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D'OUSELEY'S CASE.

Husband and wife-Purchase of shares by wifeLiability of husband-Concurrence of husband. THIS case raised the question of a husband's liability on shares purchased by his wife.

In 1867 Mrs. d'Ouseley became entitled, under the will of an aunt, to a legacy of £1000. Her husband consented to her receiving the money and employing it as she thought fit. She accord. inglylinvested some of it (£326 58.) in the purchase of 800 shares in the European Assurance Society. The shares were procured for her by a local agent of the society, who was well aware that she was a married woman. The dividends were paid to her, and her husband never dealt with the shares at all. In the winding up of the society he was placed on the list of contributories in respect of the shares, and his application was to have his name removed.

Everiti, for Mr. d'Ouseley, contended that the shares were treated as the wife's separate estate, and that Mr. d'Ouseley was under no liability in

respect of them.

Lord ROMILLY grieved to say that in his opinion there was no doubt as to Mr. d'Ouseley's liability. The legacy of £1000 was in law his property; he could give a discharge for it, and his allowing his wife to invest the money did not prevent his being liable in the same manner as if any other agent had invested it for him. His Lordship thought the case a very hard one, and, in conse quence of its being so he had delayed it, hoping he might find some mode of rescuing Mr. d'Ouseley from a difficulty into which his wife's dealing with the money by his consent, and with his concurrence, had placed him. However, that could not be done, and Mr. d'Ouseley must remain on the list of contributories; but the case was so hard that no order would be made against him for

costs.

Napper Higgins, Q.C., and Montague Cookson were for the official liquidators.

The sitting was then adjourned to Wednesday

next.

COUNTY COURTS.
COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
Tuesday, Nov. 25.
(Before LUSH and ARCHIBALD, JJ.)
FLOWER V. PURKISS.

Admiralty jurisdiction-Barge-Costs. THE point was raised in this case as to how far the Admiralty jurisdiction of the County Courts extends. It arose upon a question of costs, a rule nisi having been obtained by the defendant calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be deprived of his costs, which had been allowed him on taxation, on the ground that the action in which they were incurred had been improperly brought in the Court of Queen's Bench, within the meaning of the Statute 31 & 32 Vict. c. 7, s. 9, which provides that "where a plaintiff brings an action in the superior court, which might have been brought in the County Court, he shall not recover his costs."

The action was brought to recover the cost of damage done to the plaintiff's ship by a barge of the defendant's in the river Thames, the collision occurring within the body of a county.

Phillimore, in showing cause against the rule, argued that the County Court had no jurisdiction over a barge, because it was not a ship over which the Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction within the meaning of the Act, which, therefore, could not be conferred upon the County Courts.

Weymouth to Mortimer. He had a return ticket The train started at 12.30, and to Reading. was timed to reach Reading at 5.35, and the train starting for Mortimer left at six o'clock. There were delays at Trowbridge and Didcot, and the consequence was that the train did not reach Reading till 5.57, and it was kept outside the station for five minutes. Plaintiff told the servants of the company he wanted to catch the Mortimer train, yet it was allowed to start before he could reach it. There was no other train for an hour and a quarter, and he took a conveyance and sued the company for the cost of it-10s. The defendants offered no evidence, and there was a verdict for the plaintiff, with liberty to defendants to appeal. Application for a new trial was now made. The grounds of such application were as follows: First, the wrongful reception of verbal evidence to contradict, or in opposition to, the written terms of the contract between the parties; secondly, no evidence was adduced by plaintiff at the trial in support of the real cause of action as set out in the summons; thirdly, that the verdict was against the weight of evidence adduced by the plaintiff.

Digby, barrister (instructed by Gledhill) now appeared on behalf of the company in support of the application for a new trial. Forsyth appeared in person to oppose the application. Blandy again acted as solicitor in the matter for Mr. Forsyth.

company had no locus standi, as there was an Forsyth took the preliminary objection that the appeal pending at the present time, and an appeal supposed that a certain effect is not to be given to a subsisting judgment. The existence of a judgment or verdict could not be affirmed, and at the same time a new trial be applied for. That had been decided several times. He would refer

to one or two cases.

His HONOUR said he would not trouble Mr. Forsyth further. The grounds on which a new trial was asked were all grounds of appeal not grounds for a new trial, and the defendants had had leave to appeal.

Digby said the company had served their notice of appeal.

His HONOUR observed that the case ought to
be then in court ready for signing or settling by
him.

Digby said that under some misapprehension
the solicitors to the company had not delivered
the grounds of appeal, thinking that Mr. Blandy
the solicitor for the plaintiff, would accept the
That was fre-
grounds of appeal afterwards.
quently done, and might have been done in that
He was willing to go on with the appeal if
Mr. Forsyth would accept the grounds of appeal
now.
Forsyth.-Certainly not. I intend taking ob-
jections if the appeal goes on.

case.

His HONOUR.-I cannot disturb the verdict.

The Great Western Railway Company were very
wrong in not defending the case upon its merits,
and afterwards they should have given notice of
the grounds of the appeal in due time and pre-
sented their case at this court.

Digby said there could be no appeal now, as the
grounds of appeal were not given in due time,
and, therefore, he moved for a new trial.

His HONOUR said that if the plaintiff consented he would enlarge the time for appeal, but he would not give a new trial even if the plaintiff consented, as the defendants ought to have defended the case on its merits at the hearing.

Forsyih would not consent to an enlargement of time for appeal, and the application for a new trial was dismissed with costs, the effect of which is that the verdict for the plaintiff will stand.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

part, and was, in fact, an assignment by the debtors of the whole of their property with the exception of a small amount of furniture, which was afterwards sold for £30. The property comprised in the deed included the lease, goodwill, fixtures, stock, and book debts of the debtors, amounting in the whole to £683 10s., the considera tion money being made up partly of a sum of £500 and interest then due from the debtors to A. and R. Cook amounting to £560, and partly of a sum of £123 paid by them in cash to the debtors at the time of the execution of the assignment. The grounds upon which the trustee rested his case were that the execution of the deed was an act of bankruptcy as a fraudulent transfer, and that it was void as a fraudulent preference.

His HONOUR, in giving judgment, reviewed the facts of the case, and said there was direct evidence that the sum of £500 was advanced on the faith of a bona fide contract made between the parties to execute the deed, and no extrinsic circumstances were disclosed tending to show fraud in fact as against the general creditors, and no ground existed for avoiding the transfer as an act of bankruptcy.

Upon the question of costs,

Mr. Registrar MURRAY said this court should be very slow to encourage what he might term pocket agreements. Creditors-members of the family in this case-chose to advance money on the promise, be it in writing or be it not, that a bill of sale should be given, and they kept that agreement in their pocket which they might easily register, and on the eve of insolvency they gave a notice which resulted in a conveyance by the debtor of all his property to those particular creditors. He declined to allow costs against the

trustee.

LIVERPOOL BANKRUPTCY COURT. Saturday, Nov. 21.

(Before J. F. COLLIER, Esq., Judge.) Re J. KEYWORTH.

secured creditor?

Bankruptcy Act 1869, sect. 12-What constitutes a Held, that a sum paid into court by defendant to abide event of action does not constitute plaintiff a secured creditor in case the defendant becomes bankrupt before action determined. Murray v. Arnold (7 L. T. Rep. N.S. 385; and Culverhouse v. Wickens (L. Rep. 3 C. P. 295; 17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 468), distinguished. THIS was a motion on behalf of Mr. Banner, the an agricultural implement maker in Liverpool, trustee of the property of the liquidating debtor, for an order that a sum of £880 be declared part of the estate divisible amongst the creditors. The circumstances of the case were these:-In July last an action was brought against Keyworth on a bill of exchange for £1200 drawn by one Lacy, whose affairs are now in liquidation, upon and accepted by Keyworth, and by the drawer, endorsed to Messrs. Griffiths, Tate, and Co., the plaintiffs in the action. On the 22nd July order was made giving leave to Keyworth to appear on payment into court of £880 to abide the event of the action. That sum was paid in accordance with the terms of the order, and on the 29th July further order was made for a compulsory reference. On the 2nd Sept. Keyworth filed his petition for liquidation, and shortly after. wards Mr. Banner was chosen trustee. The present motion was two-fold, viz., to restrain the action and to obtain possession of the £880.

Martin appeared for Mr. Banner, and Potter, instructed by Duncan, Hill, and Parkin. son, for the plaintiffs in the action.

Martin argued that under the present Bank. ruptcy Act the Court of Bankruptcy had exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions arising in any bankruptcy. Here the question pending was whether the plaintiff in the action was a creditor or not. The functions of the trustee now were far more extensive than those possessed by the former assignees in bankruptcy. It was his duty

R. E. Webster, in support of the rule, contended that the Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction over the barge, and cited cases in support of this proposition, which jurisdiction was, he said, conferred upon the County Courts by the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 10, which gives these courts, in certain cases, some of the powers of the Court of Admiralty. Mr. Webster went on to show from this that it was clear that the action might have been brought in the County Court, and that the plain- (Before Mr. Registrar MURRAY, sitting as Chief now to receive and decide upon all proofs of debt,

tiff was wrong in having brought it in the Court of Queen's Bench, and submitted that in consequence the rule ought to be made absolute.

The COURT (Lush and Archibald, JJ.), gave judgment, confirming Mr. Webster's view of the effect of the cases and statutes, and made the rule

absolute.

READING COUNTY COURT.
Wednesday, Nov. 19.

(Before H. J. STONOR, Esq., Judge.) FORSYTH V. THE GREAT-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Application for new trial. THIS case was decided against the company at the last court. The plaintiff is a Queen's counsel, living at Mortimer. It will be remembered that on the 28th Aug. the plaintiff was travelling from

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. Wednesday, Nov. 26.

Judge.)

Re COOK AND COOK.

"Family" assignments-Advance-Fraud-Costs.
THIS was a motion by the trustee in this liquida-
tion against one Aaron Cook, the father, and
Robert Cook, the brother of the debtors, seeking
to invalidate a deed of assignment executed by the
debtors a short time previously to their liquida-
tion as being fraudulent and void.

Finlay Knight appeared for the trustee.
Colt for the respondents.

The debtors, William and John Cook, trading
at Reading under the style of W. and J. Cook, as
wholesale and retail tea dealers and provision
merchants, filed their petition for liquidation on
the 10th May 1873. The deed which the trustee
sought to impeach was dated the 15th April 1873,
and was made between the debtors of the one part,
and Aaron Cook and Robert Cook of the other

and for such purpose to administer oaths, and from his decision there was an appeal to the court. In the present case all that the plaintiff in the action need do was to substantiate his claim before the trustee, and that being so there could be no object in further prosecuting the action, as even if the plaintiff obtained a verdict the trustee was not bound to admit the claim. By rule 289 every creditor in respect of a prove able debt shall, in the event of a liquidation by arrangement being resolved upon, be absolutely restrained from commencing or prosecuting any action against the debtor or his property, and he submitted here as this debt was proveable he was Assuming the entitled to a restraining order. restraining order were granted, the money paid into court to abide the event of the action became "result" of the returnable, as the "event" action was that it had been stayed by a court of competent jurisdiction.

or

Potter, in reply, relied upon the case of Murray v. Arnold (sup.) and several others since derided under the 184th section of the Act of 1849, where it was held that money deposited as security to abide the eventual determination of the action created a lien in favour of the plaintiff, and his rights were not affected by the subsequent bankruptcy of the defendant. By the proviso in the 12th section of the present Act, a creditor holding security, as he submitted his clients held, were expressly authorised to deal with their secu rity as though there had not been any bankruptcy. His HONOUR gave judgment as follows:-I think this case is distinguishable from Murray v. Arnold (3 B. & S. 287; 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 385) and Culverhouse v. Wickens (17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 468; L. Rep. 3 C. P. 295). The judgment in both those cases are based upon the hypothesis that the payment into court is payment to the plaintiff, and in the judgment of Willes, J., in the latter case, it is recognised that if the creditor could not make out his claim, the payments could only be treated as conditional. In the present case the payment into court cannot, I think, be regarded as payment to the plaintiff; it is, in reality, only of the nature of security to the plaintiff that his rights, whatever they may turn out to be, shall not be prejudiced. But, however that may be, I think it my duty to restrain further proceedings in this arbitration. It is discretionary whether I should do so or not, no doubt, but it appears to me that it is an essential part of the policy of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 that all the creditors should be placed upon an equal footing; but, by so doing, I shall introduce an entirely new element into the case. Directly the proceedings have been restrained the end and object of the payment into court ceases, there is no claim that the creditor can make out, and, according to the judgment of Willes, J., in Culverhouse v. Wickens, under such circumstances the payment into court would be, as he expresses it, "discharged." If that is so it can be the property of no other person than the defendant in the suit, and under his liquidation passes to the trustee. I shall therefore order the fund in court to be paid to the trustee. The costs of this application to be paid out of the fund. Notice of appeal was given and £20 named as the amount of deposit.

Ex parte BOLLAND; re RAHN AND CO.

Bankruptcy Act 1869-Sect. 6. Bill of sale executed by one partner in a firm of all partnership assets held to be invalid. Is a bill of sale given to secure a possible risk valid? Held on the authority of Ex parte Foxley (18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 862) to be a sufficient equivalent. THIS was a motion on behalf of Mr. Bolland, the trustee of the property of the liquidating debtors, who were commission and cigar merchants, having five retail cigar shops in different parts of Liverpool, for an order of the court to declare that a bill of sale executed immediately prior to the liquidation by one of the debtors (Rahn) of all the partnership assets in favour of Mr. Whitfield, as security for a past debt, was void, and an act of bankruptcy. The further question was as to the validity of a transfer of wine and matches which were alleged to be a fraudulent preference. Walton, instructed by Miller, Peel, and Hughes, appeared for the trustee in the liquidation, and Etty for Mr. Whitfield.

The facts stated shortly were these:-In the month of March last, Rahn, who was a partner in the firm of Rahn and Eaton, was requested by Mr. E. C. Whitfield to give him security, in accordance with an alleged previous promise, for the payment of a sum of £400 borrowed by Rahn through Mr. Whitfield, and for the repayment of which the latter was security. Rahn accordingly executed a bill of sale over all his effects to Mr. Whitfield, who immediately afterwards took possession of the property. The firm thereby being divested of everything, filed their petition for liquidation, and a motion was made by their trustee to set aside the bill of sale.

His HONOUR, in giving judgment, said: With respect to the facts of this case, I may premise that I regard Mr. Whitfield's version as substantially the true one. It is difficult to imagine anything more misleading than the affidavit of the debtor. It is also evident that he concealed from Whitfield the fact that Eaton was his partner, and there is such strong intrinsic evidence of untruthfulness about his testimony that I do not think him worthy of credit. It is admitted that at the time of the execution of the bill of sale by Rahn alone there was a partnership between Rahn and Eaton, and that the property assigned was partnership property. On the authority of the cases of Harrison v. Jackson (7 T. R. 207) and Steiglitz v. Egginton (Holt, 141) I am compelled to come to the conclusion that the bill of sale was void, as being a deed purporting to assign the partnership property, but executed by one partner only. Rahn had no implied authority so to bind

his co-partner; he could only have been authorised first branch of the application, viz., that with re-
so to do either by deed or by signing the partner- ference to the bill of exchange, are these. A bill
ship name in the presence of the co-partner. It of exchange for £553, drawn by Messrs. Stuart,
was argued that there being a symbolical delivery Whitehead, and Co., upon Mr. Chadwick, the
of a chair in the name of the whole property at debtor, and accepted by him, was due on the 13th
the time of the execution, that amounted to a Feb. in the present year. On the 11th Feb. Mr.
delivery, and that such delivery was good, inde. Chadwick wrote a letter to Messrs. Stuart, White-
pendent, and apart from the deed, and bound the head, and Co., enclosing a bill for £300 drawn
partnership. But the symbolical delivery is pro- upon them, and asking their acceptance of it as a
vided for in the deed, and I do not think it can be partial renewal of the bill for £553. In the same
considered as a delivery separate or apart from letter Mr. Chadwick enclosed an unsigned bill,
the deed. Where there is a deed, everything that with the acceptance of his firm written across it,
is done must be considered as done under it, and for the like amount. The bill was afterwards
the fact that the bill of sale was afterwards regis- signed by Stuart, Whitehead, and Co., and retained
tered is some evidence that it, and not the delivery, by them. On the 12th Feb. Messrs. Stuart, White-
was relied on. The property comprised in the bill head, and Co., returned their acceptance to Mr.
of sale or its equivalent, will, therefore, have to be Chadwick in a letter which may be presumed to
restored, and will pass to the trustee. With have reached him on the 13th. On the 12th Feb.
respect to the delivery orders for the matches and Mr. Chadwick swears that he became first aware
wine, the same rule would not apply. Rahn had that his bankers would not retire the £553 bill,
implied power to pledge the personal property of as he had expected they would, and on the day it
the firm for advances. It remains to be considered was due, viz., the 13th, it was dishonoured. Mr.
whether the transfer was or was not a fraudulent Chadwick did not pay Messrs. Stuart, Whitehead,
one within the policy of the bankruptcy laws. I and Co.'s acceptance to his bankers to meet part
do not think that it was a voluntary transfer; of this £553 bill, but retained it in his own hands
indeed the only reasonable explanation of the till the 25th, when he handed it to the trustee in
transaction is that it was done on pressure of a liquidation. Messrs. Stuart, Whitehead, and Co.
severe kind from Whitfield, for I disregard the pro- have since provided for both the £300 bills, viz.,
mised advance of £300. I do not think it was their acceptance of Chadwick's bill and Chad-
done with any intent to delay or defraud the other wick's acceptance of their bill, both of which
creditors, or from any preference for Whitfield; became due on the 13th June, and also for
all the facts negative such a supposition. On the the £553 bill. To cover the latter bill and
subject of the proportion which the matches and expenses they drew a bill for £557 odd on
wine bore to the remainder of the debtor's pro- Chadwick. Both these latter bills appear on the
perty, I have no trustworthy evidence. I may proof. On the 19th Feb. Mr. Chadwick filed his
observe that this point of the case was scarcely petition for liquidation. On the 21st May Messrs.
touched upon in the argument; and I may con- Stuart, Whitehead, and Co. filed the usual affi-
clude that it was not considered of any great davit of proof of debt against the estate of Mr.
importance. The inference I draw from all the Chadwick, and claimed to prove among other
circumstances of the case is, that this property items for the £300 bill accepted by Mr. Chadwick,
did not bear any such relative proportion to the and they have since claimed a dividend on the
stock in trade, fixtures, and furniture of the six full amount set forth in the affidavit. Upon
shops as to make its transfer an assignment of all examining the sum set out in the proof it was
the debtor's property with an unimportant excep- found that £300 more was claimed than was due,
tion, or even an assignment of the greater part of and this Mr. Whitehead admits to be the fact. It
the debtor's property; nor did the transfer affect was argued before me that there had been a
their insolvency, which was complete before. It specific appropriation of Messrs. Stuart, White-
was argued that Whitfield's claim being a mere head, and Co.'s acceptance, and that it was in Mr.
undertaking of suretyship, the debtors had re. Chadwick's hands, clothed with a trust to devote
ceived no equivalent for the transfer, but in the it only to the object to which it had been specifi-
case of Ex parte Foxley (18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 862;cally appropriated-viz., to a part payment of the
L. Rep. 3 Ch. App. 515) it seems to be distinctly bill for £553; but I think that Messrs. Stuart,
admitted by Sir W. P. Wood, L.J., that a Whitehead, and Co.'s dealings with respect to
suretyship was a sufficient equivalent to support that acceptance (i.e., the £300) negative the idea
a bill of sale, and there is no difference in principle that any such intention was in their minds, or at
between a bill of sale and a transfer such as the any rate lead to the conclusion that they have
present. His words, which are at p. 520, are these: waived any right to take advantage of it. In
"The debtor gave a security to cover the risk of their letter of the 14th Feb., in which they return
Lewis in indorsing the bill. I am not prepared the bill, no such specific appropriation is alluded
to say that that was not in itself an equivalent to. The bill came into Mr. Chadwick's hands on
which would have supported a bill of sale." In the 15th Feb., and remained in his hands until the
Strachan v. Barton (11 Ex. 647) it was held that 25th. On the 15th Messrs. Stuart, Whitehead,
the payment by a bankrupt of a debt not due was and Co. became aware, by a letter of Mr. Chad-
not necessarily a fraudulent preference, and in wick's, dated the 14th, that the bill for £553
Edwards v. Glyn (2 Ell. & Ell. 29) a request from would not be met. Not a word do they say during
a surety was held sufficient to negative a fraudu- that period about the bill being specifically appro-
lent preference. Upon these authorities I am priated to the payment of the £553 bill, nor do
prepared to hold, if necessary, that the liability of they make any request that it shall be returned to
Whitfield on the promissory note was a sufficient them. It is true that on the day of the first
equivalent for the transfer of the wine and meeting of creditors Mr. Whitehead says, and it
matches. For the foregoing reasons I think the is not denied, that he claimed the return of the
principal ingredients necessary to making this bill from the trustee, and he endeavours to explain
transfer void, or an act of bankruptcy, are want- his want of diligence in insisting upon its return
ing; and I refuse so much of the motion as relates by some hope being held out by the trustee that
to the wine and matches. The costs will come out if he met both hills he could be entitled to have
of the estate.
the value of his own acceptances returned to him.
But what does he do? On the 21st May he in-
cludes this very sum in his proof; in fact, on the
21st May he elects, he deliberately elects, for his
attorney drew up his affidavit of proof on his own
instructions, and as he says with all the bills and
facts before him, to treat this £300 as a loan from
his firm to Mr. Chadwick, and when the time comes
for a dividend he claims a dividend upon it. From
the beginning to the end of the transaction until
the present proceeding is instituted, not a word
do we hear from Messrs. Stuart, Whitehead, and
Co. about the specific appropriation of the bill to
the payment of the £553 bill. I therefore think
that Messrs. Stuart, Whitehead, and Co. are not
entitled to have the bill given up or to receive its
equivalent. My judgment in the matter of the
wire stood over by arrangement until the decision
of the appeal from this court in the case of Ex
parte Catlin and Waller, re Chadwick (29 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 431), the principle involved in the two
cases being precisely similar. In that case the
decision of this court that the transitus was at an
end when the goods came into the warehouse of
the railway company at Liverpool having been
confirmed, I give judgment to the same effect with
reference to the wire. The application will there-
fore be dismissed with costs.

Re DANIEL CHADWICK.
Bankruptcy Act 1869-Stoppage in transitu.
Held, on the authority of Wilmshurst v. Bowker,
and Maddock v. Granger, that the arrival of
the goods at the railway terminus, and the
subsequent delivery to the purchaser of the usual
advice note, rendered the transit complete. Also
that a bill of exchange, although alleged to be
sent for a specific purpose, and in the hands of
the debtors on their failure, is not returnable,
where, by proof of debt and other circumstances,
there is evidence sufficient to satisfy the court
that at the time of forwarding the bill, there was
nothing definite either expressed or implied in
the mind of the sender.
THIS was a motion argued a few weeks ago in
which judgment was reserved.
Sampson, appeared to support the application.
James, instructed by Woodburn, Pemberton, and

Martin, on behalf of Mr. Bolland, opposed.
His HONOUR now said: In this case I am asked
to order Mr. Bolland, the trustee in liquidation
of the property of Daniel Chadwick, to repay to
Messrs. Stuart, Whitehead, and Co., the sum of
£300 in respect of a bill of exchange drawn by the
said Daniel Chadwick and accepted by Messrs.
Stuart, Whitehead, and Co., and dated 10th Feb.
1873; and to deliver up an advice note relating
to fifty-one bundles of wire consigned by Stuart,
Whitehead, and Co., to the said Daniel Chadwick.
The facts of the case, so far as they relate to the

Sampson said he was unaware whether it was the intention of his clients to appeal, but, assuming they were so advised, he should be glad if the court would now fix the amount of deposit. His HONOUR said the ordinary sum, £20, would be sufficient.

Re T. S. TRUMBLE.

Bankruptcy Act 1869-Registration of resolutions

court.

-Practice.

Held that the court could only entertain an appeal from the registrar on the question of registration. The registrar's duties were merely ministerial, and if a proof was questioned which affected the registration, it ought to be submitted to the THIS liquidating debtor was a paperhanger in Liverpool. He presented his petition in November of last year, with liabilities of £1525 and assets £976. In the same month the creditors passed resolutions to liquidate by arrangement, and appointed Mr. Williams trustee. A proof of debt was tendered at the meeting by Mr. George Trumble, a brother of the bankrupt, for £1563, and objected to by the chairman. On the resolutions being presented for registration, the objection to the proof was considered by the registrar, and finally, after much discussion and delay, he rejected it, and registered the resolutions. Etty applied for an appointment to appeal from the registrar's decision as to the proof. The registrar said the proper course was to appeal against the registration, and in support of such application to revive the question of the validity of Mr. George Trumble's debt, for if it was established the registration fell to the ground, as the resolution of creditors would be insufficiently signed. Etty said he did not object to the registration, and all that he wanted was his client's debt admitted, and his dividend paid thereon. The registrar intimated if that were so the parties should go before the trustee, and in case he rejected the proof there could be an appeal to the court. Etty preferred adopting his own course; and finally, after some discussion, an appointment was given for the court to consider the validity of the debt. On the 22nd inst. the appeal came on for hearing.

Myburgh, instructed by Duke and Goffey, excepted to the jurisdiction of the court. The only appeal which was provided for by the Act was against the registration of the resolutions. Here, on the question of proof, the registrar had given his decision, and had registered the proceedings. Had the parties desired, they could have adjourned the question of the proof for the opinion of the court; but as they had elected to take the registrar's decision, it was too late to revive the matter, except by appeal to the Chief Judge or from the trustee, in case he rejected the proof.

His HONOUR held the objection to be good, as he saw no provision in the Act or rules sanctioning an appeal from the registrar's decision, except as to the registration of the resolutions.

Myburgh then, after some discussion, said that, as he did not wish the claimant to be damnified by a technical objection, he would consent to the court considering the proof as an appeal from the trustee, who, under his advice, would at once reject the same.

Etty censented to that course, and after evidence was adduced and arguments urged on both sides, the court reserved its judgment.

LEGAL NEWS.

THE Glasgow News hears that the Government has resolved to set up in Scotland, and in Ireland also, a court of final appeal.

A DINNER was given at Willis's Rooms on Saturday evening by the past and present members of the Oxford circuit to Mr. Henry James, Q.C., on his appointment as Attorney-General. Mr. Huddleston, Q.C., presided; and amongst those present were Lord Romilly, Mr. Justice Keating, Mr. Baron Pigott, Mr. Amphlett, M.P., and Mr. Kenyon, Q.C.

SOLICITORS ELECTED TO THE Office of MAYOR 1873-74.-In addition to those already published by us, the following solicitors have been elected to the office of Mayor for the ensuing year: Mr. C. J. Follett, B.C.L., Exeter (second time); Mr. Arthur Leech, Newcastle-under-Lyme, Staffordshire; Mr. Charles Newman, Barnsley (second time); Mr. Charles Denton Leech, Bury St. Edmunds; Mr. W. H. Bailes, Boston.

RULES OF PROCEDURE IN THE LAW COURTS.The Times understands that progress is being made in the framing by the judges of the rules of procedure which they were to make under the Judicature Act. The judges have met, and a committee has been selected from among them. Under the direction of this committee three draftsmen are at work, one of whom has been selected for his acquaintance with procedure in common law, one for his knowledge of the practice in the equity courts, and the third on account of experience in the Admiralty, Probate, and Divorce courts. A draft of the rules is expected to be ready before the end of the year, and it will then be carefully considered, with the object of placing the definitive rules in the hands of the Profession some time before the Long Vacation.

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SIR JAMES MARTIN has been appointed Chief Justice of New South Wales, to succeed Sir Alfred Stephen, C.B., who has resigned the office. MEETING OF PARLIAMENT.-It is announced officially that the Houses of Parliament will meet business. on the 5th of February, 1874, for the dispatch of

SIR JOHN B. KARSLAKE has announced his intention of coming forward as a candidate in the Conservative interest for the representation of Huntingdon. He says in his address that the opinions he entertained when he was successively Solicitor-General and Attorney-General are well known, and he has not seen any reason to change them.

THE Licensed Victuallers' Protection Society have directed their solicitors to prepare a Bill to amend the Licensing Act of 1872; and a conference will be held at the London Tavern on the 10th Dec. to consider the clauses of the Bill, with the view of taking prompt and vigorous action in the forthcoming session. made to test the feeling of the trade upon a Inquiries are being uniform closing hour throughout the metropolitan police district.

WILLS AND BEQUESTS.-A writer in the Globe, with reference to testamentary documents, observes, "that the nature of some men reveals itself only in their last wills and testaments. In these the vanity or caprice, or the irony, or the spite of an individual, restrained by circumstances during life, often find fresh vent. Sure of being beyond the reach of retaliation, when the shaft he levelled is fired, he feels no compunetion for the wound he is about to create, but rather regrets that he is able to exert his individuality from beyond the grave. The manner even in which their funeral obsequies are to be performed give many immense concern. Some insist on being buried in the most private and unostentatious manner; while others, of whom the late Duke of Brunswick seems to have been a conspicuous example, live in a perpetual dread lest they should be interred without the pompous circumstances they regard as suitable to their station. The caprices of the will-maker have no limit." Reference is made to the singular case of Messer Ludovico Cortorio, A.D. 1418, who desired that his friends and relatives should not weep at his funeral, and his instractions were observed with strictness, for jolity prevailed upon this occasion instead of sorrow.

CRIMINAL STATISTICS.-On Wednesday the criminal statistics of Ireland for last year appeared in a Parliamentary volume. Compared with 1871, the decrease is 111, or 176 in malicious offences against property. Malicious offences against property stood at a minimum of 526 in 1867, rose to a maximum of 761 in 1870, but in 1872 fell to 520, or below the minimum reached in 1867, showing a subsidence of this very grave class of offence, in which the Irish statistics are usually more unfavourable than those of England and Wales. There was an increase of 105 in riots and breach of the peace last year, compared with the preceding, which arose from the party riots at Belfast. A table shows that the outburst of agrarian crime which occurred in 1869 and 1870 has undergone a remarkable diminution. It is stated that notwithstanding the unfavourable character of the harvest last year, producing pressure on the poor, and withdrawal of savings, there were in the eleven months ended the 31st July last, only 2147 offences and outrages specially reported, as compared with 2422 in the eleven months ended the 31st of July 1872-the pressure had, in other words, been attended with a diminution of crime. In reference to crime in counties and districts, it is stated by the compilers in this document that the great problem indicated by the Irish statistics in 1872 is how to deal with town crime to guard against such dangerous developments as were exhibited at the recent fire in Dublin. The population of Ireland in 1871 was 5,402,759; the offences disposed of summarily last year 211,470, being a proportion of 3914 in each 10,000 of the population. The excess of town crime is a feature in the present tables. There were two persons sentenced to death in Ireland last year, neither of whom were executed. Comparisons are drawn in the document between England and Ireland. Of 29,121 of both sexes in prison last year in Ireland 12,700 could neither read nor write. Last year in Ireland the total cost of repression of crime was £1,336,388, of which £929,705 was for police, £334,246, for persons in confinement, and £72,4371. for prosecutions.

to be ineligible for that position. By an old custom in the Middle Temple any member of the Inn who receives during Term the rank of serjeant is formally "tolled out" of hall, but it is a somewhat curious circumstance that, although many distinguished members of the society have been raised to the Bench and to the minor dignity of the coif during the last seventeen years, only three received their promotion in Term time and went through the ceremony of last evening-namely, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, Mr. Justice Honyman, and Lord Chief Justice Coleridge. Nearly 200 members of the Inn, both barristers and students, dined in hall on the occasion, and among the Benchers who supported the new Chief Justice were Mr. J. R. Kenyon, Q.C., the treasurer; the Right Hon. Sir Lawrence Peel, Vice Chancellor Hall, Sir John Karslake, Sir Henry Sumner Maine, the Right Hon. Peter Erle; Mr. Hawkins, Q.C., Mr. Powell, Q.C., Mr. George Loch, Q.C., Mr. Milward, Q.C., Mr. Johnson, QC., Mr. Gray, Q.C., Mr. Prentice, Q.C., Mr. Little, Q.C., Mr. H. T. Cole, Q.C., Mr. Fox Bristowe, Q.C., Mr. Charles Clark, and Mr. Charles Shaw, the under treasurer. Lord Chief Justice Coleridge read grace both before and after dinner, and gave from the chair, without comment, the toast of the Queen, which was received with the heartiest enthusiasm. No speeches were delivered. At the close of the dinner Sir John Coleridge, who was loudly cheered by the members, was escorted to the principal door of the hall by the Benchers and the under treasurer, and by the head Porter (Mr. Bye) bearing his staff of office. As the Judge passed out the doors. were closed upon him, and the bell in the hall tower was solemnly tolled for some minutes. In this way the Lord Chief Justice formally terminated his intimate connection with the Inn. He subsequently re-entered the Parliamentary chamber as a guest of the Benchers. On the new Judicature Act-by which it will not be necessary for a Judge to become first of all a serjeant-atlaw and thus to change his Inn-coming into operation this ancient ceremony will fall into desuetude.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE. This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it COMMISSIONS FOR OATHS IN COMMON LAW.It is stated in the Solicitors' Department of the Law Times for last week, that cases have occurred where Common Law Commissions to take affidavits which were bespoken a month ago, will not be ready for another month-perhaps two. Allow me to say that I applied last February, nine months ago, through my agents, and was then informed that no more commissions would be granted until July. In July the application was renewed, when I was told the commissions could not be signed until November. Again I reminded my agents of the matter the first week in November, and received a reply that they hoped to write me satisfactorily by the middle of Michaelmas Term. As yet, however, I have received no further communication from them on the subject. The inconvenience and delay, therefore, in my case, far exceeds that mentioned by you, and is quite inexplicable.

A COUNTRY ATTORNEY OF TEN
YEARS STANDING,

NOTES AND QUERIES ON POINTS OF PRACTICE.

NOTICE. We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consulted upon." Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides.

Queries.

34. STAMPS-AGREEMENT FOR WEEKLY TENANCY.What stamp does a lease from week to week or an agreement for a weekly tenancy require? If a penny receipt stamp, must it be obliterated in the usual way? EX OFFICIO.

35. BILL OF COSTS PARTNER. - A solicitor retained to institute suit. During its progress he took a THE NEW CHIEF JUSTICE.-On Tuesday evenpartner. Should costs against client be in two partsing Sir John Duke Coleridge, the recently-ap-.e., in name of solicitor to time of partnership com. pointed Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, mencing, and afterwards in name of firm, or the whole took formal leave of the Society of the Middle in name of solicitor first instructed. Temple, with which Inn of Court he has been INQUIRER FOR CASE. connected as a student, barrister, reader, and bencher for the last 30 years. In the ordinary course of things he would this Term have succeeded to the Treasurership of the Inn on the completion of Sir John Karslake's term of office, but his prior appointment to the Bench, and his consequent removal to Serjeants'-inn, caused him

36. CHEQUE-INDORSEMENT A cheque drawn on a country branch of the London and County Bank, and payable to the order of "the executors of Mrs. G.," is handed unindorsed by R. W. (who is her executor) to J. P. for a particular purpose. J. P. indorses the cheque, J. P., executor of Mrs. Giblin," and obtains cash for the cheque at another bank, which takes it to the chief office of the London and County Bank, where

it is honoured, and in due course it is returned to the
branch on which it is drawn. First, Is the indorse-
ment by "J. P." a forgery? second, Who loses the
money, (a) the executor of Mrs. G., (b) the drawer, or
(c) the bank ?
R. B. P.

37. TRUSTEES-INVESTMENT.-Can trustees under the following clause invest upon East Indian Railway Stock? Please give a reason, and, if possible, an authority: "And the said trustees shall lay out or invest such moneys in their or his own names orname in the Parliamentary or Public Stocks or Funds of Great Britain, or at interest on Government or real securities in England or Wales, or on the bond or bonds of some corporate body constituted by Act of Parliament, or in the capital stock of some incorporated company constituted by Act of Parliament and paying a dividend."

38. JOINT TENANCY.-If any of your readers will enlighten me on the following query I shall feel greatly obliged:-If one of three joint tenants aliens his share, do the two remaining tenants still hold their parts by joint tenancy and survivorship? Thus, suppose A., B., and C. are joint tenants in fee, and A. conveys to D. his share in the lands, and then B. dies, in what shares are the lands then held? I am aware that the share which is disposed of becomes a subject of a tenancy in common with the remaining two.

INTERMEDIATE.

39. CUSTODY OF INFANT.-A. B., who is resident in the United States of America, is desirous of removing his infant child from the custody of his wife and her relations, who reside in this country, into the custody of his parents, who also reside in this country. What is the proper course for him to adopt for this purpose, and form of authority for him to execute, and need it be under seal or bear a stamp, and how should it be executed and attested, and what would be about the cost of applying to the Court of Queen's Bench, for a writ of habeas corpus ? LEX.

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40. LORD MAYOR'S COURT-JURISDICTION.-Will any of your readers inform me how jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Lord Mayor's Court in respect of debts contracted in the country? I have now before me a summons from the above court in respect of a debt for provisions contracted 200 miles from London, secured by a bill of exchange sent to the defendant by a firm of accountants in town for acceptance. I was under the impression that "transitory actions were qualified as regards inferior courts of record, and only triable where the defendant resides, and the place where the debt was contracted. It is so in the County Courts. HARDSHIP.

[The jurisdiction of the court is limited to the city. except in Foreign Attachment. But the difficulty of objecting to jurisdiction is so great that it is generally yielded to.-ED.]

Answers.

(Q. 12.) POOR LAW-LIABILITY TO MAINTAIN GRANDPARENT." Pauper," in your last number, in answer to "G. K.." states that in the index to the last edition of Archbold's Poor Law, under the head "Grandfather," will be found" liability to maintain grandchildren, and to be maintained by them." The index, it is true, contains such a reference, but I am unable to find any authority for the latter proposition in the body of the book; on the contrary, I am convinced that the law as laid down 31 J. P., p. 755, referred to by " F. W. F." in your last issue is correct. X. X. X.

OWL.

The heir-at-law is entitled, since he can only be disinherited by an eflectual gift to some one else.

Z. Y.

(Q. 27.) CONVEYANCE.-B.'s co-trustee or co-trustees

will release to him.

OWL.

Subject to any question as to the payment for her separate use or otherwise of the legacy to B.'s wife B.'s co-trustees, by virtue of their legal and beneficial interests, can make a title. I doubt, however, whether it would be good as against unpaid creditors of the testator, who might very properly insist that a bona fide sale should have been made to a stranger.

Z. Y.

(Q. 29.) RAILWAY-TRESPASS. -The placards being true, would not render the company or its officers liable to an action for libel. The persons concerned in the placarding are, however, prima facie, liable to indict ment. In order to escape conviction they would have to show not only the truth of the libel, but to persuade a jury that it was for the public benefit that the offender should not only be fined but held up as a scarecrow, for the warning of others. I think that placarding offenders is in general a proceeding which railway companies or their officials have no right to adopt. As a rule the public press sufficiently exposes offenders.

Z. Y.

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(Q. 26.) DEVISE-WORDS OF REVOCATION.-The rever-quired in searching out from a mass of evidence
sion was in C. on A.'s death, and on failure of the estate what could and what could not be laid before a
tail C. cannot be prevented from taking the whole es-
tate. The revocation was good without the words jury, and he also spoke as to the necessity of legal
quoted, which only embody the testator's personal knowledge in drawing a will. He then proceeded
feeling, and are inoperative to defeat the rights of C. to speak of the grievances of which the legal
as heir. See 1 Reeves' Hist. Eng. Law, 105; Co. Litt., profession complained. He put on one side the
191a, n. (1) vi. 3.
question of legal education, as that had been taken:
He was
up by the Legal Education Association.
not there, he said, to express an opinion upon that
Association; but he was entitled to refer to the
existence of that Association as an evidence that
it was possible for the two branches of the Pro-
fession to combine together for a common object,
for they had found it possible to sit on the
council of that Association together. (Hear, hear.)
The artificial barrier raised between the two
branches was a grievance of which both sides
complained. A flourishing junior at the Bar re-
cently told him that the Bar and attorneys were
natural foes. There were persons who thought
that the internecine war between the two branches.
was hardly consistent with 19th century civi-
lization. An eminent Queen's Counsel had said
that "attorneys exercised a malignant influence
over the Bar ;" and lately an eminent solicitor
declared that it was "time the reign of barrister-
dom should cease.' Now was this state of things
to be allowed to go on without an attempt being
made to humanise, not to say to Christianise, the
relations between the two branches before another
race of lawyers grew up? The fact of a barrister
dying in a common lodging house of starvation,
opened the eyes of the public to the hollowness of
the existing state of things. Many barristers
were keeping up the position of members of the
aristocracy upon the income of paupers. Success-
ful solicitors, on whom wealth had descended
in golden showers, were sitting in splendid
homes without a chance of obtaining dignity or
honour. There were persons who thought that
the existing state of things exercised a demoralis-
ing influence upon the Profession. (Hear.) It
was asked whether it would be possible if a higher
tone prevailed for attorneys to gamble for counsel
and counsel to jilt their clients? Would it be
possible for accountants, law stationers, money
lenders, debt collectors, and advertising quacks
to usurp the functions of the legal Profession?
(Cheers.) Would there be an Inn of Court, calling
gentlemen to the Bar at a cost of £2150 each?
If the rules of etiquette were defined, would un-
scrupulous men violate them with impunity?
There would be no satisfactory solution of
existing difficulties until there was joint action
between the two branches of the legal Profession.
They had been too long kept apart, and it was
time they met in a spirit of compromise. Each
should be prepared to sacrifice something for the
general good. The public interest should be
paramount. It might be hoped that the noble
Profession to which they belonged would then be
as unsullied as the ermine of the judges who adorn
our judgment seat. (Cheers.)

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(Q. 33.) COMMISSIONER.-In the third edition of Day's Common Law Procedure Acts, p. 24, see as to affidavits sworn before attorneys, their agents, and clerks. R. G. H. T. 1853, rr. 142-3 post, and Horsefall v. Matthewman (3 M. & S. 154). R. G. H. T. 1853, r. 142, no affidavit of service of process shall be deemed sufficient if sworn before the plaintiff's own attorney or his clerk: (See Foster v. Harvey 11 W. R. 899, July 1863. V.C. W.) R. G. H. T. 1853, r. 143, where an agent in town or an attorney in the country is the attorney on the record, an affidavit sworn before the attorney in the country shall not be received, and an affidavit sworn before an attorney's clerk shall not be received in cases where it would not be receivable if sworn before the attorney himself; but this rule shall not extend to an affidavit

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(Q.13.) LEGACY DUTY.-From the initials given in the
case it may be guessed that A. T. was the sister of
J. G.'s wife-not the wife or widow of J. G.'s brother.
If A. T. were such sister, the reply given by "S. " is
correct. In the other event; 3 per cent. only would be Society, for "the reform of the existing unsatis-
payable, under sect. 11.

Z. Y.

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(Q.16.) CONVEYANCING.-The concurrence of the cestuis que trust under H.'s will does not appear to be absolutely necessary; but, if it be necessary, it will be inoperative against the married women, unless they acknowledge the deed. A new trustee should be ap pointed in the place of the one said to be of unsound mind. Z. Y.

(Q. 21.) REPUDIATION OF BET.-I think C. was safe in paying over, notwithstanding B.'s protest. See Martin v. Hewson (10 Ex. 737.)

Z. Y.

(Q. 24.) WILL AND CODICIL.-See Wills Act of 1837, s. 34; Winter v. Winter (5 Ha. 306); Gordon v. Atkinson (1 De G. & S. 478); Brooke v. Kent (3 Moo. P. C. 334, i No. Cas. 93). But the rule that a codicil confirming a will makes the will for many purposes bear the date of the codicil is subject to the limitation that the testator's intention be not thereby defeated (Dos v. Hole, 15 Jur. 13). OWL.

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THE LEGAL PRACTITIONERS' SOCIETY. THE meeting of barristers and solicitors, to which reference was made last week, was held at the rooms of the Social Science Association, Adelphi, under the presidency of Mr. W. T. Charley, D.C.L. M.P., on Thursday, the 20th inst.. to consider the necessity for founding a Legal Practitioners' factory state of the legal profession." The proposal was that the society should restrict itself to the reform of proved abuses in connection with the Profession only," and among its objects the following were mentioned: To define the rules of etiquette of the legal profession, and reduce them to a written code; to define the rights and liabilities of the two branches of the legal profession inter se, as well as in relation to the public; to place the government of the legal profession on a sound representative basis; and to protect the legal profession against the depredations of unqualified men.

The Chairman, in his opening speech, stated that letters had been received from members of both branches of the Profession favourable to the objects for which the meeting had been called, and it was felt that there was no existing society to which could be confided the onerous task of reforming the abuses in the legal profession. The question of that night would be whether there should or should not be a society founded. The law had been amended, and the judicial system reconstructed, but no effort had been made to redress the grievances of which both branches of the Profession complained, and the Profession stood in nearly the same position that it stood a century ago. There were many persons, no doubt, who would improve the legal profession off the face of the earth (a laugh), and abate it as a nuisance; and there were not wanting members in the House of Commons with that desire; but he most emphatically stated that the public could not get on without lawyers. (Hear.) A man might be his own priest or his own doctor with more or less success, but he failed altogether when he tried to be his own lawyer. He instanced the necessity of legal assistance by recounting the discrimination re

Mr. Gresham, the high bailiff of Southwark, corroborated the chairman's statement of the unpleasant state of feeling between the two branches, and he expressed his regret that it did exist. He did not think there should be any disagreement between members of the Bar and attorneys. He then alluded to the state of things in Gray's-inn, in which he was personally interested, his son having been excluded from the inn because he was articled to his father as an attorney. He alluded to the dissatisfaction caused by barristers taking briefs without the possibility of attending to them, and this too, without any responsibility; while attorneys would be held directly responsible for any neglect. As to Gray's-inn, he said that though an attorney, he maintained the right of membership in his Inn, and he went on to complain of the usurpa tion of the duties and privileges of the Profession by accountants and others in bankruptcy, county, and police courts. He thought a society such as this proposed to be would be a most useful one for the Profession.

Mr. Gresham, jun., urged the necessity of a society such as this proposed to be, to protect the Profession against the depredations of unqualified persons.

Mr. Coryton, late a judge at Rangoon, thought that an amalgamation of the Profession would lead to partnerships between the two branches. In India the feeling was something like that which the chairman had described as the feeling of some in this country, that lawyers were a nuisance. The Government in India looked upon litigation as a nuisance, and tried to keep it within bounds. After some explanations with the Chairman on one or two remarks made by the latter, he went on to say that simplifying the law in India opened up plenty of fair business. He explained the system prevailing in India, and stated that the judge had to discover, by having the parties to a litigation before him, the points at issue, and then to confine the parties to those points. He thought there was room for improvement in the system in this country.

Mr. Crump said that he had come to the meet

ing to hear, and with no intention of speak. ing, but in response to a suggestion that he should make some observations, he would say

that he did not think the rules of the Profession required any codification. As a barrister, he could not say that he had known of any heart burnings or jealousy as between the members of the two branches of the Profession. He had seen no trace of "a malignant influence on the Bar" by attorneys, who, in his intercourse with them he had generally found to be educated gentlemen, and he could not understand how business could be carried on as it is if that feeling existed. The fact that an enormous amount of work was conducted in and out of court to the satisfaction of the public, showed that the two branches did work in accord, and he believed that they would continue to work in accord. He was emphatically opposed to any proposition for amalgamation. But, if attorneys could not live because of the depredations upon their profession by unqualified men, let those enactments which existed for the protection of the Profession be strictly enforced in the tribunals of the country. Let it not however be supposed by the public that the two branches were engaged in internecine warfare. He believed that if a poll were taken of the Profession there would be no differences of opinion except as to the means of facilitating business. Speaking as a barrister, he desired to point out that in the matter of briefs being taken which could not be attended to, the barrister, in this matter, was often in the hands of his clerk, who would take in business in the bona fide expectation that it would receive proper attention, and who could not always foresee the engagements of his employer. The remedy for the grievance of a barrister not attending to briefs was in the hands of the attorneys; for if they found a man so overwhelmed with business that he could not attend

to all his work, it was their fault in retaining him. For his part he did not see that there was any grievance in there not being an amalgamation. He did not want to become an attorney, but he had no objection to any solicitor becoming a barrister per saltum. He did not think, if there were an amalgamation, that the Profession would hold the position it now did before the country; for there was something now about the Bar perhaps it was owing to their not being brought into direct contact with the public-which gave it a peculiar position. If that were broken down, and the barristers were liable to be pressed by their clients to take strong views of particular cases as attorneys were, the influence of the Profession would be diminished in the country, and they would be deprived of the means they had now of doing a vast amount of good to the public. The one object of the society should be to ensure that steps were taken to protect the Profession, and the Profession should do their best to suppress unqualified persons. There could be no doubt that in County Courts and other tribunals, the Profession was robbed by accountants and agents of all kinds, and he was surprised to see so large and powerful a body as the attorneys sitting quietly by, while the legitimate profits of their profession were taken by persons who, he believed, fostered the worst class of litigation in this country.

Mr. Leslie, as a solicitor, was entirely opposed to amalgamation, and he felt that the subject of depredations on the Profession was one requiring serious attention. He did not complain of the junior Bar, but thought it would be very desirable if leaders confined themselves in the common law courts to particular courts as they do in Chancery.

Mr. Lowe spoke at some length with reference to the conduct of unqualified persons in County Courts and police courts, as well in London as the country.

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A MEETING of this society was held at the Law
Library, Small-street, on Tuesday evening, the
18th inst., E. J. Swann, Esq., solicitor, occupied
the chair. The following subject was discussed:
"Was the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench
in the case of Roberts v. Humphreys (21 W. R.
885) well founded in view of previous decisions ?"
Mr. Foster opened in the affirmative, and was
opposed by Mr. Dymond. The question was
cided in the affirmative by a majority of one.

PETERBOROUGH ARTICLED CLERKS'
DEBATING SOCIETY.

Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday

Thursday
Friday.
Saturday

Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday

Thursday
Friday..
Saturday

At Lincoln's-inn.

Dec. 2 First Seal. Appeals.

3 Appeal motions and appeals
4 Appeals

5 Bankrupt appeals and appeals
6 Petitions in lunacy and appeal
petitious

8 Appeals

9 Ditto

10 Appeal motions and appeals 11 Second Seal. Appeals

12 Bankrupt appeals and appeals 13 Petitions in lunacy and appeal petitions

15 Appeals

16 Ditto

17 Appeal motions and appeals 18 Third Seal. Appeals

19 Bankrupt appeals and appeals 20 Petitions in lunacy and appeal petitions

The dars (if any) on which the Lords Justices shall be engaged in the Full Court or at the Judicial Comde-mittee of the Privy Council are excepted.

Tuesday.

Wednesday
Thursday

A MEETING of this society was held at the County Wednesday
Court, New-road, Peterborough, G. F. D. Gaches, Thursday
Esq., solicitor, in the chair. Mr. M. P. Grissell, Friday
opened in the affirmative: "An owner of lands in Saturday
fee simple, whose rents are payable half-yearly at
Michaelmas and Lady-day, dies in the month of Monday
August 1872, having made his will dated 1869,
whereby he devised his estates in Peterborough Tuesday
to A., and the residue of his real estate to B.
Are the executors entitled under the Apportion-
ment Act (33 & 34 Vict. 35) to receive from both
or either of the devisees at Michaelmas 1872, the
amount of the rent which shall have accrued due
in respect of the estates devised to them respec-
tively from Lady-day 1872 to the day of the
testator's death, as part of the personal estate of
the testator?" Mr. J. W. Smart replied in the
negative, and after a good discussion the affirma-
tive was carried by a majority of four.

LEGAL OBITUARY.

NOTE. This department of the LAW TIMES, is contributed
by EDWARD WALFORD, M.A., and late scholar of Balliol
College, Oxford, and Fellow of the Genealogical and
Historical Society of Great Britain; and, as it is desired
to make it as perfect a record as possible, the families and
friends of deceased members of the Profession will oblige
by forwarding to the LAW TIMES Office any dates and
materials required for a biographical notice.

A. H. WHITAKER, ESQ.

THE late Alfred Hanbury Whitaker, Esq., bar-
rister-at-law, who died on the 10th inst. at
Abbot's-walk, Reading, was the youngest son of
the late Edward Whitaker, Esq., of the Manor
House, Bampton, Oxon, and was born about the
year 1816. He was called to the Bar by the
Honourable Society of the Middle Temple in
Hilary Term 1844, and practised for some years as
a conveyancer at his chambers in Field-court,
Gray's-inn.

Mr. Charles Ford then rose to move the only resolution, which he said was intended to submit to the meeting, namely, "That it is expedient to establish a society to be called, 'The Legal Practitioners' Society,' for the purpose of reforming abuses in relation to the legal profession." He said he felt much pleasure in undertaking the office of honorary secretary, not only because such a society might certainly be made of use to the Profession, but also because he felt sure its operation would be of advantage to the public. This being a preliminary meeting it was not his intention to address them at any length; he would only refer, therefore, to one or two points. The depredations of unqualified persons upon the Profession was beyond question serious. The W. MILLS, ESQ. practical exclusion of solicitors from passing to THE late William Mills, Esq., barrister-at-law, the Bar was a great injustice, and he had received who died on the 23rd ult., at his residence in letters from the Lord Chancellor, the late At-Sackville-street, in the thirty-first year of his age, torney-General (Sir J. D. Coleridge), and the pre- was the eldest son of John Robert Mills, Esq., of sent Master of the Rolls, and others, admitting York, and was born in the year 1843. He was that the rules of the Inns of Court in this respect called to the Bar by the Honourable Society of required modification. He (Mr. Ford) felt strongly the Inner Temple in Hilary Term 1868, and pracon this subject, it was discreditable to the Bar and tised with considerable success as a special pleader an injustice to solicitors. Upon the subject of on the Midland Circuit. He also attended the the liability of counsel for negligence, he quite North Riding of Yorkshire Sessions, and also the agreed with the views entertained by Mr. Charles York City and Leeds Borough Sessions.

Friday.
Saturday

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday
Thursday

Friday
Saturday..

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At the Rolls, unopposed petitions must be presented, and copies left with the secretary, on or before the Thursday preceding the Saturday on which it is in. tended they should be heard.

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