antor was present when it was delivered, and knew of the purchase of goods which
the principal made under a contract contemplated by the guaranty, the guarantor's
acquaintance with the business of the principal, and his general knowledge respect-
ing the business transactions between the principal and the party to whom the guar-
anty is addressed, is admissible for the purpose of proving notice to the guarantor
of the acceptance of the guaranty, and of the transactions of the other parties
under it. Noyes & Co. v. Nichols, 159.
2. Notice to the guarantor of "about the amount of the advancements which
were made to the principal, on the credit of the guaranty, is all the notice which, in
this respect, need be given. Ib.
3. Technical rules are not to be resorted to in the construction of a guaranty,
where the meaning of the parties is plain and obvious Ib.
4. The defendant promised the plaintiffs that if they would furnish N. with mer-
chandise " upon commission or otherwise," the defendant would be accountable for
all N.'s contracts and engagements, and, if he did not fulfill them as agreed, the de-
fendant would guarantee the payment thereof. Held that the defendant was liable,
under such a guaranty, for merchandise which the plaintiffs made a direct and abso-
lute sale of to N. Ib.
5. Held, also, that, under such a guaranty, it was not necessary that the payment
should first be demanded of the principal, and notice of his default be given to the
guarantor, for the purpose of rendering him liable. Ib.
6. Where a guaranty is absolute and binds the surety to the fulfilment of the
principal's contract unconditionally and in general terms, no demand of payment of
the principal and notice of his default is necessary to charge the guarantor. Ib.
7. The defendant informed the plaintiffs that N. was desirous of obtaining goods
upon a credit, and guaranteed the fulfilment of N.'s agreements with the plaintiffs
according to his contracts. A contract was thereupon entered into by which the
plaintiffs agreed to furnish N. certain goods, to be paid for by him from time to
time, but with a provision that the goods should be owned by the plaintiffs until
they were paid for. Held, that this was a conditional sale upon credit, and within
the fair scope of the guaranty. Ib.
8. The contract provided that N. might pay for the goods in certain kinds of bar-
ter, and at the expiration of the year return the goods on hand at a certain dis-
count; and that his indebtedness under a former contract, for which the defendant
was liable under a previous guaranty, was first to be paid. Held, that these stipula-
tions not operating to the injury of the defendant, did not prevent or discharge his
liability; nor would it be affected by a want of notice of N.'s right to return the
goods. Ib.
9. The plaintiffs, after the default of N., attached (and sold his goods, including
those which they had sold him, and applied the avails in part satisfaction of their
claim; and they received from N. his note payable on demand, secured by mortgage
as collateral, and not to be credited until paid, and upon which nothing had been
paid; and they had also purchased, in the name of a third person, a prior mortgage
upon the same premises, and caused it to be foreclosed, but the time for its redemp-
tion had not expired. Held, that neither of these acts discharged or affected the lia-
bility of the defendant as guarantor. Ib.
10. The defendants and H. W. C. signed and delivered a writing of the following
tenor: "C. C. Trowbridge, Esq., President, Detroit, Michigan. R. H. & Co. are
"authorized to value upon us or either of us to the amount of $25,000, in such
"amounts and on such time as they may require, which will be duly honored, and
66 we hereby jointly and severally hold ourselves accountable for the acceptance and
"payment of such drafts."
Held, 1. That it might be shown by parol, that the writing was intended for the
plaintiffs of whom said Trowbridge was president.
2. That the writing bound all the signers to the payment of such drafts as might
be accepted by either of them.
3. That it was not answered by the acceptance and payment of drafts to the amount
of $25,000; but that it was a standing or continuing guaranty for that amount, the
parties themselves having so treated and practically construed it.
4. That it extended to and provided for the payment of drafts made payable else-
where than at the residence of the drawee, which had been accepted generally and
recognized, and were obviously conformable to the expectation of the parties.
Michigan State Bank v. Pecks, 200.
11. A person holden as surety on a letter of credit will be discharged if, without
his consent, after the maturity of the paper, for the payment of which he is holden,
the holder receive as collateral security for its payment another obligation with oth
er sureties payable at a future time. Michigan State Bank v. Est, of Leavenworth. 209.
12. The death of a person who has given a letter of credit authorizing another to
value on him to a certain amount for a limited period, and agreeing to accept the
drafts drawn, and pay them if not paid by the drawer at maturity, will operate as a
revocation of all authority to thereafter draw on him, though the person to whom,
and for whose security the letter was given, has no notice of the death, and the pe-
riod for which the authority is given is unexpired. Ib.
13. Such a letter of credit dated and given in this state to a person in Michigan,
specifying no place at which the drafts were to be made payable, will not bind the
signer to the acceptance or payment of drafts payable in New York; ISHAM, J. Ib.
(But see Same plaintiffs v. Pecks, 200.)
GUARDIAN, See PROBATE COURT, 6, 7.
1. The occupation of premises on the line of a highway for a period of twenty
years or more, without any paper title, affords no presumption, as matter of law,
that the possessor's title extends beyond the limits of his actual possession or to the
centre of the highway. Hatch v. Vt. C. R. Co., 142.
2. Nor can a person acquire a title to any portion of the highway by an occu-
pancy of it with his wagons and carriages and those of his customers, if such occu-
pancy is not adverse to the rights of the public, or under some other claim of right
to the premises as a highway. Ib.
3. A petition for the discontinuance of a highway, laid by the selectmen, but not
yet built, does not suspend or prevent their immediately proceeding with the build-
ing of the highway. Taft v. Pittsford, 286.
4. An appeal by a landowner from the laying of a highway vacates the previous
orders of the selectmen respecting it, and suspends all their operations and proceed-
ings for the purpose of building a road. Ib.
5. A person who has contracted to build a road laid by the selectmen, cannot pro-
ceed with his contract after he receives notice of such an appeal, and recover of the
town therefor. Ib.
6. Nor can he recover upon an order given by the selectmen for work performed
after receiving notice of such an appeal. Ib.
7. The order counted upon in the present case, held to have been given for such
work, and not in compromise of a claim for damages for such a termination of the
contract. Ib.
8. Ornament and the improvement of grounds about a public building, may be
taken into consideration and regarded in connection with the convenience and ne-
cessity of a proposed highway; but they do not alone constitute a sufficient basis for
establishing it. Woodstock v. Gallup, 587.
9. Upon a report of commissioners in favor of laying a highway, if the county
court do not proceed to consider and determine the case upon its merits, the ag-
grieved party may, upon a proper application, have a remedy in the supreme
court. Ib.
10. In an application therefor, a general prayer for such remedy as the court shall
deem proper is all that is necessary. Ib.
11. The plaintiff having, at the request of the defendant, who was one of the select-
men of the town of Windsor, taken the highway tax-bill of one of the districts in
said town, and having made expenditures of labor and money in the necessary re-
pairs of the highways in said district, to an amount largely exceeding all that he
was able to collect on said tax-bill, which he had been unable to recover of said
town; it was held that, upon the facts found and reported, the defendant had assumed
and was under no personal liability for the same. Stone v. Huggins, 617.
12. The defendant, for the purpose of widening a side-hill highway upon the plain-
tiff's land, drew stone and dumped them on the lower side of the road so that some
of them rolled down against and through the plaintiff's fence into his field. The
widening of the road was necessary, and was done in a proper and reasonable
manner, with the approval of the highway surveyor. Held, that the defendant
was not liable to the plaintiff in an action of trespass for so doing. Morse v. Wey-
mouth, 824.
1. The homestead of a deceased person is holden and liable for the same debts
which it was before his decease. It is not exempted from debts which accrued be-
fore its purchase, or before the first of December, 1850. Simonds et als., v. Estate of
Powers, 354.
2. The owner of a homestead, having a wife, may convey it by his own deed,
without his wife's joining in it, so as to vest in the grantee a superior title to that of
a subsequently attaching and levying creditor upon a demand which accrued before
the first of December, 1850, and as to whose claim the homestead was not exempted
from attachment. Howe v. Adams, 541.
3. An appeal lies from the decision of the probate court setting out a homestead
to the widow of a deceased person. True et als. v. Est. of Morrill. 672.
4. A piece of land which has a dwelling house upon it, occupied by a tenant, but
upon which the owner never resided, cannot be treated as his homestead within the
meaning of the statute, (Comp. Stat. ch. 65, § 1 and 4,) though he had no other
dwelling house, and may have contemplated living upon the premises at a future
time. Ib.
5. Nor can separate pieces of woodland from which the owner was accustomed to
obtain wood for his own use, or a piece of land occupied only by a shop, or a pew
in the meeting-house, be regarded as a homestead, or a part of it, within the mean-
ing of said statute. lb.
1. A husband is liable for property, suitable to his situation and circumstances in
life, which is procured by his wife while she is living with him, if, after knowledge
of the fact, he permit her to retain it; and especially where the person who fur-
nishes the property has reason to believe, from his previous dealings with the hus-
band, that the wife is authorized to contract for it. Gilman v. Andrus, 241.
2. The possession of a piece of land belonging to a feme covert, upon which she
and her husband reside, is a possession of the husband alone; and his acts and de-
clarations are admissible for the purpose of showing the character and extent of the
possession; in this case, to show that a piece of land which was fenced and
occupied with that of his wife, did not belong to her, but to an adjoining proprie
tor. Holton v. Whitney, 448.
3. The prima facie inference that a deed, taken to the wife of the person who pays
the consideration for it, was intended as a gift to her, may be rebutted and over-
come by parol proof to the contrary; and if this is done, a resulting trust will ex-
ist in favor of the husband. Wallace v. Bowens, 638.
4. In the present case, the orator having purchased and paid for a piece of land,
the deed of which was taken to his wife, and the proof being satisfactory that it was
not intended as an absolute gift to her; it was held that there was an implied or re-
sulting trust which a court of chancery would execute in his favor. Ib.
5. Semble. That if a husband had so taken the deed under a misapprehension as
to its legal operation, supposing that it would have the same effect as though taken
to himself and his wife jointly, a court of equity would be justified in compelling
the parties interested to allow it to have that operation. REDFIELD, CH. J. Ib.
6. In a deed from a husband and wife, executed while our statute required the
acknowledgement by the wife to be made by her separately from her husband, it should
'appear in the certificate of acknowledgement that it was so acknowledged by her.
If it does not, the deed will be inoperative and void, as against the wife. Pratt v.
Battels, 685.
7. The possesion of land taken under a deed from a husband and wife, without a
certificate of such an acknowledgement by the wife, will not be adverse to her rights
while she remains under coverture. The statute of limitations will commence run-
ning against her only from the death of her husband. Ib.
8. The choses in action of a feme covert, in this state, who dies intestate and
without issue, which had not been reduced to possession by her husband, are to be
distributed to her collateral heirs, to whom her real estate, if she had any would de-
scend, and not to her husband. Heirs of Holmes v. Admr. of Holmes, 765.
9. The fact that such choses in action were all the property that the wife possessed,
and that she, before the marriage, so informed her husband, and that he, at her de-
sire, procured her wedding dress and other wedding preparations, and was at the
whole expense of furnishing the house, and that, after the marriage, she handed the
notes to her husband, who took them and kept them with his other papers, do not
constitute a reducing of them to the possession of the husband, or give him any
valid lien upon them. Ib.
1. A note is void which is given, either wholly or in part, for the purpose of pro
curing the suppression of a prosecution for an offence of a public nature, involving
moral turpitude, and affecting the public morals and example. Bowen et al. v. Buck
et al., 308.
2. A note is also void which is procured by a representation that such a prosecu-
tion has been commenced and an agreement to stop it, even if such a representation
was false, if it was believed and acted upon by the opposite party. 16.
3. If the pretended prosecution was for obtaining goods by fale pretences from
the payee of the note, it will make no difference, in this respect, as to its validity,
that it was given only for the value of the goods obtained, and for only the amount
of the debt justly due therefor from the person who obtained them. Ib.
INDIFFERENT PERSON, See JUSTICE 7; PROCESS 3.
INCEST, See CRIMINAL LAW 1, 2.
1. A justice judgment against a minor is valid, and cannot be set aside on account
of his infancy, if his father and natural guardian was sued jointly with him, and
appeared and defended the suit. Wrisleys v. Kenyon, 5.
INJUNCTION, See CHANCERY 9, 10, 11.
1. Leaving a horse with an inn-keeper does not render him liable, as such, for the
keeping of a bag of gold or other dead property delivered to him by the owner of
the horse during the time the horse is kept, if the owner is not personally a guest,
and the delivery of the property is a distinct transaction, disconnected in considera-
tion, and in fact, from the delivery and keeping of the horse. McDaniels v. Robin-
387.
1. Interest upon a debt, payable on demand, will be allowed, after a demand, by
way of damage for the delay; and the law will imply a contract to pay it. Gleason
v. Briggs, 135.
1. The respondent, a citizen of New Hampshire, having his only place of business
in that state, there contracted to sell to a resident in this state a part of a cask of
brandy, which was then in this state in transitu from New York to New Hampshire.
The purchaser, by permission of the respondent, obtained the cask from the railroad
depot in this state, where it then was, and took it to his residence, where he was to
take from it what he wanted and carry the cask with what remained to the respond-
ent's store in New Hampshire, where the quantity taken was to be ascertained by a
measurement of that which remained, and be there paid for. Held, that this consti-
tuted an offence against the act of 1852 to prevent the traffic in intoxicating liquors.
State v. Comings, 508.
2. The conviction of a person for being a common seller of intoxicating liquor is
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