel for the appellant, Lewis Thomas; for the respondent, Morten Smith. Solicitors: H. K. Honey; Martin and Nicholson.] Licensing-Drunk on Licensed Premises during Closing Hours-Licensing Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94), s. 12.-Rule for a certiorari to remove into the High Court a conviction made on the 9th Jan. 1897, whereby one A. Lacey was convicted by the justices of Ongar, in the county of Essex, of being found drunk on licensed premises in the parish of Chipping Ongar. At a court of summary jurisdiction, held at Ongar, the applicant for the present rule, Lacey, was summoned for being found drunk on licensed premises, namely, the Bell inn, and was convicted and fined 58. and costs. From the affidavits it appeared that the defendant had been in the public-house on the evening of Sunday, the 20th Dec.; that he did not leave the house at closing time; that about a quarter past ten-the house having been closed at the closing time, namely, ten o'clock-a police constable, hearing men talking in the bar, gained admittance to the house, and there found the defendant, who was drunk, talking with the landlord of the house. On being asked why he was there during closing hours, he said that he had previously engaged a bed there for the night, as he lived some three miles away and the weather was rough, and this account was corrc borated by the landlord of the house. The justices, however, found as facts that when the police constable gained admittance to the premises the defendant was there and was drunk on the licensed premises, and that it was after closing hours, and they disbelieved the evidence given to the effect that the defendant had engaged a bed at the inn, and they found as a fact that the defendant was not on the night in question a lodger or inmate at or in the licensed premises, and was not intending to sleep there that night, and they the.efore convicted him of the offence of having been found drunk on licensed premises contrary to the provisions of sect. 12 of the Licensing Act 1872. At the time the rule for a certiorari was granted there was before the court only the affidavits filed on behalf of the applicant, which contained the allegation that the applicant was a lodger at the time, and that therefore he came within the decision in the case of Lester v. Torrens (2 Q. B. Div. 403), but in the affidavit subsequently filed it appeared that he was not a lodger. Sect. 12 of the Licensing Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94) provides that "every person found drunk on any licensed premises shall be liable to a penalty." For the justices, in showing cause against the rule, it was contended that the licensed premises still remained licensed premises although they were closed to the public, and, as the defendant was not a lodger or inmate, he did not come within the decision in Lester v. Torrens (ubi sup.), where it was held that the licensed person himself, being an inmate of the house, could not be convicted of being found drunk on his premises during closing hours. In support of the rule it was contended that the licensed premises ceased to be licensed premises at closing time and as soon as they were closed to the public, and that the principle of Lester v. Torrens applied. Held (discharging the rule), that the licensed premises remained licensed premises although closed to the public, and that the case of Lester v. Torrens (ubi sup.), which had reference only to the case of the landlord himself being found drunk on his own premises during closing hours, had no application, and that therefore the defendant was properly convicted. [Reg. v. Pelly and another (Justices). Q. B. Div.: Hawkins and Lawrance, JJ. March 31.-Counsel: Earle; Ogle. Solicitors: Smith, Ongar; Haynes and Clifton, Romford and London.] Railways-Luggage- Cloak Room-Article left in-Condition-" Responsible for "-Meaning of.-Appeal by the defendants from the Southwark County Court of Surrey. The facts were thus stated by the learned deputy County Court judge in his judgment. The plaintiff deposited his gun in the cloak room of the defendants, and he received a printed ticket, which he had to give up on receiving the gun back. On the back were printed certain conditions in small type, and as a matter of fact the plaintiff knew nothing of what the particular conditions were until they were read in court, but the learned judge considered that he was bound by authority to hold, and he did hold accordingly, that the plaintiff was bound by the conditions. These conditions were headed "Important Notice." "The company will not be responsible for articles left by passengers at the station unless the same be duly registered, for which a charge of 2d. per article will be made, and a ticket given in exchange; and no article will be given up without the production of the ticket, or satisfactory evidence of the ownership being adduced, &c.; and the condition went on : The company will not be responsible for any package exceeding the value of £10." The gun in question was worth more than £10, and when it came to the plaintiff's hands it was found to be broken, and the learned judge said that he could not doubt, after hearing the evidence of gunmakers on both sides, that it was injured by the careless handling of the company's servants; and as he construed the condition that "the company will not be responsible for any package exceeding the value of £10," as having reference to the loss of the article only, and not to any damage it might sustain, he was of opinion that, although they would be protected by the condition against the loss of the article, they were not protected against damage to it. He accordingly gave judgment for the plaintiff for £5 53. with costs, with leave to appeal. The defendants appealed. For the defendants it was contended that, as the greater includes the less, the loss of the article would include damage to it, and that, therefore, any condition which protected the company against the loss of the article which this condition admittedly did-would also protect them against any damage to it; and that the - plaintiff was bound by the condition: Van Toll v. South-Eastern Railway Company (6 L. T. Rep. 244; 12 C. B. N. S. 75); Pepper v. SouthEastern Railway Company (17 L. T. Rep. 469). For the plaintiff it was contended that the judgment of the learned judge was correct; that the onus was upon the defendants to make the condition clear to the plaintiff, which they had not done; that the learned judge had found as a fact that the injury to the gun was caused by the negligence of the defendants' servants, and that it could not be a reasonable construction of the condition to construe it so as to exempt the company from liability for the negligence of their servants. Held, that the word "responsible" in the condition meant responsible not only for the loss, but also for the damage to the article, and that the reasonable construction of the condition was that the company were protected not only against loss, but also against damage. Appeal allowed. Judgment for defendants. [Pratt v. South-Eastern Railway Company. Q. B. Div.: Cave and Lawrance, JJ. April 3.-Counsel: R. Brown and Archibald Willis; Hume-Williams. Solicitors: John W. Watkins; Keene, Marsland, and Co.] Revenue-Stamp Duties-Annuities-Conveyance on Sale-Security in Satisfaction of Loan- Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), 88. 54, 60, and 87 (2).-The M. D. Company were a corporation incorporated by Act of Parliament. Under certain special Acts they were entitled to borrow money up to a given amount, and, in order to raise the amount in question, they were entitled to issue bonds for sums borrowed, or to grant annuities. If they granted annuities, such annuities were not to be determinable, but were to continue until they were repurchased from the holders. The company were under obligations to set apart a portion of their revenues for the purpose of redeeming bonds and repurchasing annuities, and there was a provision to the effect that if holders of annuities were not willing to sell, the company might repurchase compulsorily at the average market value during the six months preceding the repurchase. The company granted a number of annuities, and the Inland Revenue authorities claimed stamp duties upon the deeds creating them at the rate of 10s. per £100, on the ground that the instruments in question constituted conveyances on sale within sects. 54 and 60 of the Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39). The company appealed from this decision. It was now contended on their behalf that the transaction here was not a sale, but a loan contracted upon the company's parliamentary powers to borrow money up to a certain amount, and that the deeds creating the annuities were securities for the satisfaction or discharge of a loan within sect. 87 (2) of the Stamp Act 1891, and consequently they were liable to a stamp duty of only 2s. 6d. on the £100. For the Crown it was contended that the transaction was in reality a sale of an annuity. The special Acts gave the company power to raise a certain amount of capital, either by issuing bonds or by selling annuities. The deeds creating the annuities so sold did not come within sect. 87 (2), which applied only to securities for the payment of annuities by way of repayment or in satisfaction or discharge of loans "intended to be so repaid, satisfied, or discharged," i.e., terminable annuities intended not merely to pay the interest on the loan, but to repay the loan itself. Held, that the grant of the annuities. was a conveyance on sale within sects. 54 and 60, and not a security within sect. 87 (2). [Mersey Dock Company v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Q. B. Div.: Wills and Grantham, JJ. April 7. Counsel for the appellants, J. Walton, Q.C. and Carver; for the Commissioners, the Attorney-General and Vaughan Hawkins. Solicitors: Rowcliffes, Rawle, and Co.; Solicitor for the Inland Revenue.] Practice County Court-Employers' Liability Act 1880, s. 4-Notice of Injury within six Weeks-Want of Notice-Statutory Defence-County Court Rules 1889, Order X., rr. 10, 18a.-Appeal from a decision of the learned deputy judge of Wandsworth County Court. The action was brought by the plaintiff under the Employers' Liability Act 1880 to recover damages for injuries sustained in the service of the defendants. At the hearing the defendants sought to raise the objection that the plaintiff had not complied with the 4th section of the Act, which provides that an action shall not be maintainable unless notice that injury has been sustained is given within six weeks of the occurrence of the accident. The learned deputy judge, however, refused to allow the objection to be raised, on the ground that it was a statutory defence of which notice should have been filed under Order X., r. 10, of the County Court Rules 1889 which provides that, where the defendant intends to rely upon (inter alia) any statutory defence (under r. 18a) he shall file a notice giving a concise statement of the grounds of that defence, five clear days before the return day. On appeal, counsel for the defendant contended that the objection was not a statutory defence, but that the six weeks' notice of his injuries was a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to bring the action. He cited Keen v. The Milwall Dock Company (8 Q. B. Div. 482) and Moyle v. Jenkins (8 Q. B. Div. 116). Held, (affirming the learned deputy judge), that the objection to want of notice from the piaintiff under sect. 4 was a statutory defence to the action, and could not be raised without five days' notice being given as required by Order X., r. 10. [Conroy v. Peacock. Q. B. Div.: Cave and Lawrance, JJ. April 6. -Counsel; for the plaintiff, Moyses; for the defendant, Lynch. Solioitors; for the plaintiff, Appleton; for the defendant, S. Franklin.] Seaman Discharge at Foreign Port-Passage Home Maintenance Recoverable as Wages - Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), ss. 134, 186.-E. was a seaman who at West Hartlepool entered into a contract with the defendants to serve in their steamship C., which went foreign. Under the contract he was to receive certain monthly wages and his rations, and he was to be discharged between Elbe and Brest, or in the United Kingdom, at the master's option. He was ultimately discharged at Antwerp. In accordance with the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), the master and crew of the C. attended before the British Consul for the purpose of paying off. There the wages then due to E. were handed to him, and. the consul gave him an order for his passage to the port of Grimsby. The Grimsby packet did not sail till the next day, but E. received no money for the payment of his expenses in Antwerp till she sailed, nor for his maintenance on the voyage home. The Court found that there was no evidence that he asked for these, nor that he expressed any wish to be sent to West Hartlepool. It was admitted hy the master that he had made no deposit with the consul to. cover such expenses, but he had given the consul a guarantee and had left the whole matter of sending the men home in the consul's hands. On reaching Grimsby E. took the train to West Hartlepool. Ht now sued the defendants under sect. 186 (4 a) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 for maintenance and lodging at Antwerp from the time of discharge till his departure to Grimsby, for maintenance on the voyage to Grimsby, and for train fare from Grimsby to West Hartlepool. He further claimed wages at the rate of 2s. 8d. per day, and rations at the rate of 2s. 4d. per day from the date of his discharge until payment or judgment, under sect. 134 of the Act. For E. it was contended that the master had not provided him with a passage home within the meaning of sect. 186 (2 c.), as home there meant the port where he had been employed, and that sect. 186 (4) clearly entitled the seaman to maintenance where maintenance was necessary; and as to the claim for wages, that as sect. 186 (4) made the expenses E. had in consequence of the master's default been put recoverable as wages due to him, E. had not received his full wages on his discharge, and therefore wages continued to run under sect. 134 until he in sect. 186 (4) did not necessarily mean the port where the seaman was engaged, and was here satisfied by Grimsby, which was a port in the United Kingdom, at which under the articles of agreement E. might be discharged. As to maintenance en route, where that was necessary the master must provide it, but here the master had done all required by sect. 186 (2 d) As to the claim for wages, sect. 186 (4 a) did not make expenses incurred by a seaman wages, but merely recoverable as wages. Sect. 134 therefore did not apply. [William Edwards v. Steel, Young, and Co. Q. B. Div. Commercial Court. Collins, J. April 1 and 2.--Counsel: for the plaintiff, Robson, Q.C. and J. D. A. Johnson; for the defendant, Joseph Walton, Q.C., and Lewis Noad. Solicitors: Pattinson and Brewer; W. A. Crump and Son.] LAW LIBRARY. A Treatise on the Modern Law of Contracts. By CHARLES FISK BEACH, Jun. Wm. Clowes and Sons Limited; The BowenMerrill Company, U.S.A. MR. FISK BEACH, jun., is one of the most voluminous writers of modern times. He has written on very many themes, prominently corporations; and whatever he writes is received by the Profession on both sides of the Atlantic as the work of a good lawyer and a most industrious compiler. The volumes before us (two portly tomes) are monumental, all-embracing. They include the law as determined by the Courts and Statutes of England and the United States. Our author has recognised, rightly or wrongly, that an exhaustive examination of modern cases on contract, not a statement of elementary principles, is wanted. The result is the citation of an enormous number of cases and a text of great length, with a multiplicity of smalltype foot-notes. It is needless to say that of the cases cited there is a preponderance of American decision, and this to the English student and practitioner is a distinct disadvantage. To the cosmopolitan jurist, to the lawgiver and codifier seeking material for the best possible definitions, this latest effort of Mr. Beach will prove a storehouse of dicta, decisions, and statute law. In America the contracts of corporations public and private the undertakings of railroad companies and building and loan associations-have given rise to much litigation and judicial decision. Such matters receive elaborate treatment at the hands of Mr. Beach, and he deals with them in a masterly manner with a wide grasp and fulness of detail. To the English lawyer, however, disquisitions of this nature are of little practical moment, particularly because when necessary he can consult Mr. Beach himself, who is now resident in this country, with an office in the city of London. It is quite unnecessary to describe at length the scope of these volumes, because the law of contracts has known limits, with historic subdivisions. Here they all are. Here is all the latest learning under every heading. Nothing is absent; there appears but one thing wanting-condensation. If our law is really developing at the rate which this great work declares it to be, and if fresh decisions mean, not making the law more concrete, but expanding and outspreading, the human mind must begin to despair of ever reducing even everyday law to a reasonable compass. The work of the codifier would appear to be becoming more and more distant. We can, however, believe that works of this magnitude may some day suggest to the powers that be the question recently asked in the House of Commons as to the codification of the law must be answered in the affirmative-it must be done, even if it cost as much as an ironclad. On the committee of codification Mr. Beach, jun., should find a seat. A conscientious workman with a full knowledge where to find his material, he would be an acquisition— which is, perhaps, the highest testimony which we can bear to the work before us. Limited), is a very useful volume, but it is not "Bullen and Leake" as old-fashioned lawyers understand those names. In revising and adapting that venerable volume to the present practice, the editors have revised and adapted away the chief value of the book. This is not their fault, but the present practice makes the rigid test which was provided by the original work impossible. Judges still continue to ask from the Bench, "What was the old Bullen and Leake' count for that?" and the senior members of the Bar are always still ready to rush into the fray in answer to such a challenge.. That this method may not pass away, it is desirable that a reprint of the now rare third edition should be forthcoming as speedily as possible, for there are many among our younger lawyers who are anxious to possess the book on which their fathers were nourished, and who are kept from it only by its prohibitive price. Still the present volume is, as we have said, a very useful one, especially when considered as a work of reference to all the most recent cases which the pleader should have before him. Of the precedents themselves different pleaders will doubtless take different views. Their style is more terse than that which ordinarily prevails in the Law Courts at the present time; this we suppose has been the result of the editors' attempt to keep as close as possible to the great masters upon whose text they have been working. Students will do well to study the introductory chapters of this work, by way of preparation for approaching the great science of pleading-a science, however, which no book can teach alone, but which must be laboriously pursued in the chambers of someone or other who has himself learnt the whole matter in a long course of years and of experience. The Law relating to Civil Engineers, Architects, and Contractors, by Messrs. Livingston Macassey and Andrew Strahan (Stevens and Sons Limited) has reached a second edition. As originally designed, it was a treatise intended for the layman, and in this edition an attempt is made to adapt it also to the lawyer. In a way it may be useful to the latter, but there is very little peculiar to the Profession dealt with which is not to be found in the general law. In these days of severe specialism, however, it is difficult to say that any book on even a quasilegal subject will not find a market. The authors have taken every care to make the treatise reliable. A second edition of Edmunds on Patents (Stevens and Sons Limited) speaks to the rapid development of the law and the cases. Mr. Edmunds, Q.C., the author, has left most of the work of this edition to Dr. T. M. Stevens, and he has been fortunate in placing it in most competent hands. A very good example of the re-written portion of this volume is to be found in the chapter on "Action to Restrain Threats" (p. 470). It shows a grasp of the principles of the law and an intelligent appreciation of the decisions. But our reference to this portion of the work is not intended to convey the opinion that it is superior to the residue. The utmost care has evidently been used down to the minutest details to present a full and comprehensive exposition of a very complicated and difficult branch of our jurisprudence. We think this result has been attained, thus placing the treatise in the front rank of text-books. It is only necessary to acknowledge the receipt of the seventh edition of Mr. John Indermaur's Manual of the Practice of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Stevens and Haynes). The sixth edition went out of print in three years. BOOKS RECEIVED. Jelf's Where to Find your Law. Horace Cox, LAW TIMES Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C. Price 10s. 6d. Bastable's Theory of International Trade. Second Edition. Macmillan and Co. Limited, London; The Macmillan Company, New York. Price 3s. 6d., net. Bax's Outspoken Essays on Social Subjects. William Reeves, 185, Fleet-street, E.C. NEW EDITIONS. THE fifth edition of Bullen and Leake's Precedents of Pleadings, with Notes and Rules relating to Pleading, revised and adapted to the present practice in the Queen's Bench Division, by Thomas J. Bullen, Barrister-at-Law, Cyril Dodd, Q.C., and Charles Walter Clifford, Barrister-at-Law (Stevens and Sons COMMERCIAL FAILURES AND BILLS OF SALE.-According to Stubbs Weekly Gazette, the number of failures in England and Wales gazetted. during the week ending the 10th April was 138. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 112, showing an increase of 26. The number of bills of sale in England and Wales registered at the Queen's Bench for the week ending the 10th April was 151. The number in the. corresponding week of last year was 117. LORD JUSTICE LOPES ON CRIMINAL APPEALS. IN charging the grand jury at Salisbury on Tuesday, the 6th inst., Lord Justice Lopes, as chairman of the Wiltshire Quarter Sessions, made the following remarks respecting the proposed Court of Criminal Appeal and other suggested legal reforms. The Court of Criminal Appeal Bill, which has been read a second time in the House of Commons, is, he said, very crude, and it is difficult to understand what it comprehends. "Its object is two-fold to give an appeal on facts in criminal cases, and thus to minimise the risk of the innocent being convicted; and to promote uniformity of sentences. Is the Bill wanted for any of these objects, and will it secure or promote them? I answer both these questions in the negative. I believe the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal will be rather mischievous than beneficial. It is no doubt an attractive argument to compare civil with criminal cases, and to urge that there is an appeal in almost all civil, but never in criminal cases. The comparison of criminal cases with civil is delusive; they stand altogether on a different footing. In civil cases the verdict proceeds on the weight of the evidence, and no verdict of a jury is allowed to be impeached unless it is so unreasonable as to be almost perverse-a state of things which in a criminal case would justify the interference of the Home Secretary. In criminal cases the accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty, and the jury are emphatically told that they must not convict unless they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In indictable cases the case of the accused is before trial subjected to two if not three previous investigations-inquiry before the magistrate, reading of the deposition by the judge before charging the grand jury, and a finding of a true bill by the grand jury. The risk of an innocent person in England being convicted is infinitesimal, and that risk, in my opinion, will be practically removed if, as I hope soon will be the case, the accused and the husband and wife of the accused are permitted to give evidence in all criminal cases. The existence of a court of appeal, empowered to reverse a conviction on facts, will introduce an element of uncertainty in the administration of the criminal law highly detrimental to the deterrent effects of punishment. It will relax, too, the sense of stern responsibility now so keenly recognised by juries, proceeding, in my judgment, from the feeling that their verdict is final and irrevocable. Nor do I approve of the power proposed to be conferred on the tribunal to revise sentences, to increase or diminish them. It is said there is a want of uniformity in sentences; doubtless there is, and there must be. There is a disparity of sentences as there is a disparity of circumstances; one judge is more lenient, another more severe. This is an incident of human nature, and will not be cured by a court of appeal. But the disparity of sentences is less real than generally supposed. How are we to get uniformity? Is there to be some standard by which sentences are to be measured? If so. you must increase as well as diminish, you must level up as well as level down, and this the inclination towards mercy, which is the inseparable characteristic of our criminal law, will never tolerate. Is there to be an appeal in every criminal case? If so, the temptation to appeal will be overwhelming, and at whose cost? In the case of the poor man it must be at the cost of the public, otherwise the rich will have an advantage over the poor. For these and many other reasons I am not an advocate for the creation of a Court of Criminal Appeal on facts. It is well known there is a Court of Appeal on questions of law which the judge at the trial thinks require further consideration. Another Bill is before the House of Commons, entitled 'An Act to permit juries to separate in cases of Felony.' This Bill has been read a third time. It permits the jury before they consider their verdict in cases of felony to separate for the purposes of refreshment and rest' in the same way as juries are now permitted to separate in cases of misdemeanour. As the law stands at present in cases of felony the jury are not permitted to separate until after they have returned their verdict; in cases of misdemeanour they may separate at any time and the judge may adjourn the case. It has long been a reproach to our criminal law that the jury cannot separate before verdict if the charge is stealing a duck, but that if the accused is charged with a misdemeanour involving, if found guilty, a long period of penal servitude, the jury can separate and the case be adjourned so long as convenient. This no doubt proceeded in former times from the fact that there were penal consequences attached to a conviction for felony which did not follow a conviction for misdemeanour. This distinction no longer exists. This Bill is a step in the right direction, and does away with an obvious anomaly. But the Bill does not go far enough; it only permits a separation for purposes of refreshment and rest. Suppose the judge is taken ill and wishes to adjourn till the next day. or suppose a juror or witness is ill, or there is an important witness whose evidence cannot be obtained till the next day. In all these cases the Bill affords no relief. The Bill should allow the jury in cases of felony to separate, if the judge thinks fit, in the same way as in cases of misdemeanour. I regret to say that there is no provision before Parliament for two defects in our criminal law to which I have on a previous occasion directed attention. I allude to an extension of the jurisdiction of the quarter sessions to certain cases of forgery. I think the same course should be adopted with regard to such cases as last year was adopted with regard to burglary. I mean that the magistrates should have a discretion whether they would commit to the assizes or sessions. Now the most simple case of forgery, such for instance as forging an order for goods, must be sent to the assizes. The other defect to which I refer is the scandalous anomaly that a person who has stolen some small article and wishes to have his case disposed of at once may be tried summarily by the magistrate in petty sessions, but if he is charged with obtaining that same small article by false pretences he must be committed to the assizes or sessions, however willing he may be to be tried summarily, the result being that he is often kept in prison longer before trial than would be an adequate punishment after trial and convic. tion, and, worse still, he may be acquitted." Sheffield, Wednesday and Thursday, at 10 Sittingbourne, Friday, at 10 Cambridge, Wednesday (Reg., Bky), at 11 St. Asaph, Friday Cardigan, Thursday Cheltenham, Thursday and Friday Chester, Thursday Christchurch, Wednesday, at 10 Derby, Thursday, at 10 Leicester, Thursday (Reg., Bky), at 10 St. Columb, Wednesday, at 12.30 Sleaford, Saturday, at 10 Southampton, Friday (Reg., Com. Sum.), at 11 Stowmarket, Saturday Stroud, Wednesday Sunderland, Thursday (Reg., Bky) Swindon, Wednesday (J.S. & Reg., Bky), at 10 Tavistock, Saturday, at 10 Truro, Friday, at 10.30; Saturday, at 11.30 Usk, Wednesday, at 11.30 Wareham, Tuesday, at 10.30 Welshpool, Wednesday Westbury, Saturday, at 10 Worcester, Wednesday and Thursday, at 10 Wrexham, Wednesday. Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. THE JUBILEE OF THE COUNTY COURTS. THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON COUNTY COURTS. AN event which has been looked forward to with a considerable amount of interest took place, on the 9th inst., when the Lord Chancellor (Lord Halsbury) paid a visit to Derby, primarily for the purpose of opening the handsome new County Court offices in St. Peter's Churchyard. All the different departments of the work will be carried out under one roof, and every convenience is provided both for officials and for the general public. The building has a frontage of 75ft., and is built entirely of beautiful red brick, known as Wain's Ether brick. The windows are set in terra cotta, the latter material being very extensively used throughout the interior of the building. The main entrance, which is in the centre of the structure, admits the visitor into a large and handsome corridor, with terra cotta arches and a dado of coloured glazed bricks. This leads to the main staircase to the Courts above, a special entrance, with private staircase at the right hand of the building, being reserved for the judge. On the left hand side of the corridor near the entrance is the Inland Revenue office. The greater portion of the room on the first floor is taken by the courts of the judge and registrar; the former is the smaller of the two, its dimensions being thirty-five feet by twenty-seven feet nine inches. There is ample accommodation for the public, solicitors, and the press. On this floor also are the offices of the surveyor of taxes and of the supervisor. On the other side of the building, but on the same floor, is the registrar's court, of which the dimensions are 47.9 by 30.9. Both courts are well lighted from above, and by windows overlooking internal areas, of which latter there are two. The building is lit throughout by electric light, and the sanitary arrangements comprise all the latest improvements. Amongst those supporting his Lordship were his Honour Judge Smyly, the Mayor (Sir T. Roe), the Lord Bishop of Southwell, Sir Henry Wilmot, Mr. Bemrose, M.P., Mr. M. C. Buszard, Q.C. (the Recorder), Mr. Kenelm |
