Philip Harry Van Cortlandt, Esq.; Frederick Harvie Linklater, Esq.; Alexander Edward Pole, Esq.; Alweyne Turner, Esq.; Edward Morton Daniel, Esq.; Edward Rowdon, Esq.; John Wilkes, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Percival Beevor Lambert, Esq., B.A., Oxford; and Douglas Nugent Wyndham E. C. Grenville-Murray, Esq., B.A., Oxford.

cause.

of a prisoner named Elise Counhaye, that depositions duly authenticated, though not taken in the presence of the accused, were admissible in proceedings under the Act of 1870.

GROVE, J. remarked that this was only a semble from the case, and added that the statute of 1870 did not contain the strong words introduced in that of the present year.

Sir John Karslake said that the Legislature armed our courts with this authority as a matter of international courtesy. He did not see why the prisoner should not instruct counsel to show As a matter of fact, a somewhat similar order made at chambers had been set aside by the Court of Queen's Bench, on the application of counsel for the prisoner, as informal. The priINNER TEMPLE.-George Drinkwater Lucius soner could not be made to attend here, as he Cary, Esq., M.A., Cambridge; Arthur Bovell, could not be held in custody. It seemed from a Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Henry Studdy Theo-recent case in the Queen's Bench, in the matter bald, Esq., B.A., Oxford; William Frederic Thompson, Esq., Oxford; William Samuel Lilly, Esq., L.L.M., Cambridge; Henry De Burgh Hol. lings, Esq., B.C.L., M.A., Oxon; Jacques Edouard Chenaux de Rosieres Durup de Balaine, Esq., Paris; Cecil Jalland Page Clay, Esq., M.A., Oxford; Thomas George Stacpoole Mahon, Esq., B.A., Oxford: Thomas Ryburn Buchanan, Esq., M.A., Oxon; John Frederick Leigh-Fleming, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Arnold Morley, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Henry Fielding Dickens, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; William George Blane, Esq., B.A., Oxon; Cecil George Kellner, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; William Henry Gibb, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Charles Robert Tyser, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Walter Herries Pollock, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; John Henry Ward, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; John George McMaster, Esq.. M.A., Dublin; Henry Stevens, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; William Scott Goodfellow, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; William Holmes Carbery, Esq.; David Lewis, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; James Eyre Thompson, Esq., M.A., Oxon; Gordon Taylor Bentinck Wigan, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; William Henry Nash, Esq.; Arthur Heathcote Montagu Long, Esq., Oxon; Arthur Welch, Esq.; Alfred Bray Kempe, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; and James Patten, Esq., B.A., Oxon.

MIDDLE TEMPLE.-Sidney Woolf, Esq., of the University of London, holder of an Exhibition in Common Law and of Real Property, and of an Exhibition granted by the Council of Legal Education in Michaelmas Term 1873; Robert Lloyd Kenyon, Esq., of Christ Church, Oxford, M.A., and Vinerian Law Scholar; William Young, Esq., of the University of London, B.A.; John Barton Hutton, Esq., of Trinity College, Dublin, B.A.; Sydney Twentyman Jones, Esq., of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, LL.B.; Frederick Forester Goold, Esq., of London University; William Blake Odgers, Esq., of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, B.A.; James Nathaniel da' Russell Day, Esq., of Christ's College, Cambridge, B.A.; Arbuthnot Butler Stoney, Esq., of Trinity College, Dublin, B.A., LL.B.; Charles William Greenwood, Esq., of Trinity College, Cambridge, B.A.; William Rutherford, Esq., of the University of Edinburgh, M.A.; Alexander Comyns, Esq., of Trinity College, Dublin, B.A., LL.B.; Thomas Moreton, Esq.; Charles Bousfield Shaw, Esq.; David Jones Lewis, Esq.; John William Edwards, Esq.; Charles Marsh Denison, Esq.; Samuel William Casserley, Esq., of the University of London, LL.B.; Alfred Guy Whipham, Esq.; Jesse Herbert, jun., Esq.; Robert Bovill Neblett, Esq.; and Robert Wilson, Esq.

MAGISTRATES' LAW. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. (Sittings in Banco, before KEATING, BRETT, GROVE, and DENMAN, JJ.)

Re EMILE FERRAND, A FRENCH PRISONER. Extradition-Evidence. SIR John Karslake (with him J. H. Hodgson) moved, on the part of the French Government, for an order to examine witnesses in England, in order that their depositions might be used in a criminal trial abroad. He made his application under the Extradition Act of 1870, which extended to criminal proceedings not of a political nature an Act of 1856, enabling evidence to be taken here in relation to civil and commercial matters pending before foreign tribunals. He produced the certificate of the French ambassador that the prisoner, Emile Ferrand, was in custody on a charge of fraud, and that his offence was not of a political character. The matter had been before Mr. Justice Denman at chambers, who had referred it to the court, his difficulty being that the examination would be in the absence of the accused. As to this, the Extradition Amendment Act, passed in August of the present year, expressly enables a Secretary of State to order the examination of witnesses for the purpose of any criminal matter pending abroad, whether in the presence or absence of the person charged.

BRETT, J., said that if it had not been for the Act last cited, he should have thought it a fundamental principle of English law that no examination should be taken in a prisoner's absence. KEATING, J., thought the charge should be definitely stated, as it was in proceedings before magistrates under extradition treaties. One of the practical inconveniences of this novel proceeding was that it must necessarily be ex parte.

Sir John Karslake said that the Act of 1870, extending that of 1856 to criminal matters, was possibly an instance of the Legislature entirely forgetting what the other Act was about. It might be a rule of English law that depositions taken in the absence of the accused could not be used against him, but the English courts might nevertheless allow such evidence to be taken. They merely perpetuate the evidence, they do not sanction its use. The order could be framed so as to issue an affidavit of notice to the prisoner and service. It was assumed by the comity of nations that foreign tribunals would act right, and in this case they were desirous of having evidence given under the sanction of an oath instead of a voluntary statement.

BRETT, J., remarked that in the recent Extradition Amendment Act the Legislature had expressly and deliberately overruled what the courts considered a fundamental principle of English law, and the courts were of course bound by their

decision.

KEATING, J., said that the wording of the last Act proved that the Legislature knew what words to use to effect its deliberate purpose. Those words, however, did not appear in the Act of

1870.

Sir John Karslake said that the order might be drawn up in an imperfect form to be completed on affidavit of service. The prisoner would then have an opportunity of appearing by counsel. Civilised nations must be trusted to do their duty in criminal cases. Our own laws of evidence were not perfect, and a trial was now pending in which very strong remarks had been made on the inconvenient distinctions between civil and criminal evidence in our own courts.

GROVE, J., said he should like to have the question argued before granting an order. Why had the French Government not applied to a Secretary of State, under the recent Act?

Sir John Karslake said this had been done, but the Secretary of State had sent them to the court.

KEATING, J., said there was a provision in the Act of 1856 that the Lord Chancellor and two judges should frame rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Act, and regulating procedure under it. This had never been done, and he looked upon it as a formidable objection to the

motion.

Butt, Q.C., in answer to a question of the court, stated that he had urged the objection alluded to by Mr. Justice Keating in a recent motion before the Court of Queen's Bench, but that the court had refused to entertain it.

KEATING, J., said that quieted him, though he should have great doubt had the matter been res integra. He should, however, like to have the nature of the charge before the court.

It was arranged that the matter should be again mentioned to the court next week, with fresh materials for a decision.

PRACTICE UNDER THE LICENSING ACT

1872.

THE following case has been submitted to counsel by the justices' clerk of Newark :

THE LICENSING ACT 1872.

Counsel's attention is particularly called to the copy of correspondence between the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Justices of the Peace for the Borough of Newark, and to the copy memorial incorporated therewith, which accompanies this case. It will be seen therefrom that differences have arisen between the licensed victuallers of Newark and the said justices and their clerk upon the construction of the Licensing Act 1872, and as to the duties of the justices and their clerk thereunder.

At the General Annual Licensing Meetings for the borough for the years 1872 and 1873, the chairman was the present ex-Mayor of the borough, and who is a solicitor in proctice. At such licensing meetings the justices required each applicant for a licence or a renewal of licence to state on oath the name and residence of the owner of his premises, for the reasons stated in their clerk's

letter of the 2nd Oct. to the Secretary of State, considering it of great importance to have on the register (by sect. 36 of the Licensing Act 1872, directed to be kept) the correct names and ad dresses of owners to whom certain notices of disqualification and convictions have to be given. Sect. 36 of the Act states that "every person applying for a new licence or the renewal of a licence shall state the name of the owner of the premises in respect of which such licence is granted or renewed, and such name shall be endorsed on the licence." Sect. 42, sub-sect. 3, enacts, "The justices shall not receive any evidence with respect to the renewal of such licence which is not given on oath," and such sect. 42 concludes, "Subject as aforesaid, licences shall be renewed and the powers and discretion of justices relative to such renewal shall be exercised as

heretofore."

The justices and their chairman and clerk considered that the justices had power to require the statement of each person applying for a new licence or the renewal of a licence to be given on oath.

con

For administering such oath the clerk charged an additional fee of 1s., according to the scale of fees referred to in his said letter of the 2nd October. It will be seen by the Secretary of State's letter of the 6th October that he considers "the requirement of an oath on the statement as to the ownership of premises to be unauthorised by the Licensing Act 1872, and quite unnecessary," and that the charge of a fee for such oath is therefore irregular." Section 36 of the Act enacts that in every licensing district there shall be kept by the clerk a register of licences taining the particulars of all licences granted in the district, the premises in respect of which they were granted, the names of the owners of such premises, and the names of the holders for the time being of such licences. There shall also be entered on the register all forfeitures of licences, disqualification of premises, record of convictions, and other matters relating to the licences on the The latter part of the section enacts register." and there shall be paid by each licensed person to the clerk in respect of such registration the sum or fee of 1s. for every licence granted or renewed."

The justices' licences are in force for one year, expiring on the 10th Oct. in each year, and therefore at the Annual Licensing Meetings, a renewal licence is granted to each applicant who previously held a licence. Since the passing of the Licensing Act 1872, such licence by way of renewal granted at each licensing meeting has been entered on the register by the clerk, who has each year charged each licensed person a fee of 1s. for every licence "renewed."

It will be seen by the Secretary of State's letter of the 6th Oct. that "with regard also to the registration of licences on renewal, Mr. Lowe thinks that re-registration in every case, where is no change of ownership, is unnecessary and oppres sive."

Although the former part of sect. 36 enacts that the register is to contain particulars of "all licences granted," yet as the latter part enacts the payment to the clerk of a fee of 1s. for every licence granted or renewed, the clerk considers he is entitled to register every licence renewed, and to charge each licensed person such fee on "every licence granted or renewed," that is, "yearly," irrespective of change of ownership.

Sect. 29 of the Act of 1872 empowers the local authority to grant to any licensed victualler or keeper of a refreshment house in which intoxicating liquors are sold, "an occasional licence exempting him from the provisions of the Act relating to the closing. of premises during certain hours, and on the special occasion or occasions to be specified in the licence."

The Newark Licensed Victuallers' Association have, by their secretary, on more than one occa sion applied to the justices for a general order, exempting, on certain days, the licensed victuallers as a body from the provisions of the Act relating to closing of premises. The justices have declined to make such general order, as being contrary to the intention of the Act, and have only granted the occasional exemptions by "an occasional licence" to each licensed victualler requiring or applying for the exemption. And the justices have declined to recognize the association, contending such association has no locus standi before them, and that they must have applications from indivi dual licensed victuallers, so as to be able to enforce the penalties imposed by the Act for infringement of any of its provisions by such persons. For each occasional licence so granted the clerk has charged a fee of 28. Gd., considering that in the absence of any fee being named in the Act of 1872 for such occasional licence, he is legally entitled to charge the full fee of 58. for every such licence as for an original licence, but being satisfied to charge for such occasional licence the same fee as is given by 5 & 6 Vict., c. 44, sec. 3, for endorsement of a temporary licence.

Counsel is requested to advise on behalf of the justices and their clerk.

1. Whether under the Licensing Acts or otherwise the justices have the power or discretion to require each applicant applying to them each year for a new licence, or for the renewal of licence, to state on oath the name and address of himself and the owner of the premises in respect of which such licence is granted or renewed? And, if so, whether the clerk can legally charge a fee for administering such oath in addition to the fees payable for the licence ?

2. Is the opinion of the Secretary of State, as expressed in his letter of the 6th Oct., in conformity with the requirements of the Act as to the registration of licences ? If so, are not licences granted yearly by way of renewal to the same person to be entered on the register either as to date or otherwise? And if so, how is the register to show "particulars of all licences granted, and the names of the holders for the time being of such licences ? "

3. Can the clerk legally charge at each Annual Licensing Meeting, or otherwise, whenever a licence is transferred at a speecial sessions for transfer of licences, the fee of 1s. for registration of every licence granted or renewed? If not, when and under what circumstances may he charge such fee?

4. Are the justices right in their contention as to "granting occasional licences only to indidividual licensed victuallers; or have they the power, and ought they to make such grant, by one general order for the whole of the licensed victuallers within their jurisdiction? And are the justices justified in refusing to grant the Licensed Victuallers' Association, as an association, any locus standi before them?

5. Can the clerk legally charge the fee of 2s. 6d. for each " occasional licence ?" If not, what fee ought he to charge for the same? And generally to advise the justices and their

clerk on the case.

COPY OPINION.

I am of opinion that upon an ordinary renewal the justices should not require a statement on oath or otherwise of the ownership, because sect. 42, part 2 provides that they shall not take any evidence with respect to the renewal, &c., unless after notice of opposition. Upon application for a new licence the justices are bound to take evi. dence of the ownership. It is said that the applicants shall state the name of the owner, but I rather infer that it is not to be on oath. 2 and 3. I am of opinion that the Secretary of State is wrong as to the registration. By sect. 36 the register is to contain the names of the holders for the time being. How can this be if the original licence expire on the 11th Oct., and the renewal is not registered? It seems to me clearly necessary to register the renewal-not the particulars afresh -but the fact of renewal, and in case of a transfer, the name and address of the present holder. If so, it follows that the clerk is entitled to the fee of 1s., and both propositions are completely established by the concluding sentence of sect. 36, "and there shall be paid by each licensed person to the clerk in respect of such registration the sum or fee of 1s. for every licence granted or renewed."

4. I am also of opinion that the justices are clearly right in not recognising the Association, and in granting occasional licences to individuals only. Nor have they the power under sect. 29 to make any such general order as is proposed, Under that section the licence must be granted to the individual, and must specify the special occasion or occasions, and the hours. It is also in my opinion an original licence, and may be so treated in charging a fee.

I should, therefore, suggest to the justices that they answer the letter of the secretary to the effect that, in accordance with his letter, they propose to abandon the evidence of ownership upon renewals, and the oath in respect of it, on the original application, but that upon the question of registration they are advised that it is a matter over which they have no control, inasmuch as sect. 36 peremptorily directs not them, but the clerk, to register the renewal, and that otherwise the register could not show the present state of the premises, whether licensed or not. They might add, also, that they are advised that the clerk, in omitting to register such renewals, would render himself liable to an indictment for disobeying the statute, as in my opinion he would be. By sect. 58 the register is to be evidence of all the matters required to be be entered.

Temple, Oct. 17.

WILLIAM J. METCALFE.

THE LATEST PROMOTION.-A Brussels correspondent writes:-"The English residents here were greatly amused at reading, in one of the Brussels papers, that 'General' Vernon Harcourt had been appointed Solicitor-General-Le Général Vernon Harcourt a été nominé SolicitorGénéral.'"

REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WILL-CONSTRUCTION-SPECIFIC LEGACY.-A testatrix gave to her trustees a certain sum of £3 per Cent. Annuities, "or the stocks or funds which may at the time of my death represent such annuities," upon trust to pay or transfer thereout "£100 of such trust funds" to A.: Held, that the expression "of such trust funds" must be construed to mean "part of such trust funds,' and that therefore the legacy to A. was specific. Distinction between specific and general legacies: (Davies v. Fowler, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 285. V.C. M.)

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-LEGATEE-SUBSTITU. TIONARY GIFT TO CHILDREN-DEATH OF PARENT BEFORE DATE OF WILL-A testatrix by her will gave a sum of money to the children of her late cousin, and declared that if any legatee" should die in her lifetime leaving a child or children him or her surviving, such legacy should not lapse but be paid to such child or children: Held (affirming the decision of Malins, V.C.), that the children of those of the cousin's children who died before the date of the will did not take by substitution, their parents not being "legatees" under the will: (Hunter v. Cheshire, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 283. Ch.)

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF REAL PROPERTY ABSTRACT OF TITLEDELIVERY, WITHOUT FRAUD, OF IMPERFECT ABSTRACT-DEFECT IN TITLE ARISING ALIUNDE -DEEDS BONA FIDE OMITTED FROM ABSTRACT. -The plaintiff's testator was the purchaser, at an auction, of real estate belonging to the defendant, which was sold subject to the conditions that" an abstract of the title" should be delivered within seven days from the sale, and that the purchaser "should, within twenty-one days from such delivery, make his objections and requisitions in respect of the title ;" and that all objections and requisitions not made within that time should be taken to be waived; and that, in case the purchasers should make any "objection to or requisition on the title," which the vendor should be "unwilling or unable" to answer or comply with, the vendor reserved to himself the option (notwithstanding he might have attempted to answer or comply with "such objections or requisitions," or might have partly done so) "at any time" to rescind the contract, on repaying the deposit, &c. An abstract was delivered within the seven days, and within the twenty-one days the purchaser sent in (together with valid objections) a frivolous and unfounded objection to the title therein disclosed; and, as he persisted in such objection and declined to complete, the vendor filed a bill in equity against him for specific performance. In his answer to the bill, put in on the 23rd Sept. 1868, the purchaser repeated and insisted on all his old objections, and he also for the first time raised a new objection to the title, on the ground that the abstract was defective because of the omission therefrom of certain deeds which materially affected the title, and of the existence of which deeds he had only recently, and long subsequently to the delivery of his original objections, become aware. On the 2nd Dec. 1868, and while the suit was pending, the purchaser died. On the 26th Jan. 1869, the vendor's solicitors applied by letter to the late purchaser's solicitors for the name of his executor," in order" (they added), "to revive the suit, which we shall do at once." On the 11th Feb. 1869 this information was furnished to them, and on the following day, the 12th, they informed the purchaser's soli citors that they should rescind the contract and present petition to dismiss the bill." Eventually, on the 12th April 1869, the bill was dismissed, without costs, on the purchaser's motion. An action having been brought by the plaintiff, as executor of the purchaser, against the vendor for breach of contract in not deducing a good title, and for damages for loss of bargain, &c., it was found, as facts, by the arbitrator to whom it was referred, to state a case for the opinion of the court, first, that the omission of the deeds from the abstract was made intentionally, but bona fide and under the advice of counsel, as it was supposed that they did not affect the title; secondly, that in an abstract delivered by the vendor under a previous contract in 1867 to sell the property to another purchaser, these deeds were included, and that on an objection being taken in respect of these deeds, the contract was abandoned by the vendor; thirdly, that a good title was not deduced in the present case, but that there was no fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation; and fourthly, that the rescission of the contract by the vendor was not from unwillingness or inability on his part to answer or comply with objections to or requisitions on the title. Held, by the Court of Exchequer, Kelly, C.B., and Martin and Cleasby, BB. (Bramwell, B. dissenting as to the first, and doubting as to the second), first, that the defendant had power to and did rescind'

the contract within the meaning of the condition of sale; secondly, that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for loss of bargain; or, thirdly, to recover the costs of defending the suit in Chancery. Per Bramwell, B. (contra), first the finding of the arbitrator that the rescission was not from the vendor's unwillingness or inability to answer or comply with objections or requisitions, concluded the case against the defendant; but, secondly, even if that were not so, the vendor had no power to rescind at the time he did; nor any right under the conditions to rescind at all, except in respect of objections made to the title disclosed in the abstract, or of those that arose therefrom. Upon error being brought by the plaintiff, upon that decision, to the Court of Exchequer Chamber, it was held by Blackburn, Keating, Brett, Archibald, and Honyman, JJ., that the judgment of the majority of the court below was right, and should be affirmed. Sed contra, per Grove, J., agreeing with Bramwell, B., on the first ground, that the judgment was wrong, and should be reversed: (Gray v. Fowler, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 297. Ex. & Ex. Ch.)

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CONDITIONS OF SALE- DELIVERY OF ABSTRACT WANT OF

was

TITLE IN VENDOR-TIME FOR MAKING OBJECTIONS.--The plaintiff was the purchaser, at a sale by auction, of an estate put up for sale by the defendant (together with A., since deceased) subject to conditions of sale. By the third condition the vendors were to deliver an abstract of title within seven days, and "all objections and requisitions not stated in writing and delivered to the vendors' solicitors within fourteen days from the delivery of the abstract, were to be considered as waived," and, in that respect, "time was to be of the essence of the contract." The twelfth condition stipulated that "the vendor being trustees should not be required to obtain the concurrence of anyone interested in the proceeds of the sale," and the fourteenth condition stated that "if the purchaser should fail to comply with these conditions his deposit should be thereupon actually forfeited to the vendors," who were to be at liberty to resell and recover the deficiency, if any, and the costs of resale from the defaulting purchaser. The plaintiff signed the usual agreement to complete the purchase according to the conditions, and paid a deposit of £300. An abstract of title was delivered within seven days, which showed that the property had been devised to the defendant and his co-trustee A. (since deceased) upon trust to pay the income to F. S., the testator's son-in-law, for life, and after his decease to sell the estate and stand possessed of the proceeds" "upon the trusts for the children of the said F. S. as therein mentioned." It was stated in the abstract that F. S. would join in conveying the property; but the abstract was silent as to whether or not F. S. had any children. An objection, though not until after the expiration of the stipulated fourteen days, made by the purchaser to the title, on the ground that F. S. being still alive, the power of sale had not arisen, and the vendors could make no title, to which the vendors replied, first, that the objection was made too late; and secondly that it was not a valid one. It subsequently appeared that the trusts in favour of the children of F. S. were for the benefit of such of his children by H. S., the testator's daughter, as should be living at testator's death, to be paid to them if sons at twenty-one, or if daughters at that age or marriage, with limitations over for the benefit of survivors on the death of any child under twenty-one and being a daughter unmarried. F. S. and H. S. had eight children living at the testator's death, all of whom at the date of the sale had attained twenty-one, and three of whom being daughters had married and settled their shares of the trust fund. An action having been brought by the plaintiff, the purchaser, to recover his deposit, it was Held, by the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B. and Martin and Pollock, BB.), that he was entitled to recover it back, although the objection to the sale was not made within the stipulated fourteen days, the vendors having in fact no title at all to sell the property, and no power to make one. By Kelly, C.B., that the abstract was not a complete or sufficient one, and therefore the time limited for delivering objections had not commenced to run. By Martin and Pollock, BB., that the condition as to waiver and forfeiture applied only to objections and requisitions in the case of a simply defective title which could be made good on the defects being supplied, and not to a title wholly bad, and incapable of being made valid. Semble (also by Martin and Pollock, BB.), that the abstract, if a true abstract of such title as the vendor had at the time, was good, although the title shown by it was bad, and not such as the purchaser was bound to accept, and that the reference to the trusts of the will, in favour of the children, sufficiently called the vendee's attention to the trust, to call on him to make a requisition or objection on the subject: (Want v. Stallibrass, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 293. Ex.)

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

CHARTER-PARTY--ADVANCES AGAINST FREIGHT

-STIPULATION FOR INSURANCE UPON ADVANCES BEING EFFECTED BY CHARTERERS.-By a charterparty made at Bombay, a ship of the respondents, merchants at Greenock, was to proceed from Bombay to Calcutta, and there load a cargo to be conveyed to the United Kingdom. A clause in the charter-party was as follows:-"Sufficient cash for ship's ordinary disbursements to be advanced the master against freight; subject to interest, assurance, and 2 per cent. commission; and the master to indorse the amount so advanced upon his bills of lading.' Of this charter-party the appellants were indorsees. While the ship was at Calcutta preparing for the voyage, various advances for the ship's ordinary disbursements were made by the appellants, and the master gave them, on account of such advances, a bill drawn on the respondents. The respondents refused to accept the bill, on the ground that the master had no power to give it, and that under the charter-party the appellants should have effected an insurance on freight to the amount of their advances. No such insurance was, however, effected, though the appellants had time to insure after notice of the respondents' refusal to accept the bill. The ship having been lost on the voyage to the United Kingdom, the appellants brought an action to recover the amount of their advances. Held (affirming an interlocutor of the first division of the Court of Session), that under the charter-party the respondents had a right to rely on an insurance upon the advances being made by the appellants, who had stipulated for and received the right to charge the premium; and that the appellants, having chosen not to insure, must bear the loss. further that a clause in the interlocutor appealed from, affirming in law that advances against freight for a ship's ordinary disbursements can be recovered in the event of the loss of cargo, should be omitted, because unnecessary, and, assuming the question to be governed by English and not Scotch law, incorrect: (Watson and Company v. Shankland and others, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 349. H. of L.)

COUNTY COURTS, BRADFORD COUNTY COURT. (Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q.C., Judge.) Oct. 24 and 28.

Held

TURNER v. TOMLINSON. Trade fixtures-Purchase-Removal. A purchaser from a tenant of trade fixtures is bound to remove them during the term, at the peril of their becoming the property of the landlord, and if he has paid the tenant for the fixtures, but omits to remove them, contrary to the conditions under which he bought it is his loss, and not a breach of contract for which the tenant can recover even nominal damages. If disputes afterwards arise between the tenant and his landlord, which the tenant compromises by payment of a sum of money, he cannot recover against the purchaser the sum so paid, or his costs of defence as damages; they are too

remote.

W. Shaw, instructed by Rawson, George, and Wade, for plaintiff.

Berry (Berry and Robinson) for defendant. His HONOUR.-This action is brought to recover the sum of £3118s. 7d. as damages for breach of contract. The facts were as follows. The plaintiff was tenant from year to year of a mill, called the Woodlands Mill, of Low Moor, near Bradford, under an agreement which entitled him to deter mine the tenancy on three calendar months' notice, at any time, to be served or sent through the post. The rent, £175 per annum, was payable quarterly in advance. He had occupied the mill for trade purposes, and had placed in it machinery, which was affixed to the freehold, but removeable as trade fixtures. On the 30th Dec. 1871, he sent his landlord a notice through the post of his intention to determine the tenancy as from the 1st April 1872, and deliver up possession on that day. The machinery was advertised for sale by auction on the 12th March 1872. The sale was duly held and the defendant attended and was declared the purchaser of various lots comprising sixteen looms. By the fourth condition of sale, all the goods sold were to be at the risk of the purchaser from the fall of the hammer, and to be removed at his expense within seven days from the day of sale. By the fifth condition, if the purchaser did not remove the goods within seven days his deposit was to be forfeited to the vendor, who was to be at liberty to re-sell, and if any loss arose on such re-sale the purchaser in default was to pay such loss with the costs of the re-sale. In this case the defendant, immediately after the sale, paid to the auctioneer, as the agent of the plaintiff, the full amount of his purchase

money for all the looms, and he had the full power of removing them all at once or as soon as he pleased. He did remove nine of the looms, but left seven, and on the 29th inst. the plaintiff gave the defendant formal notice to remove those seven forthwith. The defendant having paid the whole amount of the purchase money, the fifth condition ceased to be operative, as its object had been fully answered by payment to the plaintiff of the purchase-money, and the removal of the loom previously to the 1st April thenceforth became a matter which concerned the defendant only. The plaintiff having performed his part of the contract by giving the defendant the right and opportunity of removal, and thus, as it seems to me, the contract between these two parties was fully performed, and neither could complain of any breach of the other. What happened afterwards, and which has furnished the occasion for the present action, was this: On the 1st April the defendant's seven looms, together with a number of others which had been sold by the plaintiff and not removed by the purchaser, had not been tendered to the landlord the possession of the mill removed from the Mill, but the plaintiff duly by offering him the key, which the landlord refused to accept, insisting that the notice of the 30th Dec. was not a proper notice, and that he was entitled to a six months' notice, and consequently the tenancy was not determined, and he should hold the plaintiff liable to the accruing rent, which was payable in advance, and treat the continuance of the looms in the mill as a continued occupation by the plaintiff. Assuming the notice of Dec. 1st to be a good notice, as being one authorised by the contract of tenancy, the landlord's contention was unfounded, and really against his interest, for the looms that had been left by the defendant and the other purchaser being affixed to the freehold, and not removed during the term, became the property of the landlord, as part of the freehold, and they had ceased to be chattels removable according to the usage of trade by the plaintiff or any person claiming under him. The law upon this subject is perfectly clear, and the authorities are collected in Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant, p. 482, 7th edit. Poole's case (1 Salk. 368, by C. J. Holt); Ex parte Quincey (1` Atk. 477, by Lord Hardwicke), and other authorities down to Lyde v. Russell (1 B. & Adol. 394), and Minshail v. Lloyd (2 M. & W. 450), and the recent case of Holland v. Hodgson (L. Rep. 7 C. P. 328. Ex. Ch.) have established beyond all question that looms of the description of those in this case are fixtures and not chattels, so far as the right of the freeholder is concerned. The law upon this point is so clear, and has been so long settled and well understood, that I should not have thought it necessary to do more than state it but that I find that brokers in this district, who, like the defendant, buy property of this description, are in the frequent habit of leaving the machines upon the premises, in the hope of being able to sell them upon better terms if left standing than if removed. And it is well for them to know that in order to secure this advantage to themselves, if they buy from a tenant and do not remove during his term, they must treat with the landlord for permission to continue the looms upon the premises, as the looms become his property, and may be sold and disposed of for his benefit without reference to them. The dispute between the plaintiff and his landlord afterwards took this singular course. The plaintiff insisting that his tenancy had been duly determined and his liability as tenant at an end, the landlord brought an action against him in this court for use and occupation subsequent to the 1st April, and claimed £50. To sustain his defence it became necessary for the plaintiff to put in the agreement of tenancy, and to show that the notice of the 30th Dec. was a good notice, and properly sent through the post. Upon being produced the landlord objected to its reception in evidence for want of a proper stamp. The registrar, on looking at the document as the officer of the court charged with that duty, decided that it was not properly stamped. It was stamped with a 6d. agreement stamp only, whereas it ought to have been stamped with an ad valorem stamp upon the amount of rent reserved, and upon appeal to me I held the decision of the registrar to be right. The proper stamp according to the scale in the schedule to the Stamp Act (33 & 34 Vict. c. 97) s. 96, being £1. This defect could have been remedied by the plaintiff paying to the registrar the penalty and the stamp, and the cost of proving the document to be stamped; but he preferred entering into a compromise with the landlord, and paid him £15 in satisfaction of his claim, and the costs of the action. And he paid his own attorney the sum of £16 3s. 7d. for the costs of his defence. These sums, together with 15s. for certain broken squares of glass, as to which there was no evidence, make up the amount of the damages sought to be recovered from the defendant in this action. A simple statement of these facts will suffice to show that these

sums are in no sense damages which the plaintiff has sustained through the defendant's breach of contract. They are sums which the plaintiff has voluntarily paid under a view which he thought proper to adopt of the course which it was for his interest to take in a litigation with a third party, who was neither party nor privy to the contract between him and the defendant; and in which litigation the plaintiff would have succeeded according to the evidence before us upon this trial if he had thought proper upon that occasion to have made the proper evidence of his defence receivable according to law. Upon the trial of the present action I have allowed the agreement to be put in evidence though not properly stamped, being tendered for a collateral purpose. Mr. Berry for the defendant, objected to its reception, and, if this case is carried further, the benefit of that objection is reserved to the defendant. The plaintiff asked for a judgment in his favour, at least for nominal damages, contending that by not removing within the seven days the defendant had broken his contract. As the defendant paid at he thereby acquired the full benefit of his cononce the whole purchase money to the plaintiff, tract, and the non-removal did not injure him, but operated only to the defendant's prejudice.

Judgment therefore will be entered for the defendant, with costs.

1870.

Under sect. 1 a married woman is entitled to earnings of business, though carried on where her husband resides, if he does not assist or inter. fere therein. Under sects. 1 and 11 such earn. ings, and the investments of the same are vested in a married woman at law as well as in equity. Under sect. 1, furniture purchased with such earnings, held to be an "investment." Presents to a married woman laid out with such earnings in furniture not within the Act. IN the above actions and interpleader summons, heard at the last court,

His HONOUR this day delivered judgment as follows: In these three actions the plaintiffs recovered judgments for £33 17s. 6d., £15 18s. 60., and £17 13s. respectively, and levied executions on goods in the house where the defendant resides. His wife now claims these goods as her property in which her earnings in the employment of a lodging-house keeper have been invested by her, and to which she is entitled for her separate use under the Married Women's Property Act 1870, sect. 1. The amount of the judgments has been paid into court by the claimant or her friends. The circumstances of the case are as follows: In August 1872, the claimant was living with her husband (who was an invalid) in a house at Brighton, taken in her name, and in which she carried on the business of a lodging-house keeper, also in her name, and by her alone, although her husband on a few occasions wrote letters in his own name to tradesmen and others, chiefly as to repairs of the house (three of which were produced). These letters he wrote at the request of the claimant, and otherwise he had nothing to do with the management of the house. In the month of August 1873, most of the furniture in the house was seized in execution and sold, and after payment of the debt there was a trifling balance, which was paid to the claimant. A small quan. tity of furniture remained unsold, and addi tional furniture was purchased by the claimant, and the whole of such remaining and addi. tional furniture, the claimant deposes, was pur chased by her since the passing of the Married Women's Property Act, 9th Aug. 1870, with her earnings, and with presents amounting to £20, given to her by her sisters for her separate use; and the claimant produced bills and receipts made out in her own name, showing the dates of the purchases and prices of such goods, with some trifling exceptions. All these goods have been seized in execution. The first point is whether the earnings of this lady fall within the terms of the first section of the Married Women's Property Act 1870. The second point is whether the furniture purchased by her with such earnings was an "investment" within the meaning of that section. The third point is, the operation of the section with regard to such furniture supposing it to be such an investment. The words of the section are: "The wages and earnings of any married woman acquired or gained by her after the passing of this Act, in any employment, occupa tion, or trade in which she is engaged, or which she carries on separately from her husband, also any money or property so acquired by her through the exercise of any literary, artistic, or scientific skill, and all investments of such wages, earnings, moneys, and property shall be

deemed and taken to be property held and settled to her separate use, independent of any husband to whom she may be married, and her receipts alone shall be a good discharge for such wages, earnings, and property." It was argued by the counsel for the execution creditors that as the claimant's husband was living with her in this lodging-house she cannot be said to have carried en the business of such lodging house separately from her husband; but I think that if it had been the intention of the Legislature to limit this provision to cases where the wife lived apart from her husband, or gained her earnings or wages at some other place than where her husband resided, such intention would have been clearly and unequivocally expressed, and that it is not necessary for the separate carrying on of a business by a married woman that she should live apart from her husband, or gain her earnings or wages elsewhere than where he resides, but only that he should not carry on, or assist, or take part in carrying on such business. If the income of money be settled on a woman separately from her husband, it does not imply that they are living apart, and there is nothing in what may be termed the settlement by the Legislature of her earnings and wages for her separate use which to my mind involves or implies her living apart from him, or gaining them elsewhere than at her residence. It will be observed that the second clause of the section relates to "any money or property so acquired by a married woman through the exercise of any literary, artistic, or scientific skill." The effect of the word "so "in this clause appears to me to be very doubtful, whether it merely restricts the money or property in question to such as may be acquired after the passing of the Act (either separately from or jointly with her husband), or whether it is to be further restricted to money acquired by her separately from her husband. The first is certainly the strict grammatical construction of the clause, but, on the whole, I incline to the later construction as being more rational in itself, and also more consonant with what I conceive to have been the intention of the Legislature; but in neither case, do I think, does the second clause affect the construction of the first clause. With regard to the furniture, I can see no reason why it should not be included in the term "investment," in legal construction, however it may be in common parlance. The third point is attended with much difficulty. The section says that such investments by a married woman "shall be deemed and taken to be held and settled to her separate use." Now, if property be "held and settled to the separate use of a married woman," it is clear that (independently of this Act) it must be vested in some other person for that purpose, either in a trustee, or, if no trustee be named, in her husband, and if it remain in her husband, it must still remain at common law subject to his debts, and in such case her remedy against her husband's creditors would only be by a bill in equity, and, as will presently appear, it is extremely doubtful whether such relief could be obtained in this court, or only the superior court. It, however, seems to me convenient and equitable to hold that the effect of the 1st section, taken in conjunction with the 11th section, which gives the wife a right of an action at law in respect of the property held or settled to her separate use, is to vest such property in her and devest it from her husband at law, and that it is much to be regretted that the 1st clause did not contain a clear express provision of the kind. As the Act now stands, a married woman's earnings and the investments of it are "to be deemed and taken to be held and settled to her separate use;" whilst deposits in savings banks and property in funds, joint-stock companies, and industrial societies, are, by the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th sections, to be deemed to be the separate property of such woman as if she were unmarried." And personal property coming to her as next of kin not exceed. ing £200, and the rents and profits of real property are declared by the 7th and 8th sections "to belong to the woman for her separate use." The 11th section, however, provides that a married woman may maintain an action in her own name for the recovery of any money earnings, wages, and property by the Act declared "to be her separate property, as if such wages, earnings, moneys, chattels, and property belonged to her as an unmarried woman, and in any indictment or other proceeding it shall be sufficient to allege such wages, earnings, and property, &c., to be her property.' And I think that, according to a liberal and equitable construction of the Act, I ought to hold that, as the Act gives the married woman the same absolute and exclusive right to bring actions and institute criminal prosecutions in respect of earnings and investments of the same as it does with regard to the funds and other property especially named in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th sections, it must have been the intention of the Legislature to vest such earnings and investments in her as well as the funds and property last mentioned

that, in 1862, the mortgagee and mortgagor joined in conveyance. This proceeding in 1862 brought them within the required term of twenty years. That would be his case. He would now proceed to put in the several documents. The first deed was on the 6th and 7th Jan. 1834, being a lease and release, and a conveyance in fee from George Baker to Peter Older of all that messuage or tene ment, with garden and appurtenances therein, in the occupation of Charles Hampshire. The next document was dated the 8th Jan. 1834, in which Peter Older mortgaged it to the said Baker for the term of 1000 years for £60, with provisions for redemption, on payment of principal and interest, with power of sale in default. Then, on the back of that was a receipt indorsed for £60, as a receipt for principal and interest, due on the mortgage dated 8th Sept. 1835. On the 7th and 8th Dec. 1835 Peter Older mortgaged to Charles John Woods for £90, continuing the power of sale in default. On the 10th Nov. 1862, the indenture between Peter Older on the first part, Charles John Woods on the second part, and Edward Hoad on the third part, was drawn, being a conveyance to Edward Hoad, for a consideration of £50. On the 15th March, there was a reconveyance, endorsed on the back of the deed by Edward Hoad's executors to Caroline Woods, Charles John Woods having died in the meantime. He put in an authorised copy of the will of Woods, whereby he willed his property absolutely to his wife Caroline. Now he came to the plaintiff. On the 25th of April 1871, Caroline Woods conveyed, both under the will of her late husband and under the re-conveyance, the proin question, in fee, to Peter Allwyn, the plaintiff, for a consideration of £30. That was the end of the documentary evidence. He proposed to make out a prima facie case, and then, when Mr. Lascelles had brought his case forward, to call, if necessary, further evidence.

at law, to enable her to bring such actions and commence such proceedings. I therefore think that if the claimant was entitled to the furniture purchased with her earnings for her separate use under the 1st section of the Act (as I have held), the same was vested in her at law, and not in her husband, and was, therefore, not subject to his debts, and she has taken her proper remedy in this court, and is entitled to a verdict as to the proceeds of such furniture. A difficulty remains as to the £20 which the claimant admits to have received from her sisters and laid out in furniture, and as this money is clearly neither wages nor earnings, it certainly does not fall within the Act, and is simply the case of a woman receiving with her husband's consent a sum of money probably for her separate use, and which she lays out with his sanction in the purchase of furniture used by her in her separate occupation, and the question at present is whether at common law this furniture can be seized by the sheriff, and I feel no doubt that such is the case and that, therefore, the judgment creditors, according to the priorities of their executions, are entitled at law to recover the amount from the money paid into court. It is, however, possible that the claimant may be able to make out a case in equity by showing that her husband did, in the words of Lord Hardwicke in Mac. lean v. Langlands (5 Vesey, 78), "by some clear and distinct act devest himself of his property, and engaged to hold it as a trustee for the separate use of his wife," and if so she would be entitled to an injunction from the Court of Chancery staying further proceedings (according to the case of Newlands v. Paynter, 4 Myl. & Cr. 408), and likewise to the payment to her now of the remain-perty ing £20 of the fund in court. But if she be entitled to such relief in equity, I think it very doubtful whether this court could afford it to her under the limited jurisdiction which it possesses in equity. Of course the subject-matter is within the amount of such jurisdiction (£500), but it is difficult to say that it falls under the second head of such jurisdiction, viz., "the execution of trusts" (County Courts Act 1865, s. 1), notwithstanding that constructive trusts have been held to fall under that head (Clayton v. Renton, L. Rep. 4 Eq. 58); and it certainly does not fall under any other head of such jurisdiction. The claimant has also admitted that she is in receipt of certain rents settled to her separate use, but there is no evidence that such moneys were applied by her in the purchase of any of the goods which have been seized, and therefore it is immaterial. On the whole, I thing that there must be judgment in favour of the creditors according to the priorities of their execution to the amount of £20, and judgment for the claimant as to the balance. I cannot conclude without drawing attention to the extremely careless manner in which this Act is drawn throughout, and also to the great hardship on creditors, who are given by it no action at law against married women for debts incurred by them probably on the credit of the earnings and separate property vested in them by the Act (and which they cannot recover at law), but are left to the expensive, hazardous, and tardy remedy of a Chancery suit in the Superior Courts in every case, however small the amount may be. Verdict for the execution creditors according to their priorities for £20, and for the claimant as to the rest of the moneys in court. The whole of the money to remain in court one month, with liberty to all parties to appeal during that time, and no order as to costs.

GUILDFORD COUNTY COURT. Thursday, Nov. 13. ALLWYN v. Luff. (Before H. J. STONOR, Esq., Judge.) Ejectment-Possession for twenty years-Evidence.

THIS was an action to eject defendant from a cot-
tage at Shepherds-hill, Haslemere.
Folkard, barrister, instructed by Alberry and
Lucas, Midhurst, was for the plaintiff.

F. A. Lascelles, barrister, instructed by G. H. Hull, Godalming, was for the defennant. Folkard, in opening the case, said it was an action brought to recover possession of a house and garden, situate at Haslemere. Plaintiff is a chemist, and occupies the post-office at Haslemere, and defendant occupies the property which is the subject of action. He should be able to trace the ownership of the property since the year 1834. In 1834 one Baker conveyed it to Peter Older in fee. This property Peter Older afterwards mortgaged to one Woods; afterwards both Older and Woods conveyed to Edward Hoad; Edward Hoad's executors afterwards conveyed to Caroline Woods, who also took under the will of her husband, the mortgagee, Woods. sideration of £30 Caroline Woods conveyed to the present plaintiff. With regard to the question which would arise out of the Statute of Limitations, he should show that rent was paid under distress in the year 1849, and also in 1851. After

For a con

Lascelles said he should object to that, but on an intimation from his HONOUR he withdrew the objection.

Folkard then called Mrs. Clark, one of the tenants of the house, who proved being distrained on for rent in 1849.

W. H. Biddlecombe was the next witness, and he said that he was bailiff at Godalming County Court, and remembered distraining.

Francis Hillier said that in 1851 his father was the tenant of the cottage, and a distress was put in for rent.

In answer to Lascelles, Hillier said that his father refused to pay any rent after that, and he never did pay any.

This was Folkard's case.

Lascelles thought that as the plaintiff had failed to make out the receipt of any rent, or to show occupation or possession since 1851, a period of more than twenty years, there was an end to his case. There was also an unsatisfied term of 1000 years.

His HONOUR said that was eased by the Satisfied Terms Act.

Lascelles handed up the case of Owen v. Owen (3 H. & C. 88) but

His HONOUR, after looking into it, said he was quite clear it did not apply to the present case.

Lascelles contended that plaintiff's only evidence was that of a documentary character. He again alluded to the mortgage as a term of 1000 years, and said that that interest still existed.

His HONOUR repeated that that was eased by the Act of 1845. The question was whether, upon the Statute of Limitations they had shown the occupation of possession, or enjoyment within twenty years.

Folkard said that in 1862 there was payment upon the mortgage.

His HONOUR.-That action between the third parties cannot affect the defendant. Defendant, as far as it appeared, was in possession, and might have been, for any evidence to the contrary, in possession for twenty years. There was no evidence that plaintiff had exercised any of the rights of ownership for twenty years.

Folkard. We claim through the mortgagee and the mortgagor.

His HONOUR.-That does not affect the case. The question is whether you have proved that you have been in receipt of the rents, or in possession of the property, within twenty years.

Folkard said that the Act of Will. 4 was passed expressly to protect the title of mortgagees. Till that deed was executed-the deed of 1862-there had been rent received within twenty years-to wit, within eleven years, and therefore Peter Older was at perfect liberty to convey. Payment of interest and principal of the mortgage was made in 1862.

His HONOUR.-That cannot affect the defendant, except under same Act of Parliament. Show me the Act.

While a copy of the Act (7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 28) was being procured, Folkard again urged that by the payment of the interest and principal in 1862 the Statute of Limitations could only be brought to bear upon them from that date.

As his HONOUR was about to refer to the Act, Lascelles rose and said he should be sorry to Occupy the time of the court unnecessarily. He had looked into the matter while they had been waiting, and he was bound to admit that what his learned friend said was right.

Folkard said that he was glad to hear his friend

say 80. The first statute of Will. 4 did not

protect mortgagees, and, in consequence of the inconvenience thus occasioned, the Act to which he had referred was expressly passed to remedy it. The statute preserved to the mortgagee and those claiming under him the same right of entry as if the previous Act had not been passed. He (Folkard) proceeded to quote two cases in point from the 17 Q. B. Rep., and said that on these cases and the Act he based his case.

His HONOUR said, that under the statute and the two cases quoted, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, and he found for the plaintiff.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.
Tuesday, Nov. 18.

(Before Mr. Register ROCHE, sitting as Chief Judge.)

Re TAYLOR.

Composition-Nonpayment-Valuation of security -Injunction. THIS was an application on behalf of G. A. Taylor, a liquidating debtor, for an order restraining Michael Waterer from proceeding with an action against the applicant.

In July 1872, Taylor, who had carried on busi. ness in Change Alley as a tailor, presented a petition for liquidation by arrangement, and at the first meeting the creditors passed a resolution to accept a composition of 2s. 6d, in the pound, pay able by instalments of 1s. 3d. each on the 1st Oct. and the 1st Nov. then next, in satisfaction of their debts, and a trustee was appointed for the purpose of making the payments to the creditors. At the second meeting of creditors the resolution was confirmed, and it was afterwards duly regis. tered. Mr. Waterer was a creditor of Taylor for £200 and upwards, holding as security a policy of assurance upon the debtor's life, and the name of Mr. Waterer appeared in the list. The composition had been paid to all the creditors except Mr. Waterer, and the trustee stated that, although he had the necessary funds in hand, he was unable to pay him, not knowing the amount at which he valued his security. Mr. Waterer had been requested to prove his debt, but he had not done so. The question was whether the creditor could now proceed at law for the recovery of his original debt.

Winslow appeared for the appellant, and Doria

for the debtor.

His HONOUR, in giving judgment, said the question in this case was of a very simple kind. The authorities showed that if default was made in payment of a composition the debts of the creditors would revive, but in the present case application had been made to the creditor to value his security, so that the composition might be paid upon the balance of the debt, and he had not done He that sought equity must do equity. If the creditor had said the policy was of no value, or had estimated the value of it, the trustees would have been bound to pay the composition upon the balance, but as the facts stood there was no pretence for bringing the action, and an injunction must be granted, the trustee tendering to the creditor the composition on the debt actually due

So.

to him.

LEGAL NEWS.

AN American, in replying to his antagonist in court, said he had "a keen rapier with which to pierce all fools and knaves," whereupon his opponent "moved the court" that the rapier be taken from him lest he should commit suicide.

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT.-The Judges on the rota for the next session of the Central Criminal Court, appointed to commence on Monday next, are Chief Baron Kelly, Mr. Justice Brett, and Mr. Justice Quain.

SIR THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, Clerk of the House of Commons, and Sir Henry Sumner Maine, have been unanimously elected Benchers of the Middle Temple.

As many as 14,053 attorneys and solicitors, writers to the signet, proctors, and notaries took out the annual certificate authorising them to practise, in the financial year 1872-73. The number is 229 more than in the preceding year.

ATTORNEYS' CERTIFICATE.-The duty on attorneys' certificates is now payable, and must be paid by the 16th proximo.

THE TEMPLE GARDENS.-The chrysanthemums at the Temple Gardens are now in bloom. Mr. Newton, the head gardener of the Inner Temple, has reared a fine show, including a white Venus.

THE NEW LAW OFFICERS.-With regard to the dignities to be conferred upon the new Attorney General and Solicitor-General, the Daily Telegraph states that both will be knighted, and that in the case of the Attorney-General a Privy Councillor ship will also be bestowed-a prececent which it is intended to follow in future cases. It is also generally understood that after the Judicature Bill comes into operation the law officers of the Crown will not, so far as concerns the action of Liberal

Governments-continue to have any particular claim to such vacancies as may arise in the chief seats of Common Law Courts, though every special instance will, of course, be considered on its merits.

THE case of Reg. v. Fox and others, arising out of a boxing-match at Portsmouth, and which has attracted so much attention in the public press, has terminated, after many adjournments, in the committal for trial at the next assizes, on 11th Dec., of all the prisoners, one of whom is a captain in her Majesty's 100th Regiment, and who acted as referee between the parties. Mr. Ford, for the

defence, in an exhaustive argument, quoted the case of Reg. v. Young, and from East's Pleas of the Crown, Foster's Crown Cases, Russell on Crimes, and other authorities, contending that boxing was not prohibited, and that it was not accompanied in the present case with more than ordinary violence, that the match was similar to that which took place at public entertainments, and that the deceased showed no symptoms of distress. The Bench deliberated for one hour and a

half, and were not unanimous in their decision.

A MAGISTRATE ON THE POLICE.

At the Clerkenwell police court Mr. Barker, in the course of hearing several cases in which the police had preferred charges of drunkenness against the defendants, and had signed the charge-sheets to that effect, complained that the police never in their evidence said anything about the charge of drunkenness, and therefore he discharged the defendants. He further remarked that when the defendants were charged with disorderly conduct and not with drunkenness, the police invariably gave evidence to the effect that the defendants were drunk. He thought it very strange that constables were not instructed to give their evidence in a straightforward and proper manner. When charges of drunkenness were preferred by the police, and the police did not think proper to give evidence to substantiate the charge, he should always discharge the defendants.

George Vernon Harcourt, Q.C., who has just suc THE NEW SOLICITOR-GENERAL.-Mr. William ceeded Mr. Henry James in the office of SolicitorGeneral, is the second son of the late Rev. William Vernon Harcourt, and grandson of the late Most Rev. Dr. Edward Vernon Harcourt, many years Archbishop of York. He was born on the 14th Oct. 1827, and was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he took his Bachelor's degree in 1851, and obtained the honours of a senior optime and a first-class man in the Classical Tripos. He was called to the Bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term 1854, when he chose the Home Circuit; in 1856 he was made a Queen's Counsel. He has been a commissioner for the Amendment of the Naturalisation Laws, and also of the Neutrality Laws. Mr. Vernon Harcourt holds the Professorship of International Law in the University of Cambridge. He has sat as the colleague of Mr. Cardwell, in the representation of the city of Oxford, since the last general Election. He is married to a daughter of the late Mr. Thomas H. Lister, and step-daughter of Sir George C. Lewis.

12. What is the effect of marriage upon the contract of a feme sole? III.-From Williams on the Principles of the Law of Real Property.

13. What is the proper form of a conveyance in order to vest a freehold estate in one person as

trustee for another ?

of the real estate of his wife; and has any, and 14. What are the rights of a husband in respect what, alteration lately taken place in the law regarding them ?

chase of an estate; by whom is the contract to 15. A man dies, having contracted for the purbe performed, and to whom will the estate belong?

16. In what cases may trustees of a will, or executors, sell or mortgage their testator's real estate for the payment of debts or legacies? it from a contingent remainder? 17. Define an executory interest, and distinguish

18. What limit does the law impose on the creation of executory interests?

19. For what period can a testator direct the decease? and by what title is the Statute conincome of his estate to be accumulated after his trolling it commonly known ? IV.-From J. W. Smith's Manual of Equity Jurisprudence.

20. If a sale or mortgage is proposed to be made by trustees (without the concurrence of the party in receipt of the rents), under a power for raising money, which has for a great number of years not been exercised, what, if any, obligation is imposed on the purchaser or mortgagee?

21. In what cases will a court of equity enforce a specific performance of a parol contract within the Statute of Frauds? Give three instances.

22. If a mortgage is cancelled by a mortgagee, and is so found in his possession on his death, what is the effect as regards the mortgage debt; what becomes of the legal estate in the mortgaged premises, and what is the right of the mortgagor in relation to it ?

23. State some of the instances in which persons having limited or ulterior interests in land have a right to have the title-deeds secured, or brought into court for preservation.

21. Where both parties to a suit, in a foreign country, are residing in this country, have our courts of equity any, and if any what, authority to act on the parties in regard to such suits, and by what means; and how can our courts act without appearing to limit or control the foreign court?

25. In cases of private nuisance, what circum. stances are necessary to justify the interposition of a court of equity by injunction?

26. If a person of unsound mind is domiciled abroad, may a Commission of Lunacy issue in this country in any, and if in any, in what case? V.-Book-keeping.

27. Describe the use of a day-book. 28. Explain the meaning of the terms, " debit" and "credit."

29. What is meant by posting the ledger? 30. On which side of a ledger ought goods sold to be entered-debtor or creditor?

31. If you receive £5000 from A. B., with instructions to pay £2000 to C. D., and retain £3000 for credit of E. F., how should you enter the sums in your ledger?

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

SUCCESSION DUTY ACT.-A question under this heading was asked in the LAW TIMES of the 1st inst., in reply to which several diametrically opposite opinions have been expressed. As one of your correspondents has referred with approval to the paper upon this subject which appeared in the LAW TIMES of the 4th Jan. last, perhaps he and your other correspondents may like to have my opinion. It appears clear, I think, that sect. 12 would have exempted A. from any charge for duty had he survived the annuitant. This section appears to have been overlooked by "D.," "A. A. R.," and "T. E. H." Section 7, to which the former refers, has, as he rightly supposes, no bearing upon the matter. Assuming, therefore, that A. was never liable to any presumptive duty, sect. 15 does not apply, as H. G." seems to think, that section being only applicable to those cases in which the vendors were, or, but for the sale, would have been, liable to some presumptive duty. "S." seems to have come to a correct conclusion; the latter part of his answer is, however, inconsistent with the former, although the section of the Act (29th) to which he refers, has some bearing upon the point. The question does not state whether the power of sale given to the

month.

11. What is the effect of the consideration in a an action on such contract ?

it state what beneficial disposition was made of